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FOREWORD BY THE HON. LORD WOOLMAN  
SENATOR OF THE COLLEGE OF JUSTICE 
 
 
Over the course of my career I have found one general truth: all branches of the law 
are fascinating. Each topic presents its own degree of intellectual interest. Our task 
as lawyers involves analysing the law and the facts. To find the right solution in an 
individual case, however, the analysis requires to be tempered. We may have to take 
account of human frailties, of financial considerations, of moral and policy factors. 
The articles in this volume cover a wide range of topics, from agricultural tenancies 
to homicide. Each one is an absorbing read. The authors write with cogency and 
clarity. It is difficult to achieve that effect. JK Galbraith said that his prose only 
appeared spontaneous after the eighth draft. So I congratulate the authors on both 
their industry and their scholarship. 
 
                                 Stephen Woolman 
February 2017 
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The Fifth Element: Should Exclusive Possession Be 
Considered an Essential Requirement for the 
Constitution of a Contract of Lease in Scots Law? 
 
MITCHELL SKILLING* 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Historically, opinions have varied on whether exclusive possession or occupation of heritable subjects 
was an essential factor for a contract to be considered a valid lease. However, recent developments 
increasingly appear to suggest that this is correct. This is especially so in the context of the residential 
sector, though some doubt also exists in the agricultural sector. The two main arguments for this 
stance are that it promotes legal certainty and that the increased protection granted by security of 
tenure ought to be more difficult to access. However, this does not mesh well with the broad nature of 
the Scottish lease, especially considering the material differences that can exist between a residential 
lease under a statutory regime and a lease at common law. Accordingly, the article concludes by 
proposing an alternative approach to exclusivity more consistent with the spirit of the Scots law lease. 
 
Keywords: Lease, Licence, Exclusive Possession, Residential Tenancy, Security of Tenure  
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Scots law has long recognised the contract of lease, whereby a person known as a 
tenant gains the right to occupy another person’s land for a set period of time in 
exchange for a consideration known as rent.1 The Leases Act 1449, which establishes 
the circumstances in which a lease at common law may give the tenant a real right 
against a landlord’s singular successor, shows that a common law lease has existed 
in Scotland since the days of feudalism. 
Over time, leases have increased in variety and complexity. New social 
pressures have created a social rented sector that has developed alongside older 
methods of private renting, commercial leases and agricultural leases. Contracts for 
certain rights in relation to land usage, such as those relating to fishing and shooting, 
have also been recognised as leases in Scots law,2 leading Rankine to comment that 
the concept of a lease runs far broader in Scotland than it does south of the border.3 
In more recent times, the various Rent Acts and Housing Acts have created a 
                                                 
* LLB (Hons) Law with Spanish Language Graduate, University of Aberdeen (2016). The author 
would like to thank Kieran Buxton for his invaluable assistance during the editing process of this 
article. 
1 A McAllister, Scottish Law of Leases (4th edn, Bloomsbury Professional 2013) 3.  
2 See, for example: Macpherson v Macpherson (1839) 1 D 794; G Paton and J Cameron, Law of Landlord 
and Tenant in Scotland (W Green 1967) 73-84.  
3 J Rankine, A Treatise on the Law of Leases in Scotland (3rd edn, Bell & Bradfute 1916) 2. See, in this 
regard, Clapperton v Edinburgh Magistrates (1840) 2 D 1385.  
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number of statutory tenancy regimes into which a contract may fall, 4  offering 
protection for those who can prove that their contract meets the requirements of a 
lease for the purposes of that statute. 
Traditionally, a contract of lease is considered to comprise four essential 
requirements: two or more different parties to the contract, heritable property to 
form the subject of the contract, a set period of time for the contract to be in force 
over (or a definite ‘ish’ or end date), and a price, usually in money, to constitute 
rent. 5  There is also a fifth element that is often considered when determining 
whether a contract is a lease: whether or not the tenant has exclusive possession of 
the property.6 In the law of leases, this term is taken to refer specifically to exclusive 
possession vis-à-vis the landlord, who will have no right to retain any part of the let 
property unless such a right is provided for in the contract,7 which is why multiple 
tenants under the same lease agreement can still be regarded as exclusive possessors 
of the leased property. 8  However, multiple apparent tenants under separate 
agreements regarding the same subjects would not be in exclusive possession, and 
indeed such a state of affairs would be impermissible under the original lease 
contract due to the landlord’s implied obligation not to derogate from the initial 
grant.9 The ‘exclusive possession’ factor arises most frequently when the courts are 
called upon to distinguish between a lease and contracts that fall short of being a 
lease, most often referred to as licence agreements.10 This distinction is particularly 
important in the context of commercial leases, which are largely governed by 
contract law.11  
Exclusive possession is an essential requirement of a contract of lease in 
English law. 12  By contrast, Scots law points to exclusive possession as being a 
normal, but not yet cardinal, feature of a contract of lease.13 That is despite earlier 
cases, especially Conway v Glasgow City Council,14 giving the impression that Scots 
law may be moving towards viewing exclusive possession as an essential 
requirement of a contract of lease.  
This article considers the context within which exclusive possession currently 
exists under Scots law and considers arguments for and against exclusive possession 
as an essential requirement for the creation of a contract of lease. At the same time, 
consideration is paid to a distinct, but closely related, issue: whether the presence of 
exclusive possession is not only essential for the constitution of a contract of lease 
but, together with the four traditional requirements (parties, property, ish and rent) 
                                                 
4 See, for example: Rent (Scotland) Act 1984, s 1; Housing (Scotland) Act 2001, s 11 (H(S)A 2001).  
5 Paton and Cameron (n 2) 5-8; McAllister (n 1) 34-38. 
6 See, for example: Brador Properties Ltd v British Telecom Plc 1992 SC 12; Conway v Glasgow City Council 
1999 Hous LR 20.  
7 Baxter v Paterson (1843) 5 D 1074; McAllister (n 1) 62.  
8 McAllister (n 1) 34. 
9 ibid 62 
10 Brador (n 6); Conway (n 6).  
11 McAllister (n 1) 235. 
12 Street v Mountford [1985] 1 AC 809, 816 (Lord Templeman). 
13 South Lanarkshire Council v Taylor [2005] CSIH 6, 2005 1 SC 182 [7] (Opinion of the Court); Cameron v 
Alexander 2012 SLCR 50 [58]-[59] (Opinion of the Court).  
14 Conway (n 6). 
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decisive to that end. Does the presence of these five elements guarantee the existence 
of a contract of lease, or is even this arrangement, this seemingly strong, clear-cut 
example of a contract of lease, vulnerable to the contrary inference that no contract of 
lease was intended? Simply stated, where a contract permits the occupier of the 
property exclusive possession thereof, can this ever be interpreted as something 
other than a lease contract if, exclusive possession notwithstanding, it can be 
concluded that the parties did not intend their contract to be a lease? These two 
issues (whether exclusive possession is necessary and, secondly, whether it is 
decisive) are distinct, but they are also two sides of the same coin. Both relate to the 
tension that can arise between the labels that two parties use to describe their 
agreement (e.g. ‘landlord and tenant’ or ‘licensor and licensee’) and the rights and 
duties to which that agreement actually gives expression (e.g. ‘exclusive possession’). 
It is largely for that reason that these two issues (whether exclusive possession is 
essential and whether it is decisive) are considered together in this article. For the 
sake of simplicity, however, both issues shall generally be couched in the language 
of the first issue: whether exclusive possession should be deemed ‘essential’ for the 
constitution of a contract of lease.  
This article establishes what the case law is able to tell us about these matters 
and what the prevailing academic opinions associated with the subject are. Having 
examined the merits and demerits of having exclusive possession as an essential 
requirement, it also proposes some possible alternatives to this position that could be 
more consonant with the principles of Scots law.  
 
 
2. The Established Law 
 
A. Background  
 
A lease at common law is, ‘a contract of location by which the use of land or any 
other immoveable subject is let for a period of time to the [tenant] in consideration of 
a determinate rent or duty to be paid or performed to the [landlord] either in money, 
the fruits of the ground or services,’15 with the term being used interchangeably 
between the contract itself and the rights associated therewith. At its most basic 
level, a lease is merely a contract between two parties: the original landlord and 
tenant. Consequently it does not, in itself, confer any protection or security of tenure 
on the tenant should the leasing party dispose of their property. This derives from 
the original non-sasine nature of leases, which, in feudal law, prevented them from 
being enforceable against singular successors.16 The Leases Act 1449 introduced a 
method of turning the tenant’s personal right into a real right enforceable against 
such a singular successor, paving the way for later statutory regimes to offer similar 
protection. It reads: 
 
Item it is ordanit for the sauftie and fauour of the pure pepil that labouris the grunde 
that thai and al vthiris that has takyn or sal tak landis in tym to cum fra lordis and 
                                                 
15 Paton and Cameron (n 2) 5. 
16 Craig, Jus Feudale II,7,28. 
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has termes and yeris thereof that suppose the lordis sel or analy thai landis that the 
takaris sall remayn with thare takis on to the ische of thare termes quhais handis at 
euir thai landis cum to for sic lik male as thai tuk thaim of befoir[.]17 
 
Despite its brevity, the Act encapsulates all of the essential requirements of a real 
right of lease. In addition to containing the four requirements for a contract of lease, it 
is the fifth element of possession, introduced by the Act, that converts the tenant’s 
personal right into a real right enforceable against singular successors. It should be 
noted, however, that it is an implied term of a contract of lease (hence, a term that 
only arises upon the classification of that contract as a lease by reference to the 
essential requirements of such a contract) that the landlord is obliged to grant the 
tenant exclusive possession of the subjects on the agreed date of entry.18 That said, 
certain reservations are allowed.19 A landlord might, for example, reserve the right 
to park a car within the area leased.20  
 As illustrated above, on this view at common law, the right to exclusive 
possession arises from the conclusion of a contract of lease, as traditionally 
understood according to the four aforementioned requirements. This is distinct from 
viewing an express right to exclusive possession as constituting a fifth essential 
requirement for the contract to be classified as a lease. This implied term also deters 
landlords from avoiding the consequences of the 1449 Act, lest they argue that the 
tenant has not yet obtained exclusive possession. In other words, the tenant must 
have exclusive possession to obtain a real right under the 1449 Act,21 and he or she 
enjoys an implied right to obtain such possession under an antecedent contract. 
Failure to provide exclusive possession at the date of entry will provide the 
incoming tenant with a contractual claim for breach of the implied term.  
 
B. Role of Exclusive Possession in the Leases Act 1449 
 
The wording of the 1449 Act clearly indicates that it will come into effect only when 
the land has been, ‘taken or shall [be taken] in time’. This offered retroactive 
protection to current tenants as well as extending that protection to those who 
would, at the time of the enactment, form contracts of lease in the future, something 
that the courts have always upheld unambiguously. The reasoning behind this was 
best explained by Lord President Cooper in Millar v McRobbie: 
 
It has been well settled for centuries that possession under a lease is the 
equivalent of sasine in relation to feudal property. Without possession the 
tenant is merely the personal creditor of the [landlord]. By entering into 
                                                 
17 Translation from McAllister (n 1) 40: ‘It is ordained for the safety and favour of the poor people that 
labour the ground that they and all others that have taken or shall take lands in time that come from 
lords and have terms and years thereof, that suppose the lords sell or alienate these lands, that the 
tenants shall remain with their leases until the end of their terms, no matter into whose hands that 
ever the lands come to, for the same rent as they took them for before.’ 
18 Rankine (n 3) 200; Paton and Cameron (n 2) 127. 
19 ibid. 
20 Cameron (n 13) [59] (Opinion of the Court). 
21 As interpreted in Millar v McRobbie 1949 SC 1, 8 (Lord President Cooper). 
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possession the [tenant] publishes to the world in general, and to singular 
successors in particular, the fact of his lease[.]22 
 
In this case, an incoming tenant entered into possession of parts of a farm before the 
starting date of his lease in order to prepare the ground and he argued that this 
constituted the conversion of his lease into a real right. This argument was rejected 
by the Court of Session, which held that a real right of lease could not come into 
existence without exclusive possession. 23  As such, it can be said that exclusive 
possession is vital to converting a mere personal right under a contract of lease into a 
real right under the 1449 Act.  
 
C. Exclusive Possession and Security of Tenure 
 
The various Housing Acts that apply to the public and private rented 
accommodation sectors in Scotland define ‘tenancies’ in a different way from a 
contract of lease, as traditionally understood.24 These Acts are responsible for the 
creation of Scottish secure tenancies in the public sector and assured tenancies in the 
private sector, although not all private rented accommodation will attract the 
protection of an assured tenancy. 25  In many circumstances, a contract for a 
residential statutory tenancy will still resemble a lease capable of becoming a real 
right using the 1449 Act, for it will possess the essential requirements for doing so. 
As such, exclusive possession still fulfils the role of conferring a real right upon a 
tenant who falls within one of the various statutory regimes.  
There are, however, circumstances where a residential statutory tenancy may 
not resemble the requirements of the 1449 Act but still fall within the ambit of one of 
the Housing Acts. The Housing (Scotland) Act 2001 construes a tenancy as, ‘an 
agreement under which a house is made available for human habitation,’ with 
related terms such as ‘lease’ to be interpreted accordingly.26 This terminology was 
broadly shared by its 1987 predecessor,27 and by its private sector counterpart.28 
These types of tenancy grant security of tenure as long as the aforementioned 
statutory definitions are met, with no need to meet the four essential requirements of 
a contract of lease. 29  The most common types of tenancy that do not meet the 
common law requirements but still fulfil the definitions of the Housing Acts are 
agreements with no fixed duration or rent.30  
                                                 
22 ibid 6 (Lord President Cooper). 
23 ibid 8 (Lord President Cooper). 
24 See text to n 5. 
25 The Private Housing (Tenancies) (Scotland) Act 2016 introduces a new form of statutory tenancy, 
and dispenses with the current assured tenancy regime.   
26 H(S)A 2001, s 41. 
27 Housing (Scotland) Act 1987, s 82 (H(S)A 1987). 
28 Housing (Scotland) Act 1988, s 12 (H(S)A 1988). 
29 McAllister (n 1) 462. 
30 For an example of the latter see Andrew v North Lanarkshire Council (Lands Tribunal for Scotland, 1 
June 2011) <www.lands-tribunal-scotland.org.uk/decisions/LTS.TR.2010.10.html> accessed 12 
February 2016. 
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In these tenancies, the role of exclusive possession is that of an implied 
prerequisite to meeting the definition of ‘house’, which, in both the social and 
private rented sector is defined as a building or part of a building intended to be 
occupied ‘as a separate dwelling’.31 Additionally, there is a requirement that the 
tenant be an individual. 32  Taken together, these three factors provide a strong 
inference that the tenant will be required to show exclusive possession in order to 
claim security of tenure. This is more explicit in assured tenancy cases where the 
tenant shares part of their accommodation with someone other than their landlord, 
as they will only have an assured tenancy if they have exclusive occupation of some 
part of the accommodation.33  
The powerful influence that exclusive possession can have on statutory 
tenancies was highlighted by the decision of the House of Lords in Uratemp Ventures 
Ltd v Collins.34  Although this was an English case, the wording of the relevant 
statutory provision is nearly identical to that of the equivalent Scottish statute;35 
hence this case can be considered a highly persuasive authority on the construction 
of the latter. Here, a long-term hotel resident was able to claim an assured tenancy of 
his room because he had exclusive possession thereof and used it as his principal 
home. The absence of any cooking facilities was deemed irrelevant, because the 
Housing Act was intended, ‘to protect people in the occupation of their homes, not 
to encourage them to cook their own meals.’36 
For the purposes of Agricultural Holdings Act tenancies, a lease is defined as, 
‘a letting of land for a term of years, or for lives, or for lives and years, or from year 
to year.’37 As a practical point, someone claiming to be an agricultural tenant would 
want to rely, first and foremost, on the statutory security of tenure provisions.38 By 
all means, it would be possible, in theory, for them to rely on the 1449 Act; nay, the 
1449 Act was expressly targeted at those who work the land (labouris the grunde). 
However, given the more lenient criteria typifying the statutory regimes (which do 
not prescribe the same four requirements applicable to a contract of lease at common 
law),39 there is unlikely to be any case in which the 1449 Act would be useful to the 
intending agricultural tenant. Those preliminary points aside, the key point to note 
is, once again, how important a role exclusive possession plays in the context of 
agricultural tenancies. In Clydesdale Bank plc v Davidson,40 Lord Hope of Craighead 
confirmed that exclusive possession was necessary to claim security of tenure under 
a 1991 Act tenancy.41 This position is unlikely to have changed for the purposes of 
                                                 
31 H(S)A 1988, s 12(1); H(S)A 2001, s 11(1)(a). See Uratemp Ventures Ltd v Collins [2001] UKHL 43, 
[2002] 1 AC 301 [57]-[58] (Lord Millett) and, by analogy, in the context of an English statute, 
Westminster City Council v Clarke [1992] 2 AC 288, 300-302 (Lord Templeman).  
32 H(S)A 1988, s 12(1)(a); H(S)A 2001, s 11(1)(c).  
33 H(S)A 1988, s 14(1). 
34 Uratemp (n 31).  
35 Housing Act 1988, s 1. Cf H(S)A 1988, s 12. 
36 Uratemp (n 31) [57] (Lord Millett). 
37 Agricultural Holdings (Scotland) Act 1991 s 85(1). The Agricultural Holdings (Scotland) Act 2003, s 
1(1) (AH(S)A 2003) implies that this definition still applies to new agricultural tenancies. 
38 ibid.  
39 ibid. 
40 1998 SC (HL) 51. 
41 ibid 54 (Lord Hope of Craighead). 
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the Agricultural Holdings (Scotland) Act 2003, given that the latter preserves the 
definitions from the 1991 Act.42 As such, it can be stated with some certainty that the 
role played by exclusive possession in agricultural holdings cases is similar to its role 
in statutory residential tenancies. 
 
D. Other Types of Lease 
 
In most other types of lease (that is, those contracts not falling within one of the 
aforementioned statutory regimes), exclusive possession will be relevant for the 
purposes of the 1449 Act. However, there are some types of lease to which the 1449 
Act does not apply: notably, long leases of twenty or more years.43 In these cases, 
registration is equivalent to possession, and so will suffice to confer a real right upon 
the tenant.44 Having already been afforded a real right, the tenant will not need to 
demonstrate exclusive possession of the subject. Quite apart from possession no 
longer being necessary, it is no longer possible to create a real right in a long lease via 
the 1449 Act: this can only be achieved by means of registration.45  
In addition, there are some contracts of lease to which the 1449 Act does apply 
but which, exceptionally, do not require actual exclusive possession for the creation 
of a real right. The Land Tenure Reform (Scotland) Act 1974 legalised the interposed 
lease in Scotland, which is a lease granted by a landlord to a new tenant whilst the 
original tenant’s lease continues to subsist.46 The new tenant is interposed between 
the parties to the original lease and becomes the head tenant and effective landlord 
to the original tenant, now a subtenant of the interposed tenant.47 One of the effects 
of such a lease is that the head tenant is legally deemed to have entered into 
possession of the leased subject,48 thus claiming a real right under the 1449 Act 
whilst side-stepping the need for factual exclusive possession, which will typically 
remain with the subtenant.49 
Scots law also recognises as leases a number of contracts relating to sporting 
rights, for instance fishing and shooting rights.50 The applicability of the 1449 Act to 
these contracts is a subjective matter, dependent upon the particular wording of the 
contract under consideration. The safest way to achieve a real right in such cases 
appears to be to form a contract for the lease of land for the purposes of the activity 
(e.g. shooting or fishing) rather than a contract simply relating to the activity itself, 
as the courts have generally held the latter type of contract incapable of conferring a 
real right.51 In Farquharson,52 which concerned the leasing of part of the estate of 
                                                 
42 AH(S)A 2003, s 1(1). Note, also, the absence of ‘lease’ from s 93. 
43 Registration of Leases (Scotland) Act 1857, s 20B (RL(S)A 1857), inserted by Land Registration etc. 
(Scotland) Act 2012, s 52. 
44 RL(S)A 1857, s 16(1). 
45 ibid s 20C. 
46 Land Tenure Reform (Scotland) Act 1974, s17(1) (LTR(S)A 1974). 
47 ibid s 17(2). 
48 ibid s 17(1)-(2).  
49 ibid s 17(1); McAllister (n 1) 176. 
50 Paton and Cameron (n 2) 73-84. 
51 Pollock, Gilmour & Co v Harvey (1828) 6 S 913. 
52 Farquharson (1870) 9 M 66. 
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Invercauld for shooting, the Lord President stated that it was material to observe 
that the tenant, ‘[had], or [was] intended to have, under this lease the exclusive 
occupation of the ground.’53  
 
E. Summary 
 
This section has demonstrated that an implied term of a contract of lease, as 
traditionally understood, is that exclusive possession must be granted to the tenant 
at the date of entry. It has also established that exclusive possession is generally 
required to elevate a common law contract of lease to a real right under the 1449 Act. 
The notion of exclusive possession also plays a role, albeit sometimes in a 
roundabout, incidental way, if a contract of lease is to attract security of tenure 
under one of the various statutory regimes. From this, it is clear that exclusive 
possession still plays a key role in allowing a tenant to obtain a real right of lease (or 
analogous security of tenure). However, none of this is necessarily to imply that 
exclusive possession is an essential requirement for the classification of a contract as 
one of lease. 
 
 
3. Opinions Regarding the Role of Exclusive Possession 
 
Aside from being used to determine whether a lease confers a real right, it has often 
been argued that exclusive possession is a factor in distinguishing between a 
contract of lease and a lesser form of contract known as a licence agreement. This 
practice began in earnest with a series of cases in the 1920s and then arose again in 
the 1990s, where it was compared, in greater detail, to the related English law. Since 
the turn of the millennium, the issue has arisen infrequently, so there is no modern 
case that can be said to have resolved it definitively. Instead, two approaches to the 
problem have developed, each of which focuses on a different aspect of leasing. The 
first is an intention-based approach that focuses on comparing the factual 
circumstances with what the contract implies they should be; the second approach 
focuses purely on the nature of the rights held by the tenant under the express terms 
of the contract relating to the property. In the twenty-first century, it appears that the 
second approach has become the dominant one, with the first playing a limited role 
in the prevention of attempts to subvert contractual terms by creating a weaker 
licence agreement. The relevant case law is considered below. 
Before proceeding, it is important to address two definitional issues. The first 
is that there is no official statutory definition of a licence agreement. For the 
purposes of this analysis, reference will be made to the definition provided by Paton 
and Cameron, which states that a licence is, ‘a contract, falling short of a lease, 
whereby not the heritage itself but a right to use a particular part of it or to put a 
particular part of it to some use is granted.’54 From this definition, the possible utility 
of exclusive possession as a distinguishing factor is made clear, since the spirit of the 
Scottish licence appears to exclude control of the whole of the subject. A model 
                                                 
53 ibid 69 (Lord President Glencorse). 
54 Paton and Cameron (n 2) 12. 
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example of a licence that highlights the situational use of such a right is a football 
season ticket, defined as, ‘a licence giving access to and egress from the allocated 
seat and a right to occupy that seat when matches are played.’55 
The second term requiring clarification is ‘exclusive possession’. The term 
‘exclusive possession’ may appear below in contexts referring to what is provided in 
the contract or whether the tenant enjoys exclusive possession as a matter of fact.56 
Thus, the simple case of ‘exclusive possession’ is where the owner of property 
expressly grants to the occupier of his property a right to exclusive possession. On 
the other hand, the owner of property may stipulate in the contract between him and 
the occupier that the occupier does not have a right to exclusive possession, and that 
the owner is free to come and go as he likes. Even so, if it is clear that the landlord 
does not, and does not plan to, act on that right, the occupier may be deemed to have 
exclusive possession as a matter of reality. For current purposes, these two 
understandings of exclusive possession are examined side-by-side.  
 
A. Early Twentieth Century Cases 
 
The first significant case on whether a contract is a lease or a licence is United 
Kingdom Advertising Co v Glasgow Bag-Wash Laundry.57 This case related to a contract 
for the display of advertising in part of a post-office that the advertising company 
had the right to use. At issue was the precise nature of that right. The laundry 
defended the action for payment by stating that the contract that they had was a 
lease. This was in their interests as, if categorised as a lease, the contract would be 
unenforceable due to its failure to comply with formalities of proof specifically 
applicable to leases. The Inner House held that the contract did not amount to a 
lease, with the Lord President stating that, ‘prima facie that contract bears no 
resemblance to a lease of heritable property. It is not a contract by which possession 
is given, as to a tenant, of any of the post-offices or of any part of them.’58 This was 
supported by Lord Hunter, who stated:  
 
There is at the best a licence to exhibit advertisements in certain post-offices 
subject to certain conditions. That gives the licensees no exclusive right of 
possession of any part of the post-offices for any purpose whatever. It gives 
them merely a limited personal right.59 
  
                                                 
55 Joint Administrators of Rangers Football Club plc, Noters [2012] CSOH 55, 2012 SLT 599 [30] (Lord 
Hodge). 
56 Although there is a general rule against construing a contract by reference to subsequent conduct, 
this has been noted as possible in the present context where there is an ambiguity: Scottish Residential 
Estates Development Co Ltd v Henderson 1991 SLT 490, 491-2 (Lord Dunpark). See, generally, W 
McBryde, The Law of Contract in Scotland (3rd edn, W Green 2007) paras 8.30-8.31. For an analysis of 
the English approach in this context, see ACL Davies, ‘Sensible Thinking About Sham Transactions’ 
(2009) 38(3) ILJ 318, 320-22. 
57 1926 SC 303. 
58 ibid 306 (Lord President Clyde). 
59 ibid 307 (Lord Hunter). 
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From this, it appears that, at the very least, the Inner House considered exclusive 
possession to be a feature absent from licences. In other words, a licence was a lesser 
personal right because it would not have been possible to convert this into a real 
right under the 1449 Act. This position would be further explored in a series of 
valuation cases starting with Broomhill Motor Co v Assessor for Glasgow.60 Broomhill 
concerned agreements relating to the occupation of lock-up garages. The occupants 
were provided with keys, but the owners were permitted under the agreement to 
enter the premises for inspection and cleaning purposes. This arrangement was 
described by the Court of Session as, ‘a temporary allocation of space for a limited 
purpose and for a limited time.’61 It did not involve a parting with the occupation of 
the heritage on the part of the proprietors. In contrast, Chaplin v Assessor for Perth62 
established that the contracts in question, whereby garages were rented out by an 
individual with no connections to the motor trade by oral agreement (terminable 
upon a week’s notice), were leases. The key factor distinguishing Broomhill from 
Chaplin was that, in the latter case, no services were performed by the garage owner, 
nor were there provisions in the contract sanctioning such use of the property.63 In 
other words, the occupiers of the garages in that case had been afforded exclusive 
possession thereof.  
These two cases, along with United Kingdom Advertising Co, used objective 
criteria to determine whether or not a lease existed. This makes their use of exclusive 
possession understandable given that it can clearly indicate who is the user of the 
heritage in question. If the purported landlord still has a significant amount of access 
to the property, it follows that the other party will be more a limited occupier than a 
tenant. From these cases alone, it would appear that the courts place value on 
exclusive possession in distinguishing leases from licence agreements. However, 
certain cases decided in the late twentieth century appear to follow an alternative 
route. 
 
B. Late Twentieth Century Cases 
  
One case to adopt a different approach to the lease-licence distinction was that of 
Brador Properties Ltd v British Telecom Plc.64 Here an attempt was made by a tenant to 
subvert a prohibition against subletting in a lease by entering into an agreement with 
the features of a lease but language suggesting that it was a licence. The tenant 
argued that there was no sub-lease because the alleged sub-tenant did not enjoy 
exclusive possession of the subjects under the disputed agreement; in this regard, the 
tenant relied on the English authority of Street v Mountford.65 The Lord Justice-Clerk 
stated that Street was of no assistance in the current matter because it only related to 
the law of England.66 This indicates a rejection of exclusive possession as a deciding 
                                                 
60 1927 SC 447. 
61 ibid 454 (Lord Hunter). 
62 1947 SC 373. 
63 ibid 379 (Lord Russell). 
64 1992 SC 12. 
65 Street (n 12). 
66 Brador (n 6) 19 (Lord Justice-Clerk Ross). 
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factor in distinguishing between a lease and licence.67 Instead, the Lord Justice-Clerk 
stated that the agreement itself must be closely scrutinised and that the court was 
entitled to consider whether the purpose of the agreement was to defeat the 
provision against subletting in the original contract of lease when reaching a 
conclusion as to the nature of the new contract.68 It was therefore held that the 
agreement in question amounted to a sub-let impermissible under the original 
contract of lease.69 
The possible emergence of an intention-based test, in place of a more objective 
test involving exclusive possession, is also supported by the earlier case of Scottish 
Residential Estates Development Co Ltd v Henderson.70 Here, a property development 
company allowed a woman to occupy a cottage for an indefinite period of time. 
When they subsequently asked her to vacate it, she refused on the grounds that her 
agreement with them constituted a lease: all the essential elements existed bar a 
definite ish, which would be inferred by the court if the other elements were present, 
a position supported by the case of Gray v Edinburgh University.71 In the court’s 
opinion, Lord Dunpark stated: 
 
As appears from Gray, before an ish may be inferred, there must be a lease 
and that means that the terms of this offer and acceptance must be such as to 
constitute a lease and nothing other than a lease. In our opinion that depends 
upon whether on a sound construction of these documents the pursuers 
intended to create a tenancy in favour of the defender and the defender 
accepted occupation of this cottage qua tenant[.]72 
 
The opinion went on to state that the only reasonable construction of the offer was to 
view it as a contract for the use of the property until the developers needed it, and 
that this could not amount to a lease.73 However, were this case to be examined 
without taking the intentions of the parties into account, all of the essential 
requirements of a lease could be seen, counsel for the pursuers having accepted the 
payment of repair bills and an obligation to maintain the surrounding woodlands as 
rent,74 and it being possible to infer an ish using the aforementioned principle in 
Gray v Edinburgh University. 
Both Brador and Scottish Residential Estates support the proposition that the 
intention of the contracting parties ought to be the court’s primary concern in 
determining the existence of a lease or licence, rather than the presence or absence of 
a right to exclusive possession under the contract. In Scottish Residential Estates, the 
defender exclusively occupied the cottage,75 yet the missives between the two parties 
did not amount to a lease. To have held this would have been to frustrate the 
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intentions of the developers, who had simply made a goodwill gesture while they 
did not need the land themselves. In Brador, accepting the defender’s propositions 
would have defeated the purpose of the contractual provisions agreed to by both 
parties under the original contract of lease. These cases both create a strong 
argument for disregarding exclusive possession as a litmus test, on the grounds that 
it would limit parties’ freedom to contract. For example, if A allowed B to occupy an 
unused second home that A owned for a fee until B found suitable alternative 
accommodation, that agreement could be converted into a real right of lease by 
inferring an ish of one year, thereby completely disregarding the parties’ original 
intentions and forcing the obligations of a landlord upon A. Additionally, in cases 
similar to Brador, where a tenant appears to be giving a lesser right to a third party, 
the original contract of lease between the tenant and landlord could be undermined 
if the tenant confers too great a right on the third party (i.e. a sub-lease), whether he 
or she does so inadvertently or by design.  
 
C. The 1999 hostel cases 
  
In 1999, two cases regarding hostel accommodation raised the issue of exclusive 
possession. The first of these, Conway v Glasgow City Council,76 concerned a woman 
who was evicted from her hostel accommodation without notice as a result of an 
alleged incident that took place earlier that same day. She claimed that she had a 
common law tenancy and therefore required reasonable notice before she could be 
evicted. Esto, it was argued that, even if she were not a tenant, the Rent (Scotland) 
Act 1984 would prevent the termination of her occupancy without notice.77 The 
Sheriff was unconvinced by the argument that the pursuer was a tenant. Counsel for 
the defender argued that exclusive possession was an essential condition of a 
contract of lease, distinguishing the arguments in Brador that suggested otherwise. 
This was based on the ground that no issue was taken in that case as to the supposed 
requirement of exclusive possession and that, instead, Brador was concerned with the 
question of what needed to be exclusively possessed. 78  Sheriff Gordon was 
persuaded by these arguments: 
 
Similarly, the law has come increasingly to talk of exclusive possession as a 
necessary condition of a lease, as can be seen in the Brador case itself and in 
other cases such as Chaplin and the Commercial Components case, where, 
whatever the sheriff may have been prepared to infer, the sheriff principal 
said that exclusive possession of the subjects was one of the badges of a lease. 
Counsel for the pursuer, of course, says that this applies only to leases 
covered by the 1449 Act and not to common law leases. I accept that there are 
common law leases, but that does not mean that they do not require exclusive 
possession.79 
 
                                                 
76 Conway (n 6).  
77 Rent (Scotland) Act 1984, s 23(2A).  
78 Conway (n 6) 26 (Sheriff Gordon). 
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Commercial Components (Int) Ltd v Young,80 one of the cases referred to by Sheriff 
Gordon, was a Sheriff Principal appeal concerning an agreement for the occupation 
of two fields, which was held by the original Sheriff to be a grazing lease converted 
into an agricultural tenancy because there was never any removal of stock.81 The 
Sheriff Principal held that the Sheriff erred in law when determining the nature of 
the parties’ agreement. The presence of ponies owned by the pursuers on the land, 
which denied exclusive possession to the defenders, was an important factor in 
determining the non-existence of a statutory agricultural tenancy.82 
If the Sheriff’s judgment on the first issue raised in Conway is to withstand 
scrutiny, the position will represent a radical step forward in how a lease is 
perceived. However, there are problems with this judgment.  
Firstly, no comments are made to substantiate the point that common law 
leases require exclusive possession. The Clydesdale Bank judgment makes it clear why 
such a requirement matters in relation to a statutory agricultural tenancy: the 
protection of the Agricultural Holdings Act can only be enjoyed if one has a ‘real 
right of tenancy’, obtained by way of exclusive possession. 83  However, all the 
statutory and case law evidence points to possession only being relevant for the 
acquisition of such a real right (or analogous security of tenure). Additionally, the 
comment from Commercial Components regarding exclusive possession being a badge 
of a lease appears to have been stretched in its interpretation. It is submitted that 
what the Sheriff Principal meant was that exclusive possession is an obvious 
outward sign that a contract is likely to be a lease, although it may still fail to be one. 
The classic example here is Mann v Houston, where exclusive possession was present 
but the contract was not a lease due to a lack of rent.84 The position taken in that case 
therefore is not a novel one for Scots law, but rather a restatement of what has come 
before.85 As a final note on this case, Sheriff Gordon stated that Brador did not 
explicitly dispute the general proposition that exclusive possession was required in 
leases.86 Although this may be true, only sufficient possession as to amount to a sub-
let, and thereby to rule out the possibility of a mere licence agreement, was required 
to satisfy the court in that case,87 as against a requirement that the tenant enjoy 
exclusive possession. This, combined with the explicit rejection of Street v Mountford, 
would suggest that the Inner House had a larger margin of appreciation in mind and 
that it did not tacitly insist upon exclusive possession as a dogmatic requirement. 
The language of ‘sufficient’ possession suggests that there is a degree of possession – 
less than exclusive – at which a licence agreement would be ruled out by a court.  
The second hostel case was Denovan v Blue Triangle (Glasgow) Housing 
Association Ltd.88 The facts here were similar to those in Conway: a young homeless 
person was summarily evicted from his hostel accommodation. He subsequently 
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argued that he had a common law tenancy (i.e. a common law lease) as a gateway to 
obtaining an assured tenancy under the 1988 Act, since ‘tenant’ is undefined in that 
Act. However, a material difference in facts between Denovan and Conway is that, in 
the former case, the pursuer had exclusive occupation of a room alongside access to 
shared facilities, while the pursuer in Conway was in a two-bed room where the 
hostel owners were entitled to place another occupant in the second bed without her 
consent.  
Despite Denovan’s exclusive occupation of the room, it was held that his 
residency agreement did not contain terms that would prove a lease at common 
law.89 This is significant, as, if he was a common law tenant, he would be able to use 
the exclusive possession of his room to claim security of tenure under the 1988 Act 
despite sharing the property with other people.90 However, to do so, it first had to be 
established that the four traditional requirements of a common law lease were 
present.  
Whereas Conway suggested that exclusive possession was a requirement for a 
contract of lease, Denovan favoured the opposite, more traditional, view of matters. 
The latter case suggests that, in determining whether a contract of lease exists, 
recourse is had to the first four elements only, with exclusive possession becoming 
relevant only after it has been established that a contract of lease exists (for instance 
as a prerequisite for statutory security of tenure). In contrast, the Sheriff in Conway 
used exclusive possession as a fifth element of a contract of lease (as opposed to a 
mechanism for claiming statutory protection), taking it into consideration at the 
same time as the other four requirements. As such, Denovan makes it easier to 
distinguish Conway as deviating from accepted practice. The view expressed in 
Conway, namely that exclusive possession was required to determine the existence of 
a contract of lease, was one for which more evidence would arise in later years. 
Denovan’s continuation of the traditional view of exclusive possession would not 
prevent the ideas seen in Conway from resurfacing in later cases.  
 
D. Twenty-First Century Cases 
 
Since the turn of the millennium, two cases have considered exclusive possession in 
detail. In South Lanarkshire Council v Taylor,91 the defender occupied a racecourse 
under a contract titled as a grazing lease, which required her to vacate the area to 
allow events to take place if given twenty four hours’ notice. The pursuers sought 
declarator that no valid lease existed. This was due to the defender’s inability under 
the contract to exclude other persons from the land for the entirety of her lease. 
Implicit in this argument was the point that if the tenant were able to exclude other 
persons under the contract, she could be deemed a tenant. In other words, the 
argument was founded on the concept of exclusive possession being a requirement 
of a lease. Lord President Cullen made the following statement on the matter: 
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In the light of these arguments we consider that it would be going too far and 
too fast to decide that merely by reason of the terms of cl 4 [i.e. the clause 
requiring her to vacate the area at short notice] the defender could not 
establish that the character of her occupation under the alleged agreement 
was that of a tenant under a lease. The authorities to which we have been 
referred indicate that a limited reservation in favour of the landowner or a 
limitation in the nature of the use to which the occupier can [put] the land 
would not necessarily be inconsistent with the existence between them of the 
relationship of landlord and tenant. Plainly, however, it would be a matter of 
degree, according to the circumstances of the individual case.92 
 
This opinion is consistent with the decisions in the valuation cases of the 1920s in 
prioritising the content of the agreement itself, namely whether it allows the 
supposed tenant to possess the property exclusively, over the parties’ express 
contractual intentions, for two persons could, quite conceivably, describe themselves 
as ‘tenant’ and ‘landlord’ even if the contract’s terms do not afford the avowed 
‘tenant’ exclusive possession. What emerges from South Lanarkshire is an objective 
approach for reconciling the decision in Broomhill (where extensive access by the 
owner was seen to preclude the possibility of a lease) and the decision in Chaplin 
(where negligible interference by the owner was viewed to permit the possibility of a 
lease). Together, Broomhill, Chaplin and South Lanarkshire create the impression that it 
is not simply a rigid requirement of exclusive possession, enjoyed by the tenant, that 
is the deciding objective factor in the classification of a contract as a lease, but 
instead a certain degree of possession, the sufficiency of which is to be judged on a 
case-by-case basis. It is for these reasons that South Lanarkshire marks a return to the 
more objective reasoning visible in the earlier valuation, and more recent hostel, 
cases. Brador is referred to only to support the proposition that it is enough for the 
tenant to obtain certain uses of land to have sufficient possession not to be deemed 
the mere holder of a licence; that case is not invoked for its contractual, intention-
based approach to the distinction between the different rights.93 
The decision in South Lanarkshire was followed in the Land Court case of 
Cameron v Alexander.94 Here, the purported tenant sought declarator that he was 
entitled to possess the whole of a leased steading, subject to reservations of certain 
parts thereof by the landlord. The landlord objected, arguing that the agreement 
only constituted a licence agreement due to his right to use certain parts of the land. 
The landlord’s argument was strongly founded on Sheriff Gordon’s decision in 
Conway, but the court here found little persuasive authority for a fifth cardinal 
feature of a contract of lease, instead calling exclusive possession an ‘important 
pointer’ in determining the nature of an indeterminate agreement.95 With this in 
mind, it was held that exclusive possession was not an absolute requirement for the 
creation of a contract of lease in a non-statutory, agricultural context.96 The court in 
Cameron did, however, conclude that occupation of a residential property by tenants 
                                                 
92 ibid [7] (Opinion of the Court). 
93 ibid [6] (Opinion of the Court). 
94 Cameron (n 13). 
95 ibid [53] (Opinion of the Court). 
96 ibid [58] (Opinion of the Court). 
The Fifth Element: Should Exclusive Possession Be Considered an Essential Requirement for the 
Constitution of a Contract of Lease in Scots Law? 
16 
under different leases, as against co-tenants under the same lease agreement,97 could 
be such an impediment to the enjoyment of the property that an absolute rule of 
exclusive possession would be necessary in that context.98 However, the Land Court 
had no difficulty in providing examples, both historical and modern, of situations 
where shared use would not impact on the legitimacy of a contract of lease in a 
residential context.99 
 
E. Academic Opinion  
 
The uncertainty surrounding the role of exclusive possession is, in many cases, 
reflected in literature. This uncertainty has been observed from a comparative 
perspective. In a study of time-limited land interests of various legal systems, the 
Scottish stance on exclusive possession was described as ‘not entirely free from 
doubt,’100 although it was noted later in the text that it was most likely that a 
common law lease would be found where exclusive possession existed. 101 
Meanwhile, McAllister wrote that, although Rankine allowed for leases that only 
granted specific uses of land, such as leases for sporting or mineral rights, it did not 
follow that exclusive possession, ‘[could] be dispensed with in the case of leases (the 
vast majority) that [fell] outwith these special categories.’102 From this, an inference 
can be drawn that a lack of exclusive possession is the exception rather than the rule 
in a modern context. Thus, although some forms of lease can exist without exclusive 
possession, those comprise a narrow group of contracts with arguably limited 
relevance to modern law.  
One of the principal arguments against exclusive possession as an essential 
requirement is that, as discussed in the second section, its role is largely confined to 
obtaining a real right or security of tenure. The lease, at its heart, is a personal 
contract, a statement oft-repeated in legal literature.103 The concept of the personal 
lease was brought up recently in an article, analysing the decision in Clydesdale Bank 
v Davidson,104 where it was noted that a personal lease, ‘is no less a lease than a lease 
that has been made a real right,’ and that such a common law lease is still capable of 
coming under a statutory regime, thus conferring protection akin to that of a real 
right.105 The possibility of a personal lease that does not come under a statutory 
regime is left open, which would allow for a type of lease where exclusive 
possession has no bearing at all. 
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 Lord Gill disputes the arguments expressed in the latter article, arguing that 
the common law personal lease no longer exists in Scots law.106 If this is the case, and 
only the ‘real right’ (1449 Act) lease remains, the court’s findings in Millar v McRobbie 
will require a tenant to take full and exclusive possession of the leased subjects 
before a ‘lease’ (as Lord Gill understands the term) can be said to exist. In support of 
his argument, Lord Gill examines the historical background of the ‘personal right’ 
theory and concludes that, by the time that Millar was decided, the Scots law 
position was that the tenant had a real right that was made effective by taking 
possession.107 From his arguments, it would appear that Lord Gill interprets the 
opening statement of Lord President Cooper in Millar literally, with the prospective 
tenant not being a tenant at all until possession is taken, instead being a mere 
personal creditor who is ‘owed’ a tenancy. In response it might be countered that an 
agreement under which a person is owed a tenancy is still effectively a contract of 
lease, even if not explicitly so; nor does Lord Gill’s critique completely exclude the 
possibility of a lease without possession, as this could still be achieved with a 
registered long lease.108     
It is in the residential sector, more than any other, that exclusive possession is 
talked of as a requirement of a contract of lease. This may account for the reluctance 
of the Land Court in Cameron v Alexander to apply their judgment outside of an 
agricultural context. As an illustration of this at a basic level, the Scottish 
Qualifications Authority has seen fit to consider exclusive possession an essential 
requirement for a Scots law tenancy in their Higher National Unit on security of 
tenure, although they do note that this is ‘particularly contentious.’109 It should be 
noted that the unit focuses solely on statutory residential tenancies in the context of 
security of tenure, where exclusive possession is clearly an important factor,110 so 
this could be viewed as a simplification for practical purposes. This also appears to 
conflict with the decision in Denovan, where exclusive possession was not considered 
a necessary element for the establishment of an assured tenancy. 
In a 2015 article on ancillary rights in leases, Mike Blair offers a wider 
perspective on the matter. 111  Although Blair posits exclusive possession as a 
necessary condition of a lease, he allows for multiple leases to exist over the same 
space, each granting exclusive possession of a particular use of the land to their 
tenant. For example, an area of farmland with access to a river could be leased as an 
agricultural holding to one tenant, while another could have a fishing lease over the 
river. It is only in cases where two people share the same use of land that a lease 
would be found not to exist. This interpretation of exclusive possession appears 
wholly consistent with Rankine, who construes the term sufficiently broadly for it to 
include exclusive uses of land. However, exclusive use is materially different from 
exclusive possession, as it allows for cases where tenants do not necessarily have the 
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right to remain on the property at all times, even if they are the only ones capable of 
exercising a certain right. As such, although Blair’s arguments give the impression 
that exclusive possession is a pre-requisite of a lease, he does not always mean 
exclusive possession in the same way that it has been discussed in the case law, 
where it has always been referred to in terms of occupation as opposed to exclusive 
possession of a right, such as fishing, exercisable upon the land. 
 
 
4. Exclusive Possession as a Requirement 
 
With the current role of exclusive possession determined as a common, if not 
defining, feature of a contract of lease, and the main opinions on the subject 
established, it is important to ask why such a requirement might exist in the Scots 
law of leases. It is submitted that there are two main arguments in favour of such a 
requirement. The first is the desire for legal certainty that is so valued in property 
law. 112  This is a desire that has motivated many developments in the sector, 
catalysed by the need to know exactly what rights are possessed by anyone with 
some form of interest in property, especially heritable property. The second 
argument in favour of an exclusive possession requirement is that, in terms of time-
limited rights relating to property, the stakes associated with distinguishing leases 
from lesser rights such as licences are higher than they have ever been before. When 
Rankine wrote of the broad definition of the Scottish lease,113 he could never have 
imagined the concept of security of tenure, which offers greater protection than even 
a real right by preventing landlords from terminating a statutory tenancy without a 
specific legal ground such as failure to pay rent.114 In this context, it is easy to see 
how an argument in favour of exclusivity in leases might be formed. However, there 
are still a number of opposing arguments and potentially better alternatives that 
could be explored. 
 
A. Legal certainty  
 
Legal certainty is perhaps the strongest argument that can be made in favour of a 
requirement for exclusive possession. It is certainly a value by which the Scottish 
Law Commission sets much store: 
 
For people to be able to arrange their affairs in an orderly manner, the rules of 
property law must be clear and predictable; and that is as important in 
business as in private life. In property law, certainty is prized above all other 
virtues.115 
 
If the law is left in a state of ambiguity, it generates confusion and leads to an 
increase in litigation. This is certainly evident as regards exclusive possession: each 
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broad set of cases has presented a different approach to the issue, none of them 
providing a definite resolution. The case most favourably cited is Brador. However, 
Brador is unsuitable as a definitive answer in that it is not directly concerned with 
exclusive possession but instead the intentions of the parties and the degree of 
possession necessary for a sub-lease to exist. This allowed for the decision in Conway.  
By settling this issue in the positive and establishing exclusive possession as a 
requirement for the characterisation of a contract as a lease, the uncertainties 
regarding this area of law would be brought to an end, creating an unambiguous 
distinction between leases and licences. Contracting parties would be in no doubt 
that, in order for an agreement to be classified as a contract of lease, the owner of the 
property must grant the occupier exclusive possession thereof; nor, under the 
approach propounded here, would there be any doubt that an agreement granting 
such exclusive possession, and which fulfilled the other four, uncontroversial 
elements of a contract of lease (parties, property, rent and ish), would be sufficient to 
create a contract of lease. On the other hand, this argument could be undermined by 
the existence of agreements that grant exclusive possession but which are not 
intended as leases. An example of this can be found in the unreported Sheriff Court 
judgment in Caird Properties v Elbrask Contractors. 116  There, Elbrask Contractors 
entered into an agreement to cultivate an area of farmland and establish an initial 
crop. They later refused to vacate the land, arguing that the contract was a valid 
lease. The Sheriff at first instance ruled that the contract was in fact a locatio operis 
faciendi: a contract for services. This ruling was upheld on appeal to the Sheriff 
Principal. Paisley and Cusine note that there is no rule precluding such contracts 
from being carried out within the land of the instructing party, thus creating a 
contract that blends elements of an occupancy agreement with those of a services 
contract.117 Here, there was no question as to whether the agreement was a lease, 
since the defenders failed to establish a provision for the payment of rent, only 
attempting to argue that such a provision existed once the case was appealed. 
However, if such a contract had included some form of rent provision, it is entirely 
possible that it would have been held to constitute a lease even if that had not been 
the parties’ intention, as per the ratio in Brador. If exclusive possession were to be 
used as such a decisive, pivotal element of a Scots law contract of lease, agreements 
of the type encountered in Caird Properties, or indeed any agreement vaguely 
resembling a lease, would have to be extremely well-drafted to avoid granting the 
occupant of another’s property more rights than either party originally intended.     
Having exclusivity as a requirement could also be argued to offer tenants a 
reassurance that parts of the leased property that they do not use will not be let to 
someone else. This scenario is suggested by the editor’s note attached to the account 
of Conway in the Housing Law Reports as a reason why the decision in that case was 
generally correct.118 Otherwise, tenants would have no legal recourse if a landlord let 
the same subjects to multiple people.119 It is submitted that this argument is weak, as 
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exclusive possession is, if not a constitutive requirement of a contract of lease, 
certainly an implied term of such a contract.120 As such, were a landlord to attempt 
to break up an already-let property further, the original tenant would be able to 
pursue them for damages or even rescission of the contract,121 which reduces the 
need for an explicit statement on the matter. 
 
B. Security of Tenure  
 
The statutory innovation of security of tenure was first introduced into Scots law by 
various Rent Acts beginning in 1915. Now, it is present in the agricultural, public 
and private rented sectors and offers more protection to tenants than even a real 
right of lease does, allowing them to remain in occupation after the end date of their 
tenancy.122 With this in mind, it is no wonder that property owners have attempted 
to argue for the necessity of exclusive possession. This is because the establishment 
of a statutory tenancy could cause them to lose possession of their property for some 
time, or be unable to sell their property except at a heavily discounted price. A 
requirement of exclusive possession would restore a certain amount of power to 
landlords; there would be less risk of an agreement falling into a statutory regime by 
reason of ambiguous drafting or an error on the part of the landlord.  
That said, it is arguable that security of tenure was intended to be easily 
accessible. In respect of the social housing sector, Adrian Stalker wrote that the 
specific statutory definition included in the Housing (Scotland) Act 2001 was 
significant because it precluded attempts by social landlords to subvert the Act by 
creating a lesser contract, regardless of whether the resulting tenancies were 
common law leases or not.123 Given that this definition is also used in the private 
sector, it appears that the Scottish Parliament deliberately opened up the definition 
of tenancy for the purposes of the 2001 Act in order to extend the opportunity to as 
many as possible and to prevent landlords from exploiting their tenants. The looser 
requirements of a statutory residential tenancy also raise the point that the statutory 
tenancy is an entirely different species of contract from the original form of lease and 
a statutory residential tenancy benefits from the use of exclusive possession in a way 
that other leases do not. Thus, imposing a requirement of exclusive possession on all 
leases because the Housing Act tenancies would benefit from it would appear to 
create uniformity for its own sake, rather than for a practical benefit.  
 
C. ‘Rent’ Asunder: A Potential Tear in the Logical Fabric of a Lease 
 
One argument against exclusive possession as a requirement for the classification of 
a contract as a lease is that ‘rent’ (assuming Rankine’s definition thereof is adopted) 
ought to be capable of definition independent of other requirements for the creation 
of a lease. This is particularly the case with exclusive possession since Rankine 
defined rent as being given in return for the possession and use of the leased 
                                                 
120 Rankine (n 3) 200; Paton and Cameron (n 2) 127. 
121 Rankine (n 3) 217. 
122 McAllister (n 1) 467. 
123 A Stalker, Evictions in Scotland (Avizandum 2007) 92. 
Aberdeen Student Law Review – Volume 7 
21 
subjects.124 His definition is imperfect as it fails to take into account the Registration 
of Leases Act 1857, which allows possession to be substituted with registration, a 
point raised in an argument against the judgment in Clydesdale Bank v Davidson: 
 
Any general definition of ‘rent’ would have to be able to accommodate leases 
comprising real rights by means of the 1449 Act, and leases comprising real 
rights by means of the 1857 Act. It cannot therefore be absolutely predicated 
upon the taking of possession.125 
 
Following this line of reasoning, it would appear that, at the bare minimum, 
Rankine’s definition should be amended so that rent can be understood to be 
payable in return for possession and use in the context of short leases and in return 
for ‘registration and use’ in the context of long leases. However, this argument could 
be countered with the proposition that, since the 1857 Act provides that registration 
is equivalent to possession for the purpose of acquiring a real right,126 the word 
‘possession’ in Rankine’s text impliedly encompasses ‘registration’. Were this matter 
to be brought before a court, it appears unlikely that it would read Rankine’s 
definition narrowly to be an exception to the statutory rule when, in every other 
case, the agreement would satisfy the criteria for a long lease. In both cases, rent is 
exchanged in return for protection against a singular successor (whether achieved 
via possession or registration) and the right to use the property. 
However, if Rankine’s definition of rent is accepted and it is understood as 
being given in return for possession or registration, a different argument can be 
ventured against allowing either of these to be a requirement of a lease.  
 As regards registration, for a lease to be eligible under the 1857 Act, it must 
first be a contract of lease, satisfying the four traditional requirements: parties, 
property, rent and ish.127 If the definition of rent were tied to registration as a fifth 
element, the establishment of a long lease would be logically impossible, because 
registration of a lease would be required in order to register a lease to provide 
protection against singular successors.  
If the registration of a lease is dependent on the requirements of a contract of 
lease being present, and rent cannot be established without registration, the 
establishment of a long lease becomes a self-validating circular definition that 
provides no way of actually establishing such. This is as unhelpful for practical 
purposes as it would be to define a property right as a right capable of being a 
property right.128 
It should be noted that this problem does not arise with exclusive possession 
itself as per the 1449 Act, as the taking of physical possession is an easy enough 
matter to perform and prove. In contrast, registration is a formal process with 
specific statutory requirements, which relies on there being a personal contract of 
lease to be given real right status. With exclusive possession as a requirement of a 
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lease, there would no longer be a distinction between a lease conferring a personal 
right and one conferring a real right, as their requirements would be identical.  
The retention of the distinct personal lease allows for the definition of rent to 
be construed more widely as being given in exchange for what will be given under a 
real rights lease, as opposed to what is already there, which is impossible for a long 
lease. Removing that distinction would not be fatal to a lease under which the real 
right is conferred by exclusive possession. However, it would be fatal to the long 
lease, where the real right is conferred by registration. As such, it is submitted to be 
in the interests of consistency and simplicity that the four requirements of a contract 
of lease are kept as they are. 
Further, tying rent to another requirement would also be inconsistent with the 
other three requirements for a common law lease, all of which are capable of being 
identified independently due to being physical or legal objects or identities or a 
contractual term that can either be explicitly provided or implied.129 As such, the 
introduction of a possessory requirement could overcomplicate the process of 
establishing a prima facie lease.  
 
 
5. Future Legal Developments and Possible Alternatives to Exclusive 
Possession 
 
On 17 March 2016, the Scottish Parliament passed the Private Housing (Tenancies) 
(Scotland) Bill, which received Royal Assent on 22 April of the same year.130 A 
commencement date is to be confirmed. This Act introduces the private residential 
tenancy (‘PRT’), intended to replace the current assured tenancy regime.131 The Act 
has its own criteria for determining the existence of a tenancy thereunder, further 
distinguishing the residential tenancy in the private sector from the common law 
model. This continuing pattern of residential tenancies breaking away from the 
common law lease highlights the need to find an alternative to exclusive possession 
as a requirement; a new requirement that is sufficiently broad to encompass all the 
different types of lease without alienating any of them. In this section, some possible 
alternatives are considered. 
 
A. The Private Housing (Tenancies) (Scotland) Act 2016 
 
Under the 2016 Act, a PRT is created where a property is let to a tenant as a separate 
dwelling, which the tenant occupies as their only or principal home.132 Furthermore, 
the Act explicitly extends the meaning of tenancy to include agreements where there 
would be a tenancy but for the absence of an ish or where an agreement to pay rent 
is subsequently removed or ceases to have effect.133  
                                                 
129 Gray (n 71).  
130 Private Housing (Tenancies) (Scotland) Act 2016. 
131 ibid s 1. 
132 ibid.  
133 ibid s 4. 
Aberdeen Student Law Review – Volume 7 
23 
 The former measure – the liberal definition of a PRT – is of more significance, 
as it completely removes one of the essential requirements of the common law lease 
and the 1449 Act from the equation, namely the ish. This measure explicitly removes 
the PRT from the common law model to the extent that a technical provision is 
required in the Act to ensure that the PRT is included within the meaning of the 
word ‘tenancy’ in previous legislation.134 With this new development, the various 
private residential leases under numerous Acts become more difficult to reconcile 
with other types of lease because of their departure from the four essential 
requirements of the common law lease. This indicates that attempts to treat all leases 
using the same exclusivity criteria are counterintuitive, and that a new 
distinguishing criterion must be sought to create a clear boundary between the 
diverse range of leases and licence agreements.  
 The latter measure – extending the meaning of tenancy – is designed to 
prevent landlords from denying the protections of a statutory regime to tenants via 
later modification, further reinforcing Stalker’s proposal that the Scottish Parliament 
follow a liberal statutory framework for the creation of private residential 
tenancies.135 
 
B. Possible Alternatives to Exclusive Possession 
 
Even if exclusive possession is not the litmus test between a contract of lease and a 
licence agreement, any sort of test used to distinguish between these statuses still 
ought to examine the necessary degree of control. The reasoning behind using a test, 
which would be applied on a case-by-case basis, rather than a fifth requirement, 
which would be applied in the same way in all cases, is that, with a test, there is 
greater scope for creating reservations; this approach better preserves the parties’ 
freedom of contract. By accounting for the post-contract reality, it would also 
provide greater protection against ‘sham’ agreements, in the broad sense of the 
term.136 It is therefore submitted that a starting point for a test is to examine how 
much control the landlord retains. Strictly speaking, this is what the ratio in South 
Lanarkshire Council v Taylor addressed, as the case centred on a provision requiring 
the tenant to vacate the property at any time within twenty-four hours’ notice by the 
landlord and whether or not that prevented the contract from being a lease.137 As 
such, it could be suggested that a ‘deprivation of use’ test be employed, in line with 
this case and the valuation cases. Under such a test, the primary focus would be the 
nature of the landlord’s continuing rights in the leased property and how much they 
interfere with the rights of the tenant. If it could be shown that the landlord was 
sufficiently deprived, the contract would be considered a lease rather than a licence, 
provided that all the other requirements for a lease were present or could be inferred 
via Gray. This would be carried out on a predominantly objective basis, looking at 
the terms of the contract, in order to create the least amount of ambiguity and to 
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generate legal certainty. However, to obviate agreements that do not reflect the 
reality, which is a possibility in light of the nature of this proposal, provision could 
be made to ‘to look beyond the formal written documentation to determine the true 
nature of the agreement between the parties’.138 Under this test, the terms of the 
contract would be determinative as to the existence or non-existence of a contract of 
lease, unless shown to misrepresent the reality of the situation. For example, an 
agreement for the occupation and use of a parking garage where the terms of the 
agreement allow the landlord to enter the premises at will as well as keep their own 
car there would appear to be a licence agreement, as the landlord can use the 
property to a significant degree. However, should it be found that as a matter of fact 
the landlord does not exercise these rights at all, the contract would be a lease, the 
contractual provisions having been drafted to avoid the consequences thereof.139 
A potential problem with this approach is that, in most cases, it will be the 
tenant who is attempting to establish a lease rather than the landlord, as they will 
have the most to gain from such a contract. As such, it seems strange that the focus 
should be on the landlord’s rights, especially since they already have a real right of 
ownership in the property.  
A more practical approach would be to require the tenant to prove that they 
have a right to exclude the landlord from exercising the right let to them. This would 
appear to be the essence of modern exclusive possession, as Blair defines it,140 and 
works alongside his argument that two people sharing the same right do not have 
exclusivity. If a tenant can positively establish the four essential requirements of a 
lease, and that they are themselves capable of preventing other people, including 
their landlord, from exercising the same right, there is very little room to conclude 
that their contract is something other than a lease. This approach also sidesteps any 
potential conflict between the Housing Act tenancies, which are the sectors that 
would most benefit from a possession requirement, and other forms of lease. Under 
this system, a residential tenant would be required to prove that they can stop other 
people from living in their leased property, which is analogous to exclusive 
occupation while at the same time not imposing that requirement on leases that 
would see no practical benefit therefrom. A tenant under a fishing lease, for 
example, would have to prove that they had the right to prevent others from fishing 
on a given piece of land under the same test.  
As is usually the case, hypothetical scenarios could be foreseen where this test 
would face difficulties. An example would be a contract farming case analogous to 
Caird Properties but with provisions for a rent-like payment. However, in practice, 
payments in those sorts of contracts tend to be lump sums, and the legal 
documentation well-drafted enough to exclude a relationship of landlord and 
tenant.141 The former, alone, excludes the contract from being a lease on the basis of 
Mann v Houston, so in practice there is likely to be little difficulty in adapting these 
arrangements to a right to exclude test. Similarly, there are no difficulties applying 
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this test to long leases without possession, as the existence of the lease will still 
entitle the tenant to prevent others from occupying the land. 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
As the rights available to Scottish tenants have increased, so too has the significance 
of exclusivity within the law of leases. At the foundational level of a personal 
contract, it is, if Lord Gill’s view is to be accepted, irrelevant. The Leases Act 1449 
brought possession into the equation to secure a real right, and it has long been 
accepted that this means exclusive possession.142 Finally, a third, even greater level 
of protection came in the twentieth century, under which a strong current of 
exclusivity also appeared to run. Given the diversity of the sector, a conflict was 
inevitable. Scots law recognises a number of different contracts as leases, from 
offering places to live to sporting rights to long-term rights, each of which has their 
own set of needs that must be met to allow the law as a whole to function effectively. 
Additionally, the twentieth century has prompted the judiciary to make decisions on 
how to distinguish licences from leases, but these decisions have not always been 
consistent, creating an unnecessary amount of legal ambiguity. 
Calls for the introduction of exclusive possession in modern cases have 
mostly come from a residential perspective, where security of tenure, a right 
stronger than a real right, has become available. Comparatively, in an agricultural 
context, the courts have not viewed exclusive possession as a vital component of a 
contract of lease. The best explanation that can be found for this is that, in an 
agricultural context, the definition of a lease is not far removed from how it was 
originally conceived hundreds of years ago. Meanwhile, the Housing Acts have 
redefined, for their purposes, what a tenancy is in order to cast the net wide and 
empower as many tenants as they can. In the process those Acts have sacrificed the 
absolute need for rent, which is, more than any other essential requirement, 
sacrosanct in Scots law.  
With this in mind, it is not difficult to see why, when examining whether or 
not secure or assured tenancies exist, the courts might look favourably upon 
exclusive possession. However, the fact that exclusive possession greatly assists in 
identifying one type of lease – those under the Housing Act tenancies – is not a 
sufficient reason to impose it as a requirement upon all leases. What is instead 
required, if Scotland is to create a proper distinction between leases and licences, is a 
test that captures the spirit exclusive possession is meant to indicate without 
forgetting the broad nature of the Scottish lease. 
By using a wider interpretation and taking exclusive use rather than exclusive 
possession as the basis for a ‘right to exclude’ test, Scots law will be able to do this. 
Such a test would examine each contract based on the power that it affords to the 
occupier as regards the particular right in question. If it is strong enough to allow the 
occupier to exclude others from exercising that right, within reason, it will be a lease. 
This would be determined based on the provisions in the contract. However, should 
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the reality of the situation differ from what is provided in the contract, as an attempt 
at manipulating the true agreement of the parties, then the actions of the two parties 
will take precedence. In this way, modern challenges to lease law are overcome 
without sacrificing the uniquely Scottish identity and character of this type of 
contract.  
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Abstract 
 
The level of agricultural tenancies in Scotland has been in steady decline for over a century, with the 
result that new tenant farmers are struggling to gain access to the agricultural sector. The present 
study considers whether recent legislation has provided landlords with the confidence to bring 
forward more land to the letting market, and whether recent legislative reform has learnt from 
previous mistakes. In particular, this paper assesses the impact that measures and proposals 
considered under the Agricultural Holdings (Scotland) Act 2003 – such as the pre-emptive right to 
buy, the absolute right to buy and security of tenure – have had on the confidence of landlords to lease 
land, and how this is reflected in the circumstances surrounding the case of Salvesen v Riddell. 
Furthermore, this paper considers whether proposals and measures brought forward under the Land 
Reform (Scotland) Act 2016 have learnt from the Salvesen case, and whether the balance of rights 
between landlords and tenants needed for a healthy tenanted sector has been met. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In 2007, the Tenant Farming Forum (TFF) was commissioned by the Cabinet 
Secretary, Richard Lochhead, to investigate barriers which may be preventing a new 
generation of farmers from entering the agricultural industry. 1  It had become 
apparent to the Scottish Government that the average age of those currently working 
in the agricultural industry was not being lowered sufficiently by the entry of new 
blood into the industry, with 51 per cent of the current workforce aged over fifty-
five, a quarter of whom were older than sixty-five.2 In a recent study of tenant 
farmers commissioned by the Scottish Government in anticipation of the review of 
agricultural holdings legislation, it was found that only 7 per cent of tenant farmer 
respondents were under the age of forty, which is in stark contrast to the 74 per cent 
who were over the age of fifty.3  
The Agricultural Holdings Legislation Review Group (AHLRG) raised 
concerns, therefore, that current legislation may be preventing farmers from retiring 
earlier and, thereby, preventing a younger generation of farmers from, ‘taking the 
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reins’, before the productivity of a holding is compromised by the incapacity of an 
aging tenant to farm efficiently.4 Indeed, the survey commissioned by the Scottish 
Government revealed that almost a fifth of respondents stated that they were 
experiencing ‘long term illness, disability or health problem[s] (…) which limits the 
daily activities or work that they can do.’5 The Scottish Government also raised 
concerns that there is a risk that the skills, which many of these aging farmers have 
honed over the years, may be at risk of dying out, especially the skills of those 
involved in livestock.6 Despite this, the Scottish Government retained some hope 
that the research conducted by the TFF would reveal a strong contingency of young 
farmers available to succeed to farms, where previous research focussed solely on 
the age of the principal farmer, concealing the existence of a successor.7 Instead, 
however, the TFF’s report confirmed that there is major concern in the industry 
regarding its aging population, revealing that 83 per cent of its respondents agreed 
that the sector is faced with a ‘real new entrant problem’.8 
The TFF published a report in 2008 after extensive consultation, which sought 
to establish the most important barriers preventing new entrants into the farming 
sector. The report revealed that one of the most important barriers facing the 
industry was a lack of available land to let.9 Given the high capital cost of farming 
equipment and land, leasing provides an essential access route for new entrants. It 
was recognised by the Cabinet Secretary, Richard Lochhead, that, ‘Scotland now has 
one of the lowest proportions of rented land anywhere in Europe’, and that action 
was essential to stop further reductions thereof; as Lochhead explained, ‘[n]o 
industry can expect to flourish when there are barriers to new entrants and obstacles 
faced by successful businesses that want to improve, diversify and flourish’.10 
The reduction of agricultural holdings available to let is not a new issue. Since 
the start of the twentieth century, the dualistic pattern of agricultural land tenure has 
been converted from one dominated by tenanted holdings, to one where there is 
now a greater number of owner-occupants than tenant farmers. The Land Reform 
Review Group (LRRG) revealed in their Final Report that the tenanted sector in 1913 
accounted for 90 per cent of farms in Scotland; however, since that time, the sector 
has been in continual decline, with tenancies reducing from 71,740 in 1913 to just 
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14,274 by 1980. 11  The latest statistics published also reveal that the decline of 
agricultural tenancies has shown no sign of abating in the modern era: the current 
level sits at almost half that of the 1980s, reducing from 41 per cent to 23 per cent 
between 1983 and 2014.12 
The LRRG explained that there were various historical factors contributing to 
the reduction of the tenanted sector, such as the amalgamation of smaller tenancies,13 
the rise of owner-occupation, 14  the mechanisation of labour in the 1950s, 15  and 
increasing subsidy payments.16 Importantly, however, the reduction of the tenanted 
sector also comes as a result of legislation. After the Second World War, food 
security was a major concern of public policy, influencing the then Labour 
Government to enact radical measures, greatly interfering with the terms of 
agricultural leases.17 Up to that point, landlords would have expected to retrieve 
vacant possession of their land at the end of the lease; however, the Agricultural 
Holdings (Scotland) Act 1948 provided tenant farmers with security of tenure, 
interfering with the operation of notices to quit.18  The consequence of this was 
effectively to lock up land by unlimited succession to tenancies, where generation 
after generation of farmers could retain their lease within their families.19 After the 
1948 Act’s consolidation in the Agricultural Holdings (Scotland) Act 1949, these 
tenancies were preserved in the modern era of agricultural tenancy law by the 
Agricultural Holdings (Scotland) Act 1991.20 This was a major deterrent to land 
leasing as the capital value of land subject to a secure 1991 Act tenancy was reduced 
significantly. Unsurprisingly, landlords effectively ceased creating secure tenancies 
by the 1980s.21 
In light of the continuing reduction of tenancies, the Land Reform Policy 
Group was established by the newly formed Scottish Executive in 1997 to consider 
the most effective legislative means of remedying this situation. 22  The group 
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proposed several recommendations with that intention, eventually incorporated into 
a White Paper, forming the basis for the Agricultural Holdings (Scotland) Act 2003.  
The present study examines the effectiveness of this act in achieving one of its 
primary aims of encouraging landowners to bring forward more land to the letting 
market, which, as identified above, is an essential route of access for new entrants 
into the farming industry. Additionally, this research considers critically whether the 
Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2016 has learnt from the legislative process surrounding 
the 2003 Act, which saw some difficulties in terms of balancing the rights of tenants 
and landlords, as was reflected in the case of Salvesen v Riddell.23 In particular, it is 
considered whether the newest addition to the agricultural legislative regime will go 
any further towards achieving an increase of land on the letting market. 
 
 
2. Agricultural Holdings (Scotland) Act 2003 
 
One of the major concerns highlighted by a recent review of agricultural holdings 
legislation was the lack of confidence which the sector has felt as a result of political 
uncertainty.24 The following section assesses the impact which recent legislation has 
had on the confidence of landlords to contribute further land to the letting market in 
this sector. It has been established by research that the current shortage of tenancies 
is the greatest barrier preventing new entrants from gaining a foothold in the 
industry,25 which is linked to legislative uncertainty and its effect on the confidence 
of landlords to let land.26 
 
A. Pre-Emptive Right to Buy 
 
With the establishment of the new Scottish Parliament, the opportunity arose for 
land tenure to be reformed in order, ‘to determine what needs to change to fit 
Scotland’s land legislation for the twenty-first century’. 27  Agricultural land 
accounted for 80 per cent of rural space in Scotland; therefore, it was inevitable that 
the tenanted farming sector would also be reviewed within this process. In October 
1997 The Land Reform Policy Review Group (LRPG), chaired by Lord Sewel, was 
created and tasked with the remit of, ‘identify[ing] and assess[ing] proposals for 
land reform, taking account of their cost, [and their] legislative and administrative 
implications’.28 One such proposal identified by the group was the argument that 
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tenants of secure 1991 Act tenancies should be afforded the right to buy their 
holdings.29  
An ‘absolute’ right to buy had already been established by the Crofting 
Reform (Scotland) Act 1976, allowing crofters to acquire their holdings on 
application to the Land Court where the landlord had refused to sell their property 
voluntarily.30 This absolute right to acquire an ownership interest can be contrasted 
with that of the pre-emptive right to buy, which can only be triggered by the owner's 
volition to sell their property.  
The LRPG established, however, that an absolute right to buy (ARTB) posed a 
major risk to the sector: this would deter landlords from letting land, as well as 
leaving the Scottish Executive exposed to compensation claims potentially exceeding 
£100 million; the proposal was regarded as a ‘non-starter’.31 After recommendations 
from the group, Ross Finnie, the then Minister for Environment and Rural 
Development, rejected the ARTB in his Draft Agricultural Holdings Bill, which was 
brought before the Scottish Parliament on 16 September 2002.32 Furthermore, the 
LRPG chose to omit the pre-emptive right to buy in the White Paper that it produced 
for the Scottish Government. 33  Despite this, Ross Finnie made the following 
declaration two years later in the Draft Agricultural Holdings (Scotland) Bill: 
 
For some time I have been considering the case for a pre-emptive right to buy 
for tenant farmers. I have concluded that a pre-emptive right to buy can make 
a valuable contribution to our land reform agenda [and] I have therefore 
decided that the Bill should provide for [this.]34  
 
When one considers the Scottish Government’s rationale for this change of direction, 
it would seem justified to have afforded secure 1991 Act tenants a pre-emptive right 
to buy. The nature of those tenants’ tenure, with continuous rights of succession, 
would have already diminished the value of any land encumbered thereby. In these 
circumstances, it would have seemed prudent that a landlord should negotiate a sale 
price with the tenant, who may have been willing to pay for a value somewhere 
between that of vacant possession, and that of a sale on the open market with a 
sitting-tenant; in contrast, sale to a third party would have only amounted to 50 per 
cent of the price at vacant possession. 35  One could even question why such a 
measure had to be incorporated into statute, given that it was already the practice of 
many landlords to offer the property to the tenant.36 In any case, the measure was 
commendable for emboldening tenants to invest in their holdings. However, the 
manner in which this pre-emptive right to buy came into being undermined the 
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primary aim of the Agricultural Holdings (Scotland) Act 2003 – namely to ‘stimulate 
the rented sector’.37  
It was highlighted recently by the AHLRG that legislative intervention and 
political uncertainty have played a major role in deterring landlords from bringing 
more land forward to the tenant farming sector.38 Much of landlords’ mistrust of the 
Scottish Parliament emanated from the legislation passed in 2003. 39  Indeed, the 
manoeuvre of the Scottish Government to include the pre-emptive right to buy in its 
Draft Bill was the beginning of a sequence of events, which would eventually 
undermine the aforementioned policy aim.40  
The LRPG were tasked with assessing proposals for legislation and to 
consider their ‘legislative and administrative implications’, a remit which led the 
group to consider the pre-emptive right to buy.41 After the group’s consultation, it 
was agreed between the Scottish Ministers and the LRPG that this right to buy 
would not be pursued any further, and this measure was, therefore, not included in 
the Agricultural Holdings White Paper.42 However, within two years, the Scottish 
Executive had made a complete ‘U-turn’ on its policy,43 rejecting the advice of both 
the LRPG and key stakeholders.44 The reason behind this sudden change was the 
growing pressure from certain campaigns, such as that of Liberal Democrat MSP, 
George Lyon, calling on the Scottish Executive to reconsider its stance on the right to 
buy.45 This pressure eventually led the Executive to reconsider its investigation into 
the pre-emptive right to buy,46 and, by January 2002, Ross Finnie announced to the 
Scottish Parliament that this right was to be included in its Agricultural Holdings 
Bill.47  
Despite receiving support from the key stakeholder, NFU Scotland, the 
Executive’s contradictory move was immediately criticised by the Scottish 
Landowners’ Federation (SLF). 48  The then convener of SLF, Robert Balfour, 
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lambasted the measure for its intervention in private tenancy agreements, and for its 
retrospective effect on arrangements not originally intended to afford a right to 
buy.49 The group argued that this last minute change to the Draft Bill would only 
discourage landowners from letting as a result of the ‘uncertainty’ that it had 
caused. 50  The Conservative MSP, Alex Fergusson, also denounced the measure, 
arguing that it would instantly depreciate the value of estate lands, where 
enterprises would be broken up by the offending rights.51 It would appear, therefore, 
that even with the benefits of this measure for tenants, which could only be triggered 
by the landlord’s volition to sell and terminate his interest in a property, the mere 
fact that the Scottish Parliament could interfere with agricultural leases to favour 
tenants caused anxiety to landlords. The balance of rights which was vital to achieve 
stability in the rented sector already appeared under threat at this early stage. 
 
B. The Case for an Absolute Right to Buy (ARTB) 
 
Although 82 per cent of members of the key stakeholder group NFU Scotland had 
shown their support for the pre-emptive right to buy, 66 per cent voted against an 
ARTB.52 However, another tenant farmer group questioned the Scottish Executive’s 
rejection of the latter. Malcolm McCall, the then chairman of the Scottish Tenant 
Farmer Action Group (STFAG), wrote to Ross Finnie immediately following his 
announcement of the pre-emptive right to buy’s inclusion in the Draft Bill, criticising 
the Minister’s decision for being undemocratic, having prevented any discussion of 
the ARTB being brought before the Scottish Parliament.53 Andrew Thin compiled a 
submission for STFAG in June 2002, stating that there was a public interest argument 
for the transformation of the pre-emptive right into an absolute one.54 It was argued 
that the ARTB could address economic, social and environmental policy concerns by 
removing constraints to sustainable rural development,55  and that it was in the 
public interest to encourage investment in rural communities, as well as allowing 
tenants to express themselves within those areas where they were deeply-rooted.56 
Furthermore, the ARTB would give secure tenants the confidence to take up 
environmentally friendly measures, which the landlord could otherwise veto.57  
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Despite these exhortations, the Executive made clear in its policy 
memorandum that its stance on the ARTB would remain the same, explaining that 
this measure would ‘decimat[e]’ the agricultural rented sector.58 Furthermore, this 
would make the Executive liable for compensation exceeding £100 million, and 
impinge upon Article 1 of the First Protocol to the European Convention on Human 
Rights, which enshrines the right to peaceful enjoyment of one’s property.59 Despite 
this, STFAG claimed that, although the Executive’s stance had remained the same, 
‘the public interest case for an absolute right to buy had been largely accepted by 
policy makers in Edinburgh’.60 STFAG perceived the exclusion of the ARTB as a 
reflection of the ‘paralysis’ suffered by the Executive and Parliament, occasioned by 
a, ‘sense of institutional caution (…) not (…) necessarily in the public interest’.61 
STFAG and land-reform campaigners continually sought to dispel the ‘myths’ 
surrounding the ARTB, such as the threat of a decrease in tenancies. 62  This 
eventually swayed many of the senior Ministers overseeing the legislative scrutiny 
of the Bill, who stated in their Stage 1 Committee Report that, ‘the majority of the 
Committee is (…) sympathetic to an absolute right to buy for secure tenants under 
the 1991 Act’.63 
Once again, it appeared that there was to be a complete change of direction 
from the policy measures agreed in the White Paper. The Rural Development 
Committee had chosen to debate the merits of ARTB, despite the evidence provided 
by representative groups, arguing that landowners, ‘must be given the confidence to 
allow them to [let land]. Concern that politicians might, at some stage, extend pre-
emptive rights to ARTB wholly militates against such confidence.’64 It became clear 
to the Scottish Parliament that there was some veracity to this statement as anecdotal 
evidence began to surface that landlords were responding to a potential ARTB by 
terminating tenancies across the country.65 
 
C. Security of Tenure and Limited Partnerships 
 
Importantly, however, there was a second element to this reaction. The anecdotal 
evidence provided concerned a specific type of tenancy arrangement devised by 
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landlords to avoid the effects of legislation consolidated under the Agricultural 
Holdings (Scotland) Act 1991. Predominantly, this statute sought to strengthen the 
tenants’ position, providing them with confidence to invest in their holdings, as well 
as to share some of the capital burden required by a farming business.66 This was 
achieved by measures such as security of tenure, compensation at waygo, and 
obligations on the landlord to provide fixed equipment.67  
Landlords attempted various measures to avoid these cumbersome legislative 
controls by, for example, using sub-tenancies. One practice was for a landlord to let 
land to their spouse, wherefrom a sub-let would be granted to a de facto tenant, in 
an attempt to obviate the latter’s challenge to a notice to quit.68 The courts have 
tended to reject these measures on the basis that they undermined public policy.69 By 
1997, however, the Court of Session finally upheld an arrangement used by 
landowners to avoid security of tenure.70 Landowners found that they could use the 
Limited Partnership Act 1907 by granting a tenancy to a limited partnership body, 
where the landlord and tenant were limited and general partner respectively. This 
circumvented the restrictive process of notices to quit under the 1991 Act by 
allowing the landlord to bring the tenancy to an end through the dissolution of the 
partnership body. 
Although this arrangement received legal validation from the Court of 
Session in MacFarlane v Falfield Investments Ltd,71 previous legislative attempts from 
within the UK Parliament were made to outlaw the use of these arrangements in 
1983.72 MP Martin O’Neill argued that there was an urgent need to amend the 
Agricultural Holdings (Amendment) (Scotland) Bill to prevent large estates from 
offering limited partnerships to young farmers, who were effectively forced into 
these arrangements as a result of the shortage of tenancies.73 The proposed abolition 
of these arrangements was, however, unsuccessful. The UK Conservative 
Government of the period observed that the 1979 Northfield Report into agriculture 
had shown that not all of these arrangements prejudiced the rights of tenants, and 
that very few tenants had made any complaints regarding the operation of these 
tenancies.74 The Government also feared that the proscription of the arrangement 
would lead to further reductions in tenancy levels by removing the only popular 
letting vehicle of that time; in the absence of limited partnerships, landlords would 
likely take farming operations in-hand.75  
The Scottish Executive made clear, however, that history would not repeat 
itself: the limited partnerships were to have no role in the future of Scotland’s 
agriculture. 76  With the position of tenants being further strengthened by the 
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Agricultural Holdings Bill, providing them with a minimum term in the Limited 
Duration Tenancy (LDT), as well as rights to diversify and to claim compensation at 
waygo, the Scottish Executive wanted to ensure that landlords would not be able to 
evade these provisions.77  
The stakeholder groups argued, however, that the limited partnership 
tenancy arrangement should be left to continue, as this provided the flexibility for 
landowners and tenants to agree on the length best suited to their needs.78 This was 
already the case in England and Wales, where the Agricultural Holdings Act 1995 
allowed freedom to negotiate. 79  The Scottish Landowners’ Federation argued, 
furthermore, that in practice the dissolution of partnership could only operate in 
accordance with the deeds recorded in the partnership agreement.80 NFU Scotland 
believed that the continuation of the limited partnership agreement was vital as a 
commercial option and, therefore, any change to these arrangements would result in 
a reluctance to let land.81 
Despite these claims, the Scottish Executive would not allow the 
arrangements to continue as an evasive measure to the new Bill.82 It was established 
in the Draft Bill, therefore, that protection was to be afforded to de facto tenants of 
limited partnerships. General partners were to be given the right to continue the 
tenancy in place of the limited partnership, where they had been served a notice to 
quit, and the intention of that notice was to deprive the tenant of his rights.83 
Importantly, this proposal was only applied to tenancies created after the enactment 
of the legislation. The Scottish Executive made it clear that it had no intention of 
extending these measures to have retrospective effect on existing limited 
partnerships agreements.84 
 
D. The Consequences of Legislative Instability 
 
Despite this statement, and the numerous warnings from stakeholders regarding the 
interference with limited partnerships, the Scottish Parliament eventually did extend 
these measures to existing limited partnership agreements. Furthermore, Ross Finnie 
made suggestions that a pre-emptive right to buy might be considered to allow the 
general partners of existing partnerships to acquire ownership of their holdings, 
despite the fact that there was no clear support for such a right during the 
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consultation process.85 This, coupled with the fear of an imminent ARTB, led to the 
service of dissolution notices on general partners across the country.86  
The Scottish Parliament reacted to this situation with amendment 169: this 
proposed to allow de facto tenants, who were served a notice of dissolution on or 
after 4 February 2003 to a ‘relevant date’ in the future, to resume the tenancy in place 
of the partnership.87 This completely contradicted the Scottish Executive’s previous 
statement, which asserted that existing limited partnership arrangements would 
remain unaffected by the 2003 Act’s provisions. Instead, amendment 169 would have 
retrospective effect on these tenants, with the severe consequence that they would 
become 1991 Act tenants with the benefit of security of tenure. One commentator 
highlights the draconian effect of this, explaining that the limited partnership 
arrangements were motivated solely by an intention to provide a fixed term tenancy, 
concluded in private by the parties.88 Instead, these tenancies would now have full 
security of tenure, as well as an impending right to buy, thereby significantly 
reducing the capital value of the property.  
The ramifications of this were equally severe: the intensity of these 
dissolution notices markedly increased to the point that in one evening on 3 
February 2003, the night before this amendment was proposed to take effect, more 
than two hundred landowners informed their general partners of the end of their 
tenancy.89 After receiving news of this, the Scottish Parliament responded with a 
further amendment: the date initially proposed for amendment 169 was brought 
forward to 16 September 2002, ensuring that those two hundred or so dissolved 
partnerships would also fall within the scope of this provision,90 which became law 
under section 72 of the Agricultural Holdings (Scotland) Act 2003.  
Importantly, however, this section created two separate regimes preventing 
landlords from taking evasive action. A statutory instrument established a division 
between the application of sections 72 and 73 by enacting a ‘relevant date’ as a cut-
off point between the two provisions, falling on 30 June 2003.91 For those landlords 
who served notices after this date, section 73 would apply, which one commentator 
has described as the ‘successor’ regime.92 If the service fell before this date, section 
72, appropriately named the ‘transition’ regime, would apply.93 The importance of 
this distinction is discussed below. 
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3. Salvesen v Riddell 
 
A. Lord Gill’s Critique 
 
In the case of Salvesen v Riddell, 94  Alastair Salvesen was one among many 
landowners who informed their general partners on 3 February 2003 that they had 
decided to dissolve their limited partnerships. The general partners in this case took 
advantage of the anti-avoidance mechanism afforded by sub-section 72(6), and 
continued the tenancy as secure 1991 Act tenants in their own right.95 Salvesen 
appealed the continuation of the tenancy by his former general partners to the Land 
Court under sub-section 72(8) of the 2003 Act. For the appeal to succeed, however, 
the Land Court would have to find that the dissolution of the partnership was for a 
purpose, other than to deprive the de facto tenants of the rights bestowed upon them 
under the new legislation.96 It was in this regard that the Land Court dismissed Mr 
Salvesen’s application.97 The case was appealed by the landowner to the Court of 
Session, but on this occasion Salvesen brought forward another argument: section 72 
had violated his rights under the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR).98  
Salvesen argued that section 72 was not a ‘legitimate’ provision, and that it 
arbitrarily punished him through the instant ‘material reduction’ of his property’s 
capital value as a result of the indefinite tenancy to which his land was subject.99 As 
a result of this ‘material interference’ with the landlord’s peaceful enjoyment of his 
property, the appellant argued that Article 1 Protocol 1 had been engaged.100 The 
appellant also argued that Article 14 of the ECHR had been violated: section 72 
arbitrarily discriminated against landlords through differing and unequal treatment 
of them based purely upon whether they had served notice before or after 30 June 
2003, placing a ‘disproportionate and excessive burden’ on those falling in the 
former category without any ‘objective justification’.101 It was argued by the general 
partners, however, that the approach taken by the Scottish Parliament was justified 
as a remedy to the ‘mischief’ occurring externally to the Bill’s passage, and that this 
was not as ‘draconian’ as applying section 72 to all limited partnership tenancies, 
regardless of the date on which notice was served.102 Furthermore, although section 
72 was retrospective in nature, this effect was limited by targeting that ‘flurry’ of 
notices served before 4 February 2002.103 
The Lord Justice-Clerk began his judgment by criticising the drafting of section 72: if 
the provision were to be read literally, it would have no effect on those partnerships 
served with dissolution notices between 16 September 2002 and 22 April 2003. The 
                                                 
94 [2013] UKSC 22, 2013 SC 236.   
95 Agricultural Holdings (Scotland) Act 2003, s 72(6). 
96 ibid s 72(9). 
97 Salvesen v Riddell, Scottish Land Court, SLC/3/09 <www.scottish-land-
court.org.uk/decisions/SLC.03.09.rub.html> accessed 21 March 2016 
98 Salvesen v Riddell [2012] CSIH 26, 2013 SC 69 [53] (LJ-C Gill). 
99 ibid [55]. 
100 ibid. 
101 ibid.  
102 ibid [56]. 
103 ibid. 
Aberdeen Student Law Review – Volume 7 
39 
reason for this was that sub-section 72(9) required the court to consider whether the 
purpose of the dissolution was to deprive the tenant of any right afforded by the 
legislation.104 However, the legislation was yet to be enacted and, therefore, none of 
these rights were in existence.105 Furthermore, the main purpose of any termination 
of a contractual agreement is to bring the rights and obligations entailed therein to 
an end; therefore, the contents of sub-section 72(9) were devoid of meaning.106 In any 
case, if sub-section 72(9) were to be applied as the Scottish Parliament had 
intended,107 there would be a violation of Article 1 Protocol 1.108 The Lord Justice-
Clerk held that, on consideration of the statute as a whole, the 2003 Act pursued a 
social or economic policy in the public interest.109 The court would need, however, to 
decide whether section 72 served that legitimate aim in an ‘appropriate and 
proportionate’ manner.110 This would entail consideration of the justifications for the 
enactment of section 72; the impact that the application of this provision would have 
upon the landlord’s interest in his property; and whether there existed any 
alternatives to this procedure, such as that provided by section 73 (discussed further 
below).111 One of the justifications offered by the Scottish Government was that the 
legislation, as a whole, sought to meet a balance between the security of tenure 
afforded to tenants, and the freedom of landlords to use the land.112 It was argued by 
the Scottish Government that section 72 was a furtherance of this aim as it prevented 
landlords from circumventing the aforementioned balancing of interests. 113  The 
court found, however, that section 72 went beyond acting as a ‘furtherance’ of this 
aim: the Lord Justice-Clerk took the view that anti-avoidance mechanisms should 
seek only to remove the benefit achieved through circumvention; this measure went 
much further. 114  It had created ‘excessive consequences’ for the landlord by 
encumbering him with a 1991 Act tenancy. It was the view of the court that less 
excessive means could have been used, such as preventing those dissolutions served 
within the defined period from being effectual,115 or providing the tenant with one of 
the new limited duration leases created by the statute.116 The Scottish Parliament 
could have also extended the measure found under section 73 to all cases, instead of 
creating two separate regimes.117 
Indeed, the very existence of two regimes only highlighted the arbitrary 
nature of this provision: for those landlords who were fortunate enough to have 
served a dissolution notice after 30 June 2003, section 73 would afford them an 
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incontestable notice to quit, whilst providing a notice period of two to three years.118 
The benefit of this requirement of notice was that it acted as a ‘cooling off’ period to 
enable mediation to be undertaken, or a negotiated resolution to be reached.119 This 
was in stark contrast to the consequences produced by section 72, which placed an 
‘excessive burden’ on landlords, encumbering their lands with secure tenancies, as 
well as imposing upon them a pre-emptive right to buy, to the significant detriment 
of the capital value of that land. No justification for this distinction had been offered 
by the Scottish Government,120 which led the Lord Justice Clark to the conclusion 
that the two regimes amounted to ‘unreasonable discrimination’ between 
landlords.121 However, this did not amount to ‘discrimination’ in the sense of Article 
14.122  
In an attempt to find any further justification for the enactment of section 72, 
the court turned its attention to comments made by the Deputy Minister for 
Environment and Rural Development, Allan Wilson, during the discussion of the 
amendments in the Scottish Parliament.123 It was stated by the Minister during a 
parliamentary debate that this measure came in response to the ‘immoral’ actions of 
landlords, 124  ‘pending the final shape of the legislation’, and it was necessary, 
therefore, to protect, ‘general partners in a situation of great uncertainty (…) faced 
with the threat of imminent eviction’.125 The Lord Justice-Clerk found that section 72 
was, therefore, essentially a retaliatory measure against the ‘immoral’ actions which 
had been taken by the landlords and was, as a result, punitive in nature.126  
The court could not find any justification for the severity of this punishment, 
or for the generous level of protection afforded to general partners, which appeared 
to be based on a misconception of limited partnership agreements.127 The Minister 
stated during the discussion of amendment 111 that this was a necessary measure to 
protect de facto tenants from the ‘great uncertainty’ caused by ‘imminent eviction’;128 
however, for vacant possession to be recovered in practice, the dissolution of limited 
partnerships had to be in accordance with the deeds recorded in the partnership 
agreement.129 Furthermore, these legally valid contracts were entered into freely by 
the parties ‘at arm’s length’,130 and it would have been known to both that the 
limited partner had the right to dissolve the relationship, so no greater ‘uncertainty’ 
could have been caused to the general partners.131 
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The Lord Justice-Clerk also took the view that the action of these landowners 
could not have been ‘immoral’.132 Before the last amendment of section 72, this 
provision had not yet been extended to landlords issuing notices before 4 February 
2003, who, up to that point, had received assurances in the Draft Bill,133 as well as in 
the White Paper, 134  that there would be no interference with existing limited 
partnership agreements; therefore, they, ‘would [not] have (…) assumed that the Bill 
would be extended to existing leases’.135 Perhaps the court was seeking to find a less 
cynical view of the landlords’ actions on 3 February 2003; however, Lord Gill’s 
statement here seems to disregard the increasing external pressure on the Rural 
Development Committee to extend the pre-emptive right to buy to an absolute one.  
Indeed, this paper has shown that on numerous occasions, the Scottish 
Executive had already contradicted its own policy, becoming increasingly in favour 
of balancing rights to suit the needs of tenants. Furthermore, landowners were also 
likely to be aware of media coverage, broadcasting the unpredictable changes 
occurring within the legislative debate, and the increasing pressure for the 
introduction of ARTB.136 When one also considers the sudden emergence of evidence 
of several hundred dissolution notices being issued in a single evening, occurring 
the night before amendment 169 was due to be discussed, this would lead one to 
believe that the landlords had, in fact, already, ‘assumed that the Bill would be 
extended to existing leases’.137 Although, as Lord Gill states, they may have, ‘had no 
cause to fear that [their] action would be affected by any provision of the 
forthcoming legislation’,138 they were likely to fear that inaction would have had 
serious consequences, in light of the Executive’s comments regarding an extension of 
the pre-emptive right to buy to limited partnerships.139  
Whether the action of landlords, attempting to avoid an imminent extension 
of severely punitive measures, was ‘immoral’ is a separate question; and whether 
that would have impacted upon the Lord Justice-Clerk’s view that section 72 was 
defective is improbable: the burden created by the measure was, in any case, 
‘excessive’. The court did not believe that section 72 reasonably related to the overall 
aims of the legislation and concluded, therefore, that this provision did violate 
Article 1 Protocol 1 of the appellant’s Convention rights.140  
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Where questions of legislative competence arise with regard to the ECHR, the 
Human Rights Act 1998 then requires the court to consider whether any reading can 
be given to the offending provision to make it compatible with Convention rights.141 
With the existence of both the ‘transition’ and ‘successor regime’ and their starkly 
contrasting results, section 72 could only be read as arbitrary and, therefore, it fell 
outwith the competence of the Scottish Parliament.142 
 
B. The Supreme Court and Remedial Order 
 
The Court of Session granted leave to the Scottish Government to appeal this 
decision to the Supreme Court.143 It was argued that the decision of the Inner House 
was premature as the case had not yet been remitted to the Land Court to allow for 
proof of Salvesen’s averment that he had intended to end the tenancy for 
amalgamation purposes, rather than to deprive the tenant of any of his rights.144 The 
court rejected this view, holding that it was no longer necessary to remit the case to 
the Land Court as the parties had reached an agreement.145 In any case, it was 
necessary, in the public interest, to consider the violation that section 72 posed to the 
ECHR.  
The Supreme Court’s approach to the issue differed from Lord Gill’s, as the 
dictum focussed on the discriminatory element of sections 72 and 73, rather than the 
purposes of the legislation as found in the statements of Scottish Ministers.146 It was 
as clear to the Supreme Court as it had been to Lord Gill that the differing treatment 
of landlords lacked any proper justification and could only be seen as arbitrary, 
which confirmed that Article 1 Protocol 1 had been violated.147 The court was careful 
to recognise, however, that both these provisions had, at the time of the decision, 
been in existence for ten years, meaning that affected parties had relied thereon.148 
Indeed, the Scottish Government identified several parties who had sold property as 
a result of these provisions; 149  therefore, it was necessary to avoid any legal 
uncertainty by limiting the defectiveness of the legislation to sub-section 72(10).150 It 
was this particular provision which determined whether a limited partnership was 
to be treated under the arbitrary ‘transition regime’, or the more lenient ‘successor 
regime’, as found under sections 72 and 73 respectively.151  
The court recognised, however, that any order seeking to rectify section 72(10) 
with retrospective effect would raise issues of legal certainty for tenants who had 
relied thereon. 152  These tenants would have invested in their holding with the 
                                                 
141 Human Rights Act 1998, s 3. 
142 Scotland Act 1998, s 29(1); Salvesen v Riddell 2013 SC 69 [102]-[103] (LJ-C Gill). 
143 A Fox, ‘Holyrood out of Bounds’ (2013) 58(6) JLSS 28-29. 
144 ibid. 
145 Salvesen v Riddell [2013] UKSC 22, 2013 SC 236 [25] (Lord Hope). 
146 ibid [39]. 
147 ibid [44]. 
148 ibid [51]. 
149 Tenant Farming SB 14/52, 25 July 2014, 17. 
150 Salvesen v Riddell [2013] UKSC 22, 2013 SC 236 [50] (Lord Hope). 
151 M Combe, ‘Peaceful Enjoyment of Farmland at the Supreme Court’ [2013] SLT 201-203. 
152 Salvesen v Riddell [2013] UKSC 22, 2013 SC 236 [55] (Lord Hope). 
Aberdeen Student Law Review – Volume 7 
43 
expectation of retaining full security of tenure, as purported by section 72 of the 2003 
Act.153 It was argued in response, however, that an order that avoided this outcome 
by rectifying the provision in a prospective manner would prevent landlords from 
recovering vacant possession of their property, meaning that the law would still be 
in violation of the ECHR.154  
In light of this, it was necessary to allow the Scottish Parliament, as the 
democratic representative of the Scottish people, to consult stakeholders as to the 
optimum means of rectifying the offending provision; the Supreme Court suspended 
its judgment for twelve months to allow for this discussion.155 On 22 November 
2013, the Scottish Government brought forward the Draft Agricultural Holdings 
(Scotland) Act 2003 Remedial Order 2014, which sought to balance tenants’ rights 
with those of the landlords affected by the retrospective nature of the order;156 
however, the compromise made as a result of this was controversial. 
The Remedial Order sought to afford parties affected by the illegal provision 
the same route given to landlords under the ‘successor’ regime. This enabled 
landlords to reclaim vacant possession through notice procedure, as well as 
providing a 12-month ‘cooling-off’ period.157 However, it would not extend section 
73 to landlords who had made bilateral agreements as a result of the defect; 
therefore, where landlords had sold property or had granted new tenancies, this was 
deemed by the Scottish Government as moving ‘beyond the defect’. 158  Certain 
advisory groups agreed with the proposal, believing that this upheld Lord Hope’s 
dictum in Salvesen v Riddell, where the Supreme Court suggested that the Remedial 
Order should avoid interference with ‘settled transactions’.159 Therefore, even where 
the parties remained the same in subsequent contractual relationships, such as in an 
agreement to continue a 1991 Act tenancy, or to grant a Limited Duration Tenancy, 
this would leave the landlord with no recourse in the face of section 73, despite 
being unduly forced into these arrangements by the illegal ‘transition’ regime in the 
first instance.  
One can understand the limitation of this remedial measure where the 
tenanted property had been sold on, as a result of which the parties involved in the 
initial agreement were no longer contractually related. However, it seems unjust to 
prevent such recourse in instances where the original parties remain the same in 
simply a new bilateral agreement.160 Indeed, one commentator argues that this fails 
to recognise that section 72(10) was defective from its enactment.161 
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In any case, the cumulative effect of Salvesen v Riddell has been to undermine 
one of the key objectives of the 2003 Act in its purported attempt to stimulate the 
agricultural tenanted sector. It is no surprise that recent research into the sector has 
revealed that one of the largest deterrents to landowners considering bringing 
forward land to the letting market is the lack of legislative stability.162 Lord Gill’s 
critique of the defective section 72 revealed the drastic and ill-conceived measures 
which the Scottish Government had devised to ensure compliance with their 
statutory regime, showing complete disregard for the financial implications suffered 
by landlords as a result of this measure.  
Furthermore, Lord Hope confirmed that the Scottish Parliament had illegally 
enacted measures which interfered with landlords’ Convention rights, which, as one 
commentator observed, is ‘hardly a ringing endorsement of the exercise of [its] 
devolved powers’.163 However, one can go much further in arguing that this may 
have jeopardised any remaining confidence which landlords may have had in the 
legislature. This is particularly so when an institution believes that severely 
punishing one community is a furtherance of balancing the rights of two groups. 
One might even argue that this has revealed the Scottish Parliament’s bias. It is no 
surprise, therefore, that 81 per cent of respondents to a recent survey of landowners 
perceive a lack of legislative confidence as the greatest challenge facing the 
agricultural tenanted sector.164  
 
 
4. Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2016 
 
In light of the controversy surrounding the Agricultural Holdings (Scotland) Act 
2003 and the failure of the Scottish Government to strike the correct balance of rights 
between tenants and landlords, as outlined above, it cannot come as a surprise that 
recent statistics have shown the inadequacy of this legislation to achieve one of its 
primary aims – secure greater levels of tenancies.165 Indeed, within a decade of the 
2003 Act’s enactment, the proportion of agricultural land that is rented has dropped 
from 28.6 per cent to 22.2 per cent.166 It is also no surprise that further legislative 
reform of agricultural law was necessary to correct this problem. The Cabinet 
Minister announced in 2013 that a group of experts had been appointed to conduct a 
review of agricultural holdings legislation, with the remit of finding the appropriate 
means to reinvigorate the tenanted sector, where the 2003 Act had so obviously 
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failed.167 After the publication of the Review Group’s recommendations in January 
2015, many of these proposals were incorporated into the Land Reform Bill, which 
was passed by the Scottish Parliament on 16 March 2016 and which received Royal 
Assent on 22 April 2016.168 
 
A. The Absolute Right to Buy (ARTB) in the Wake of Salvesen v Riddell 
 
Despite the clear misgivings expressed in the debate of ARTB in the previous reform 
of the tenanted sector, it was announced by the Cabinet Secretary that AHLRG 
would specifically consider the measure.169 This came much to the disappointment 
of the key stakeholder group, Scottish Land and Estates (SLE), formerly the SLF, 
prompting the then chairman to state that, ‘allowing the absolute right to buy to be 
brought back to the table when it has been rejected by the farming unions and 
landowners alike flies in the face of listening to the farming industry’.170  
In this regard, an industry-led body was created by the 2003 Act to consider 
certain issues regarding the tenant farming sector, with the remit of, ‘promoting a 
healthy farm tenanted sector in Scotland’. 171  The TFF, consisting of the major 
stakeholders in the industry, was commissioned by the Scottish Government in 2007 
to investigate the greatest barriers obstructing access to the sector for new 
entrants.172 After the publication of the Report into new entrant barriers, the TFF 
then sought to make recommendations to the Cabinet Secretary.173 Recommendation 
four made it clear that, ‘[a]ll TFF members recognise the importance of (…) evidence 
(…) regarding the perceived uncertainty about the “right to buy” legislation and the 
impact that this is having on the confidence of the owners [considering letting 
land]’.174 It was recommended, therefore, that there should not be an extension of the 
right to buy beyond that embodied in the 2003 and 1991 Acts.175 The then chairman 
of the TFF, Jeff Maxwell, publicly announced that it was, ‘up to the [Cabinet 
Secretary] to make an unequivocal statement about the Scottish Government’s 
intentions in relation to the right to buy’.176 
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The Scottish Government responded to this by recognising that confidence 
was key to, ‘encouraging owners of farmland to offer up land for let to new tenants’, 
and that an extension of the right was not in the, ‘best interests of a thriving farm 
tenanted sector’. 177  Furthermore, the Scottish Government could not justify the 
interference that this would cause to property rights in terms of public benefit, and 
this, ‘would do nothing to encourage new entrants’.178 It was confirmed, therefore, 
that the Scottish Government would not bring forward any extension of the right to 
buy, clarifying that, ‘[the] Absolute Right to buy [was] not on [their] agenda’.179 This 
statement came with an important caveat, however: 
 
[O]wners should now have the confidence to get on and let land to new 
tenants. Indeed, we will monitor the uptake of new tenancies in the future 
and consider further action in the future if more land is not let[.]180 
 
It was likely, therefore, that the Cabinet Secretary’s statement regarding the 
reconsideration of ARTB came as a response to the fact that there had been no 
increase in tenanted land in the five years following the statement made by the 
Scottish Government. Indeed, the announcement came within a week of the latest 
statistics revealing that tenanted levels had instead decreased.181 This would suggest 
that the Cabinet Secretary’s statement came in retaliation to the failure of landlords 
to bring more land to the market; furthermore, one could even argue that if any 
future legislation were to enact ARTB, this could be interpreted as a punitive 
measure in consideration of the statement made by the Scottish Government above. 
Besides revealing the unpredictable nature of legislation in this area of law, the 
inclusion of ARTB as a punitive measure in any future legislation would certainly 
raise issues of ECHR compliance in light of Salvesen v Riddell.182  
 
B. The Future of the Absolute Right to Buy (ARTB) 
 
It is interesting to consider, in view of AHLRG’s reconsideration of ARTB, whether 
this measure has a place in the future of agricultural tenancy law in Scotland. ARTB 
has already been afforded to crofters,183 as well as to crofting communities.184 A 
similar measure was applied to ultra-long leases to allow for feuars to convert their 
property interest into dominium,185 which the Scottish Government believed to be 
the final legislative instalment fully to remove feudal superiority from Scottish land 
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tenure.186 Others would argue, however, that without providing secure 1991 Act 
tenants with ARTB, Scottish farming will remain within ‘the grip of feudal 
inheritance’.187 
The major stakeholders, excepting the Scottish Tenant Farming Association 
(STFA), have consistently asserted that the introduction of ARTB would undermine 
the confidence of landowners to let land. However, commentators, such as Andy 
Wightman have argued that this concern lacks any rationale.188  
The STFA, originally as STFAG, had only argued for the extension of ARTB to 
secure 1991 Act tenants. 189  Furthermore, the SNP, who supported the measure 
during the 2003 Act’s passage through Parliament, provided its support on the 
condition that this measure be limited to secure tenancies, recognising, ‘secure 
heritable tenants as a distinct group of people in Scotland’.190 The same stance has 
been consistently maintained by the Cabinet Secretary. 191  Wightman argues, 
therefore, that the effect of this proposal on the confidence of landlords has no 
justification, considering that the use of secure tenancies had ceased by the 1980s.192 
Indeed, recent statistics have shown that, excepting seasonal leases, the only letting 
vehicles provided by statute that have increased are the Limited Durations 
Tenancies.193  
Wightman argues, furthermore, that the assertion that the introduction of 
ARTB would lead to a loss of available tenancies on the market also lacks any 
foundation.194 The commentator believes that Scotland's level of tenancies could 
actually increase if the tenure system were shifted from a ‘landlord-tenant’ system to 
one where owner-occupier farmers rented out to one another, achieved through 
ARTB.195 Historical reference to such an approach was cited by Professor James 
Hunter, explaining that this measure was applied by the UK Government to Ireland 
in 1903, when the ‘Wyndham’ Act, named after the then Chief Secretary for Ireland, 
                                                 
186 Scottish Government, Policy Memorandum – Long Leases (Scotland) Bill (APS Group Scotland 2012) 
para 9 <www.parliament.scot/S4_Bills/Long%20Leases%20(Scotland)%20Bill/Policy_Memo.pdf> 
accessed 23 February 2017. 
187 A Wightman, ‘Tenant Farming Crisis’ (Land Matters 2012) 
<www.andywightman.com/archives/794> accessed 21 March 2016. 
188 A Wightman, ‘Why Does Norway Have More Tenanted Land than Scotland?’ (Land Matters 2013) 
<www.andywightman.com/archives/3086> accessed 21 March 2016. 
189 ‘Submission from Scottish Tenant Farming Action Group to the Scottish Parliament’ (June 2002) 2 
<www.parliament.scot/S4_RuralAffairsClimateChangeandEnvironmentCommittee/General%20Doc
uments/ECHR_-_STFA.pdf> accessed 23 February 2017.  
190 Rural Development Committee 4 February 2003, Scottish Parliament Official Report, col 4188. 
191 E Pate, ‘Richard Lochhead Takes Issue of Farm Tenants’ Absolute Right to Buy to New Level’ (The 
Courier 2014) <www.thecourier.co.uk/news/richard-lochhead-takes-issue-of-farm-tenants-absolute-
right-to-buy-to-new-level-1.132911> accessed 21 March 2016. 
192 A Wightman, ‘Why Does Norway Have More Tenanted Land than Scotland?’ (Land Matters 2013) 
<www.andywightman.com/archives/3086> accessed 21 March 2016. 
193 Scottish Government, Review of Agricultural Holdings Legislation (Interim Report, Scottish 
Government 2014) 27. 
194 A Wightman, ‘Why Does Norway Have More Tenanted Land than Scotland?’ (Land Matters 2013) 
<www.andywightman.com/archives/3086> accessed 21 March 2016. 
195 ibid. 
Agricultural Tenancies: Making Room for Generation Y – Will Only the Land Endure? 
48 
allowed tenant farmers to buy their holdings with Government support. 196 
Considering, however, that Ireland now has a lower level of tenancies than Scotland, 
this would seem to undermine Wightman’s argument.197  
Wightman argues further that in other countries where systems of owner-
occupation exist, tenancy levels remain higher, such as in France and Germany with 
62 per cent and 74 per cent respectively, 198  in stark contrast to 23 per cent in 
Scotland. 199  The Agricultural Holding Review Group warned, however, that 
‘international comparisons have to be made with care’,200 considering that there are 
various exogenous factors affecting land tenure in those countries, such as varying 
regulatory control, land prices and agricultural business structures.201 Furthermore, 
these arguments fail to take into account that Scotland’s current system of land 
tenure is already dominated by owner-occupiers: in 2013, the Scottish Government 
recorded that 71 per cent of all holdings were owned by their occupiers.202 Despite 
this rise, there has been no mitigation of the reduction of rented land.203 It seems 
unlikely, therefore, that a system of tenure, relying purely upon owner-occupiers, 
would successfully deliver the land desperately needed for new entrants. Indeed, the 
Agricultural Holdings Review Group stated that it could find no evidence to support 
Wightman’s claim; rather it seemed more likely that owner-occupiers would sell to 
other owner-occupiers.204  
Wightman and Hunter have argued, however, that once the transition has 
been made to a system of farmer-to-farmer rental, freedom of contract could be 
made available as a means of encouraging greater levels of letting.205 That said, 
neither commentator has attempted to explain why freedom of contract could not be 
afforded to landlords under the current system. It is clear that, without such an 
explanation or justification, the proposal could not be enacted without engaging 
Article 1 Protocol 1 ECHR.  
Some justification for the proposal might be addressed in the Land Reform 
Review Group’s (LRRG) consideration of secure 1991 Act tenancies in its Final 
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Report. 206  Although AHLRG were tasked with finding the optimum means of 
achieving a ‘sustainable’ and ‘dynamic’ tenanted sector, this ultimately involved 
balancing the rights of landlords and tenants for the good of agriculture.207 The focus 
of LRRG was much wider, considering measures which would make ‘stronger, more 
resilient and independent’ rural communities.208 LRRG highlighted the value of the 
inter-generational continuity which these secure 1991 Act tenancies provide, 
explaining that the resilience of rural communities operates in correlation with the 
density of kinships ties.209 This highlights the importance of these secure 1991 Act 
tenants, who are often born into land tenure by succession to these tenancies.210 
Indeed, in a recent survey of tenant farmers, it was found that 50 per cent of 
respondents and their families had held the same lease between, or over, 50 to 175 
years.211  
Furthermore, submissions to LRRG highlighted that as a result of the Scottish 
Parliament’s failure to enact ARTB for secure tenants, rural communities have 
continually deteriorated, particularly in the Highlands and Islands, where large 
estates, owned by overseas companies, were effectively diverting money from local 
economies through rents.212 LRRG recognised that, as the current debate regarding 
the right to buy continues, land agents are attempting to find any technicalities 
available to retrieve vacant possession of holdings at the cost of valuable social 
capital.213 Indeed, one submission claims that if many of the holdings on Islay and 
Jura had been owner-occupied, local businesses previously supported by secure 
tenants would have remained open, preventing the increased depopulation of the 
islands.214 LRRG considered, therefore, that the continuing deterioration of rural 
communities was not in the wider public interest, justifying the extension of a right 
to buy in appropriate circumstances.215 The group rejected the idea of an ‘absolute’ 
right to buy, preferring the notion of an ‘actual’ right to buy, which would only be 
provided to tenants on a case-by-case basis, considering the public benefit that the 
enforcement of a sale would provide; this was with a view to countering the 
concerns of ECHR compliance.216 
Similarly, AHLRG considered a conditional right to buy, but the justification 
for this was premised upon balancing the rights between landlord and tenant. 
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Tenants under the previous 2003 Act regime lacked a right to enforce contractual 
obligations owed by the landlord to the tenant. In contrast, the landlord could serve 
an incontestable notice to quit where the tenant had failed to remedy a contractual 
breach brought to their attention.217 This form of a ‘conditional’ right to buy was 
incorporated into the Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2016 (LRSA).218  
No such provision was made, however, for the ‘actual’ right to buy 
considered by the LRRG for the prevention of wider rural depopulation. Indeed, 
AHLRG found that there was not enough evidence to support either the argument 
that owner-occupation leads to greater investment in holdings, 219  or that the 
introduction of a right to buy would lead to an increase in lettings.220 Without such 
evidence, there was no clear public interest argument for the extension of the right in 
this regard.221 Instead, the group found arguments, ‘calling for the idea to be set 
firmly aside in order to bring confidence back into the market’ more persuasive.222  
Despite AHLRG’s call for the issue of ARTB to be ‘put to bed’ once and for all, 
Scottish Ministers expressed concerns during the Land Reform Bill’s passage 
through the Scottish Parliament that the proposals embodied therein did not go far 
enough towards achieving ‘radical reform’ for land tenure in Scotland, with some 
members of the SNP having demanded the enactment of ARTB.223 On the other 
hand, the Conservative MSP Alex Fergusson claimed that the Bill did not achieve the 
primary policy objective of securing an increase in lettings, arguing instead that it 
would contribute further to the erosion of landlords’ trust in the legislature. 224 
Despite these concerns, the majority of Ministers on the Rural Affairs, climate 
Change and Environment (RACCE) Committee shared the view that some form of a 
conditional right to buy, similar to that proposed by LRRG, should be explored by 
the Scottish Government.225  
The issue was raised again within a Stage 2 Committee, where Michael 
Russell MSP brought forward amendment 293 to provide ARTB for certain 1991 Act 
tenants; however, the minister withdrew the amendment, explaining that his 
intention had merely been to highlight the ongoing debate concerning the right to 
buy, and the need for the Scottish Parliament to address this issue once and for all. 226 
Russell explained that this issue had arisen from the failure of the UK Government 
to apply the same changes that had been implemented in other countries across 
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Europe at the turn of the twentieth century.227 It was only now, with the inception of 
the Scottish Parliament in 1999, that Scotland was having to cope with these 
changes.228 The SNP Minister argued, therefore, that it was imperative to take the 
next step in land reform and provide secure tenants with the right to buy in 
circumstances where they could prove investment in their holdings and 
communities, in order to allow these tenants to move forward.229  However, the 
question would then arise as to how a legal construct could be applied to test 
‘investment in a community’. Russell suggested as a qualification for this measure 
that a tenant, or their family, must have farmed the holding for a minimum period of 
fifty years.230 
The issue with this proposal is that it is impossible to reconcile the 
consequence of this qualification with the aim of the Scottish Parliament to 
encourage landowners to create longer-term tenancies. Indeed, one could argue that 
such an approach would be ‘schizophrenic’, as the chairman of SLE did, explaining 
that, ‘on the one hand you have a Bill to create a vibrant tenanted sector and they are 
trying to encourage people to let for the long term, because we fundamentally 
believe (…) it gives parties security’; however, proposals, such as the conditional 
right to buy, suggest that, ‘those who have already let for the long term in the past’ 
will be punished for doing so.231  
The Scottish Government rejected the calls for ARTB, relying on AHLRG’s 
findings that such a measure would be outwith the legislative competence of the 
Scottish Parliament, and that the Scottish Government wished to avoid another 
Salvesen v Riddell scenario.232 It believed instead that other measures now contained 
in LRSA would go some way towards strengthening tenants’ rights, such as the 
conditional right to buy and assignation, discussed further below.233 The Cabinet 
Secretary did accept, however, that this debate was likely to surface again in the near 
future.234 
 
C. Late Amendments and the Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2016 
 
With the Scottish Parliament’s continued interest in the introduction of ARTB, it 
would appear that the lessons from Salvesen have not been learnt. In addition, 
history seems to have repeated itself in another way with the late adoption of a 
controversial measure into Part 10 of the Land Reform Bill. 235  Under the old 
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legislation, landlords might have expected to retrieve vacant possession of their land 
where their 1991 Act tenant was unable to find an eligible successor or assignee of 
his tenancy. Where a secure tenant sought to assign their tenancy, the 2003 Act 
required that the assignee fall under the same class of persons eligible to succeed to 
that tenancy.236 To be assigned a secure tenancy, therefore, the assignee would have 
had to fall within a class of ‘near relatives’, excluding cousins, nieces and nephews, 
and siblings.237 The prospect of retrieving vacant possession from a secure 1991 Act 
tenant seemed particularly likely in the modern era: it was highlighted by a report 
from the TFF that, as a result of ubiquitous access to tertiary education, potential 
successors no longer had the same attraction to returning to the family farm as they 
had had in the past.238  
It was highlighted by AHLRG that there was a concern that the current lack of 
‘willing’ or ‘eligible’ successors was inhibiting older tenant farmers from planning 
retirement, which in turn prevented the early release of land to be farmed at its full 
capacity by new entrants.239 The lack of successors, and of secure pension provision, 
led AHLRG to recommend that secure tenants be afforded the right to assign their 
tenancies for value on the open market.240 Importantly, however, this could only be 
achieved through the conversion of the 1991 Act tenancy to the new ‘Modern 
Limited Duration Tenancy’, removing security of tenure and replacing it with a fixed 
term agreement.241 
This measure was incorporated into the Land Reform Bill as it made its way 
through the Scottish Parliament;242 however, this did not come without criticism. 
SLE provided evidence that if these measures were to be imposed on landlords, this 
could cost the public purse in excess of £600 million through compensation claims 
against the Scottish Government;243  furthermore, assignation of secure tenancies, 
albeit after conversion to LDT, would amount to losses of £279 million to 
landowners. 244  The only consolation that landowners could derive from such a 
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proposal would be the prospect of a fixed term tenancy; however, this would 
sometimes occur in circumstances where the tenant would have had no prospect of 
succession in the first place.245  
However, the prospect of change to the rules governing assignation was to be 
made even worse for landlords: the Scottish Government wrote to the RACCE 
Committee to inform them of their proposal to allow secure tenants to assign their 
1991 Act tenancies without any conversion to a fixed term tenancy.246 To counter-
balance this, the new provisions of ‘assignation and relinquishment’ would offer 
landlords a right of pre-emption where the outgoing tenant notified the landowner 
of their intention to relinquish the tenancy,247 which the landlord would have to 
seize if they were to have any prospect of retrieving vacant possession. Despite this 
opportunity to purchase their land back from the tenant, it was highlighted by one 
writer that this proposal would undermine the confidence of landlords. 248  The 
amendment was incorporated into the Bill at Stage 2, after the agreement of the 
RACCE Committee was obtained,249 and can now be found under Part 3A of the 
amended 1991 Act, despite claims that this measure ran the risks of ‘jeopardising’ 
the agricultural tenanted sector and breaching the ECHR. Indeed, this proposal had 
been considered by AHLRG, but the group rejected it on the basis that a public 
interest argument for this provision had not been established.250  
This move could be commended for fulfilling one of the main policy aims of 
the legislation by providing opportunities to new entrants to gain access to the 
industry, whilst retaining the benefits of full security of tenure.251 However, the 
initial proposal to afford open market assignation after conversion already achieved 
this aim without affording a right of pre-emption to landlords. Indeed, SLE stated 
that this proposal would fail to meet these aims, given that sale of the tenancy to the 
landlord would be the most likely outcome of this provision: they would have more 
capital than the new entrant and would likely absorb the costs of the purchase to 
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retain vacant possession.252 Furthermore, Michael Russell MSP, despite supporting 
the measure in the Stage 2 Committee, admitted that this would do nothing to 
achieve the Bill’s policy of increasing lets; rather, it would undermine it.253 As seen 
with the 2003 Act and the subsequent case of Salvesen v Riddell,254  the Scottish 
Parliament has, once again, brought forward a measure which has been introduced 
at a late stage in the legislative process, and contradicts the advice and expertise 
offered to achieve a healthy tenanted sector. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Considering the unpredictable nature of legislative reform in this area of law, and 
the repeated contradictory changes that the Scottish Government has made to its 
own policies, it is understandable why landlords have such little faith in the 
competence of the Scottish Parliament to achieve a fair balance of rights for tenants 
and landlords. Indeed, in a system of land tenure which requires the confidence of 
both communities for the sector to flourish, it seems that the Scottish Parliament has 
struggled to understand the difference between ideological aspirations for tenants, 
and those measures which will truly find a balance for the good of the tenanted 
sector. Unfortunately, the ill-conceived measures proposed under the Agricultural 
Holdings (Scotland) Act 2003 have impeded the invigoration of the tenanted sector.  
It was to be hoped, therefore, that the Scottish Ministers would learn from the 
consequences of Salvesen v Riddell and recognise the importance of equitable 
legislation. Instead, the Scottish Government has once again brought forward a 
hastily prepared,255 ill-conceived, last-minute amendment; one that was not based on 
the extensive consultation process conducted by the Agricultural Holdings 
Legislation Review Group. Just as the Scottish Executive did in the 2003 Act’s 
passage, the Scottish Government has produced a proposal which wholly militates 
against the primary aim of ensuring greater levels of tenancies for new entrants. 
Landlords are much more likely to be prepared to incur the cost of pre-emption than 
to allow the tenancy to be transferred with full security of tenure to a new entrant, a 
factor that undermines the entire purpose behind the provision. More important, 
however, is the scenario of a landlord who is unwilling to pay that price: the 
proposals to amend assignation of 1991 Act tenancies may induce another Salvesen v 
Riddell scenario, considering the excessive burden that this provision places on 
landlords’ property. This is a radical alteration of privately-made agreements, which 
were unlikely to have had any intention of providing secure tenants with as wide a 
class of assignees as the amendment proposes, albeit such is confined to a ‘new 
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entrant’ or those ‘progressing in farming’.256 Although such an alteration can be seen 
as beneficial in bringing new entrants into the agricultural sector, the perpetuation of 
secure tenancies favours tenants to such an extent that it jeopardises the future 
letting of land. This compromises the balance of rights needed to secure confidence 
of landlords in the letting market, and will ultimately reduce the supply of land 
available to new entrants, which is essential for affordable access to the agricultural 
industry. 
It is hard to imagine how any legislature will be able to regain the trust of 
landlords following the events surrounding agricultural tenancies, detailed over the 
course of this article. However, the provisions developed by the 2003 and 2016 Acts, 
such as those covering rent reviews, compensation at waygo, amnesty agreements, 
break clauses for new entrants and fixed term tenancies, to name but a few, do strike 
the balance required for a healthy tenanted sector. Although the uptake of these 
tenancies may be slow, as seen with the limited duration tenancies created under the 
2003 Act,257 this may improve over time as landlords regain confidence. However, 
this can only occur if the perpetuation of secure tenancies and the issue of the ARTB 
can be ‘put to bed’ once and for all.258 A healthy tenanted sector requires a balancing 
of rights, something which neither of these measures achieves. If the Scottish 
Government persists in proposing measures that weigh disproportionately in favour 
of tenants, the supply of affordable land to lease will likely dry up and the door to 
the agricultural industry for the next generation of tenant farmers will remain firmly 
shut.
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The contribution of small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) to the British economy is crucial due 
to their creation of jobs and their impetus to growth and innovation.1 In order for SMEs to thrive, 
they must first have a steady cash flow facilitated through easy access to finance. However, following 
the financial crisis in 2008, banks have been increasingly hesitant to lend to SMEs and have imposed 
stricter conditions on their lending.2 In addition, SMEs typically experience late payment from their 
debtors, which affects their cash flow, therefore restricting growth.3 Although bank lending to SMEs 
has improved in the last few years,4 the strict covenants that banks impose on SMEs restrict growth 
within the business. However, an alternative to bank lending exists in the form of invoice financing. 
This paper considers the benefits of such financing for SMEs and argues that it is an adequate 
alternative to the bank loans on which SMEs have traditionally relied.  
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1. Introduction 
 
‘A bank is a place that will lend you money if you can prove that you don't need it.’5 
- Bob Hope 
 
In the early twentieth century, Jack Cohen started a small business selling groceries 
from a market stall in East London.6 His first day’s sales were £4, resulting in a profit 
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of £1.7  Now, approximately ninety years later, this business produces over £50 
billion in annual revenue; employs around 500,000 people worldwide and generates 
£6,000 in profit per minute per day.8 That business is known as Tesco Plc. It serves as 
a striking illustration of the fact that many of the largest corporations in the world 
started life as small businesses. With a stable economy and access to working capital, 
they were able to grow into some of the most successful players in their field. 
Although the percentage of small firms that experience this kind of dramatic growth 
is minimal, collectively small businesses are vital to the UK economy.9 
Small businesses are typically grouped together with medium-sized 
enterprises under the abbreviation ‘SME’; both are very important to the economy 
and tend to be similar in nature.10 Under the Companies Act 2006, a small business is 
regarded as one with a turnover of not more than £6.5m and employing no more 
than fifty people; a medium sized business has an annual turnover of less than 
£25.9m, employing no more than 250 people.11  
SMEs make up 99.9 per cent of all UK businesses and the sector has made its 
mark in the last five years, supporting high, sustainable growth within the domestic 
economy and fostering innovation and job creation.12 Figures show that, in 2015, 
employment by SMEs totalled 60 per cent of private-sector employment and that the 
combined annual turnover of SMEs amounted to £1.8 trillion. 13  Essentially the 
backbone of the UK economy, it is vital that they have easily accessible working 
capital with which to maintain a stable cash flow or to expand. 
SMEs are typically heavily dependent on bank lending to fund general 
growth or to fuel a start-up, especially on term-loans and overdrafts, as these are 
easy loans to obtain and ostensibly the cheapest.14  However, as a result of the 
financial crisis in 2008, bank lending has now hit an all-time low. 15  SMEs in 
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particular have been challenged with the difficulty of accessing working capital.16 In 
the period from 2008 onwards, ‘rejection rates for both overdrafts and term loans 
were higher than ever’.17 Due to these circumstances, SMEs are increasingly prone to 
failure. 
With this problem in mind, the present article seeks to propose that asset-
based finance is an adequate alternative to bank lending where banks are either 
hesitant to lend or have tightened their terms of agreement. Whilst it is 
acknowledged that asset-based finance can take various forms, the focal point for the 
purposes of this work is invoice finance alone. 
 
 
2. Problems Faced by SMEs 
 
A. The 2008 Financial Crisis 
 
The financial crisis was predominantly caused by failures in the financial sector as a 
result of under-regulation and insufficient supervision of the industry.18 Financial 
institutions failed to manage their businesses vigilantly and to appreciate the risks 
inherent in the activities that they were conducting.19 As a result of these failures, 
there has been an unprecedented level of worldwide government intervention to 
increase liquidity and to prevent even more banks from collapsing.20 
The crisis first became apparent in the UK during 2008, when the Bank of 
England provided financial support to the Northern Rock Building Society; the latter 
faced a liquidity crisis after borrowing large sums of money to fund mortgages for 
customers. 21  As the crisis developed, the affected banks’ lending capacity was 
significantly diminished, impelled as they were to readjust their balance sheets.22 
Andrew Freeman testifies to this problem, explaining that banks began to deleverage 
through scanning loan agreements for covenants that the debtor may have breached; 
where a breach was discovered, the loan was withdrawn or the covenant’s 
restrictions tightened.23 Freeman describes this process as ‘upsetting’ for businesses, 
observing that ‘debt was actually behaving like equity – the lender became the de 
facto owner of the business, able to dictate terms and potentially even put the 
business into administration’.24  
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Evidence from autumn 2008 indicates that SMEs were, ‘finding it increasingly 
difficult to obtain finance; seeing the withdrawal of promised finance; experienc[ing] 
sharp increases in loan interest rates; and (…) having facility fees imposed’.25 In 
addition to this, the UK Survey of SME Finances (UKSMEF) showed that businesses’ 
credit ratings were poorer on average following the financial crisis.26 This accounts 
for the reluctance of banks to lend to smaller businesses, which were more likely to 
have poor credit ratings and to lack collateral. 
 
B. The ‘Funding Gap’ 
 
Banks’ reluctance to lend to SMEs has contributed to the notion of a ‘funding gap’ 
existing in the SME sector, identified by the 2009 Rowlands Review.27 The term 
refers to, ‘the situation where a firm has a profitable opportunity but there are no or 
insufficient funds either from internal or external sources to exploit the 
opportunity’.28  
 Although banks’ disinclination to lend to SMEs accounts for most of the 
funding gap, there are other contributory factors thereto. A significant amount of 
SMEs do not even attempt to obtain debt finance on the assumption that their 
requests will be rejected.29 For example, the Small Business Survey carried out in 
2015 stated that just under a third (31 per cent) of Scottish SMEs had applied for debt 
finance over the previous three years, a figure which, when compared with the 45 
per cent of SMEs that had sought such finance in 2012, 30  suggests that SMEs’ 
confidence in their ability to obtain bank debt finance has been diminishing since the 
2008 crisis. Increasing rejection rates have only confirmed SMEs in their fear that 
they will be refused a loan. 
Another key factor in widening the funding gap is the lack of awareness 
amongst some SMEs of the types of finance that are most suitable and the potential 
availability of finance from alternative sources. This is partly a result of the 
expectations that dominated the pre-crisis period, when the exercise of bank lending 
was unregulated and limited advice was available on the issue. 31  A lack of 
awareness of alternatives led SMEs to believe that bank debt financing, consistently 
readily available and easy to obtain, was the only suitable financing option. Evidence 
collected by the SME Finance Monitor shows that fewer than a fifth of the SMEs 
surveyed were aware of banks’ strategies to improve access to alternative providers 
of finance such as asset-based finance and Business Angel finance.32 The lack of 
educational advice and support in this matter may have posed a particular threat to 
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SMEs, for which one of the key challenges is the identification of an appropriate type 
of finance; one which has the potential to kick-start or increase growth within the 
business.  
Although, in recent years, one could observe a slight improvement in bank 
lending to SMEs – cumulative gross lending increased from £38bn to £50bn between 
2012 and 2014,33 and the ‘Funding for Lending’ governmental scheme has been 
implemented34 – this trend should not be embellished. John Allan, chairman of the 
National Federation of Self Employed and Small Businesses (FSB), states that: 
‘Although these are promising signs (…) there are still large numbers of businesses, 
especially sole traders and micro businesses, that are not aware of their finance 
options and as a consequence don’t get the finance they need.’35  
 
C. Late Payment of Debts 
 
In addition to the funding gap, SMEs are adversely affected by the late payment of 
debts due to them, in particular those owed by their larger customers.36 Larger 
customers tend to enjoy greater bargaining power, primarily due to the influence 
that they have on the potential growth of an SME as a purchaser of their goods. As a 
result, such customers can often delay payment of invoices with impunity, as well as 
exert pressure on SMEs to obtain higher quality products at lower prices. This 
constitutes a serious problem for SMEs as it hinders the cash flow of their businesses 
and prevents them from paying back their own suppliers, leading to bad business 
relationships. 
 Even before the financial crisis, in 1993 to be precise, the Forum of Private 
Business estimated that 89 per cent of SMEs were paid late by fifty-one days after the 
average due date.37 The Late Payment of Commercial Debts (Interest) Act 1998 was 
subsequently passed to allow SMEs to claim interest upon late payments from other 
businesses.38 The statutory interest rate is 8 per cent plus the Bank of England Base 
Rate, currently making it 8.5 per cent.39  
Although there is some evidence of an improvement to the ‘late payment’ 
problem within business, 40  research also suggests that the position remains 
unsatisfactory for many small firms.41 The average late payment burden that SMEs 
face now stands at £31,901, which puts many at risk of bankruptcy.42 This is even 
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more worrying given the statement by 25 per cent of SMEs that a late payment 
burden of £20,000 or less is enough to imperil their business prospects.43 
One could, therefore, question how successful the 1998 Act has been in 
combatting the problem of late payments. One potential difficulty is that SMEs want 
to avoid jeopardising their trading relationships with the customers on whom they 
rely for survival. Amir Khanlari accentuates this point, observing that no matter how 
satisfactory a business’ products are, that business will not be guaranteed continued 
customer loyalty if it has provided a poor service experience, a key example of 
which being the imposition of charges and interest.  
 In this troubling financial climate, characterised by a decline in bank lending 
and tightened lending criteria, along with the continuous problem of late payment of 
debts, the growth of SMEs will inevitably be constrained. As SMEs have, hitherto, 
tended to rely on bank lending, it is presumed that this would be their preferred 
means of reinstating their cash flow when faced with late payments. However, 
bearing in mind the increasing strictness of lending criteria and of the covenants 
imposed on higher risk businesses, in particular SMEs, the latter may be placed in an 
even more vulnerable position if they continue to borrow from banks.  
  
 
3. A Potential Solution: The Law on Invoice Finance 
 
A. What Is Invoice Finance? 
 
Ensuring a healthy cash flow is the first and foremost priority of an SME. It is both a 
necessary ingredient of the growth of a business and an important measure of 
stability.44 It is submitted that the best way to create such a cash flow is via invoices. 
With the biggest source of cash remaining in the hands of their customers, it appears 
that SMEs’ invoices will often be the most valuable assets within their businesses.45  
As an alternative to bank lending, asset-based finance covers an array of 
devices that can be used to release locked up cash, such as plant and machinery, 
property and receivables.46 For the purposes of this written work, the focus will be 
on releasing cash tied up in receivables, i.e. invoice financing. The benefits of invoice 
financing have the potential to overcome the problems that typically confront SMEs 
– by combatting restricted access to finance, providing credit expertise and obviating 
the risk of loss in profits where invoices are paid late. Moreover, the nature of SMEs’ 
payment procedure qualifies for the invoice financing service; generally speaking, 
these businesses issue invoices to their customers along with credit terms, for 
example ’30 days to pay this invoice’.47 Indeed, SMEs’ growth is built upon their 
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trading relationships with other businesses where an invoice is issued immediately 
after the transfer of goods. 
Invoice financing can be thought of as ‘receivables financing’, which refers to 
the transactions whereby a business raises money against the debts due to them.48 
According to Eva Lomnicka, legally this can be exerted through an ‘outright sale of 
the receivables at a discount’ or a ‘loan secured on the receivables’.49 Although both 
arrangements have the same economic outcome, in that the business is provided 
with immediate available finance, legally the two transactions are different. 50 
However, ‘outright sale of the receivables at a discount’ is the method most 
associated with receivables financing, as it has been established that this transaction 
is seen to be carried out more as a sale than a security transaction.51 Hereinafter, a 
business selling its invoices to a factor can be understood as the ‘client’ and the term 
‘debtor’ can be taken to refer to the customer of the client who owes the money. 
The method of invoice financing is twofold: it can take the form of either 
‘factoring’ or ‘invoice discounting’. Salinger on Factoring, the leading text on this area 
of law, defines it as: ‘The purchase of debts (other than [personal] debts (…) and 
debts payable on long terms or by instalments) for the purpose of providing finance, 
or relieving the seller from administrative tasks or from bad debts, or for any or all 
of such purposes’.52  
It is imperative at this point to elaborate on this definition by stating that, in 
the context of factoring, the debts are purchased at a discount reflecting the service 
that the factor has provided to the client.53 The client can receive up to 90 per cent of 
the discounted debts sold upfront, the remaining amount only being given to the 
client once the debtor has fully repaid their debts.54 In addition to this, the factor 
provides the function of managing the sales ledger and collecting the money on top 
of providing immediate finance to the business for a fee deducted from the 
outstanding amount due to the client.55 This method requires that the debtor be 
notified of the agreement between the factor and client.56  
In essence, ‘invoice discounting’ is achieved in the same manner. The 
difference between this and factoring is that, in the former case, notification is not 
given to the debtor; also ‘invoice discounting’ does not entail the functions of 
managing the business’ sales ledger and collecting the debts.57 Hence, one basis on 
which to distinguish factoring and invoice discounting is the presence of 
‘notification’ in one case (factoring) and the absence of notification in the other 
(invoice financing).  
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Further variants of factoring are factoring ‘with recourse’ and factoring 
‘without recourse’ to the client, the former giving the factor the right to shift the risk 
of non-payment of any debts to the client.58 Conversely, factoring ‘without recourse’ 
is the situation where the factor assumes and takes responsibility for the credit risk 
of bad debts.59 Invoice discounting (in which notification is not given to the debtor) 
is naturally carried out in conjunction with recourse to the client. Therefore, invoice 
discounting can be classed as an exclusively financial facility unaccompanied by the 
additional non-financial elements that factoring entails. 
 The differences between factoring and invoice discounting are best illustrated 
with an example. Suppose that a client is owed £40,000 by a debtor. A third party 
(either a factor or invoice-discounter) purchases the debts at a discounted rate of 3 
per cent and the client initially receives only 90 per cent of the debt. For the sake of 
simplicity, it will be assumed, for the purposes of this example, that the third party 
does not charge any additional administration fee. Here the client will initially 
receive £36,000 (90 per cent) and a further £2,800 (7 per cent) once the debt has been 
paid.  If the third party is a factor, he or she will collect the debts and pay the final 
£2,800 to the client once the debtor has fully paid their outstanding debts. In the case 
of invoice discounting, however, the client will collect the debts, as they continue to 
bear the credit risk, and give the full amount of the debt to the factor once the debtor 
has paid the invoice.’  
In its infancy, the use of invoice finance was perceived as a weakness, with 
academics dismissing it as a last resort for meeting a client’s financing needs.60 
Woodley elaborates on this criticism with the comment that banks only offered 
invoice finance once the possibilities of overdraft lending had been exhausted.61 
However, according to Caouette, this financing technique has attracted an increasing 
amount of approval and respectability in recent years. Due to a reduction in its cost, 
many financial professionals regard it as a perfectly acceptable financing 
alternative. 62  Given this increased acceptance within the financial industry, the 
evident advice gap must be closed in order effectively to promote the benefits of 
invoice financing to SMEs.  
 
B. Invoice Financing as a Transaction by Way of Sale 
 
It was submitted earlier that the transaction of invoice financing is seen more as a 
sale than a secured loan. Whilst that understanding has sometimes been called into 
question,63 the courts have not yet been persuaded to depart therefrom. In both Chow 
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Yoong Hong v Choong Fah Rubber Manufactory64 and Lloyds & Scottish Finance Ltd v 
Cyril Lord Carpet Sales Ltd,65 it was accepted that the ‘purchase price under a contract 
of sale may be discounted, reflecting early payment, without the agreement being 
[viewed] as a disguised loan’.66 These cases persistently distinguished a discount 
charge from a payment of interest on the basis that the price paid at a discount is 
fixed and paid at once whereas interest accumulates from day to day.67 From that 
point, the notion that receivables financing was a transaction by way of sale was 
established. On this view, the client is passing on ‘ownership’ of his or her debts to 
the factor.68   
The advantages of the transaction being perceived as a sale are, firstly, in the 
case of factoring, that such a transaction allows the factor to obtain the debts directly 
from the debtor. 69  Furthermore, if understood as sale transactions, factoring 
agreements do not require to be registered in the companies’ charges register.70 This 
is advantageous for clients, who will generally wish to minimise the number of 
security interests affecting their property.71 In contrast, this ‘sale’ characterisation 
does not operate to the advantage of the factor. If that party is seen to have a 
registered charge over the receivables, he will be placed in a stronger position 
regarding disputes as to priority. 72  This is because a non-assignment clause 
(discussed below in section D) which prohibits the sale of debts, does not necessarily 
apply to prohibit charges created over debts.73 With regard to the latter, the factor is 
allowed to have a security interest in the debt, thereby allowing him or her to 
acquire direct rights against the debtor from the client.74 
Another advantage of the transaction being by way of sale for the client is 
that, generally, sales are ‘off balance sheet’, meaning that the invoices are not 
required to be reported in that way.75 This in turn gives the impression of a stronger 
balance sheet, thereby increasing the client’s borrowing capacity from a bank, which 
may result in more credit, better rates or more lenient loan covenants.  
In sum, the advantages of a sale transaction are significantly beneficial, at 
least for the client.  
 
C. Assignment of Debts  
 
This section explains the law behind the transfer of the debts to the factor. In the 
context of English law, Ruddy defines debts as belonging to a class of property 
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known as ‘choses in action’,76 which is defined in Torkington v Maggee as personal 
rights of property which can only be claimed or enforced by action – and not by 
taking physical possession.77 Lomnicka explains that because they are ‘choses in 
action’, ‘any dealing in them is effected by way of assignment’.78 The assignment of 
the receivables can either be an equitable or statutory assignment, the latter of which 
can also be referred to as a ‘legal assignment’ under the Law of Property Act 1925.79 
Regardless of which assignment is given, both have the effect of transferring 
absolute ‘ownership’ of the debts.80 
For a statutory assignment to take effect, the assignment must be written by 
the client of the factor and ‘express notice in writing’ must be given to the debtor.81 
Fulfilment of these requirements transfers to the factor a ‘legal right to the debt, all 
legal and other remedies for the debt and the power to give a good discharge for the 
debt without the concurrence of the client’.82 
On the other hand, an equitable assignment need not be in writing nor is 
giving notice to the debtor necessary in order to transfer ‘ownership’.83 The only 
difference between the two assignments is that the assignee can sue in his or her own 
name for recovery from the debtor on the basis that it is a statutory assignment, 
whereas within an equitable assignment, the factor can only enforce an action jointly 
with the client.84  
 Although giving notice is not obligatory to transfer ‘ownership’ within an 
equitable assignment, a statutory assignment should be considered as an option by 
the factor due to its intrinsic advantage of conferring priority on him or her over 
other factors. This principle was established in Dearle v Hall.85 Ultimately, as the 
advantages of giving notice have been established, it is evident that a statutory 
assignment may be preferable for the factor in terms of affording him or her priority. 
  
D. Non-Assignment Clauses  
 
A successful assignment of the debts does not simply consist of concluding an 
agreement between the client and the factor. In this regard, a hurdle to the 
assignment might exist in the form of a ‘non-assignment clause’,86 which prohibits or 
restricts both a statutory and equitable assignment of debts, precluding a factor from 
acquiring any direct rights against the debtor from the client.87 There are a few 
reasons to include this prohibition for the benefit of the debtor but fundamentally, it 
is due to the fact that the identity of the debtor’s counterparty is crucial in terms of 
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performance and payment.88 This relates, at least partly, to expediency. It is more 
convenient for the debtor to approach the original creditor (the client), who will be 
familiar to the debtor by virtue of the trading relationship between them. Secondly, 
the debtor may choose to include a non-assignment clause in relation to his or her 
set-off rights that would cease to be enforceable against the creditor (the client) had 
an assignment taken place.89  
A breach of the assignment clause renders the transfer of rights to the factor 
ineffective, as was established in the case of Linden Gardens Trust Ltd v Lenesta Sludge 
Disposals Ltd.90 However, an obiter dicta comment made by Lord Browne-Wilkinson, 
expressed that the non-assignment clause does not ‘operate to invalidate the contract 
between the assignor (client) and assignee (factor)’. 91 According to general 
contractual principles, the contract is valid because the debtor cannot interfere with 
the contractual obligations between the factor and the client;92 as such the factor can 
still raise an action against the client for breach of contract.93  
Ultimately, this contractual clause dilutes the efficacy of invoice financing, 
impairing the client’s freedom to free up cash tied up in invoices. This acts as a 
barrier in the UK to the use of invoice financing where it has the potential to combat 
late payment of debts and evade restrictive terms in bank lending. However, as 
discussed below, there is a way to circumnavigate this contractual obstacle.  
 
E. Scots Law on the Transfer of Ownership of Debts  
 
A concern may arise as to the jurisdiction governing a contract where a company is 
incorporated in England but the business is carried out in Scotland, resulting in 
Scottish debtors.94 This is because the Scots law on the transfer of ‘ownership’ of 
debts is stricter than its English counterpart, particularly as regards the requirement 
of ‘intimation’.95  
In Scots law, a successful transfer entails a three-stage process. The first stage 
requires the client to agree to sell (and the factor to agree to buy) the debt. Secondly, 
an assignation (‘assignment’ in English law) of the debt must be made by the client 
to the factor in which actual words of conveyance or words of transfer must be given 
(in practice, this is done by executing a deed of assignation and delivering it to the 
assignee).96 Thirdly, ‘intimation’ (notification) to the debtor of the transfer is essential 
in Scots law.97 Assignation confers upon the factor a mere personal right against the 
client to have the debts transferred; in other words, assignation does not, in itself, 
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transfer ‘ownership’ of the debts to the factor.98 For that to occur, ‘intimation’ is 
necessary.99  
The particular stage of intimation attracts significant attention in relation to 
the stricter rules arising under Scots law. This is primarily due to the fact that 
intimation determines whether the factor has ‘ownership’ or not, whereas in English 
law a transfer of ‘ownership’ can occur regardless of whether notice is given or 
not.100 With that being said, equitable doctrines relating to the assignation of debts 
are not recognised in Scots law in the same way that they are in Scots law.101 
Alexander Grigor Allan and Others v Robert Urquhart and Others102 accentuates that it is 
‘intimation’ that gives the assignee the real right; thus the factor’s position remains 
weak between the stages of assignation and intimation as they only have a personal 
right against the assignor. 
The strict rules relating to the transfer of debts in Scots law are subject to 
some uncertainty due to an absence of clear authority concerning intimation. Doubts 
have been cast upon cases dealing with this issue, 103  but, as Ruddy explains, 
textbooks in previous years have stipulated that effective intimation is ‘given in the 
form of a notice in duplicate, the duplicate copy of which has been acknowledged by 
the debtor and returned to the assignee or, [alternatively], an old style notarial 
declaration’.104 However, in the factoring case of Liberatas-Kommerz GmbH, there was 
an indication that a court may be prepared to allow an informal intimation where 
that court only sought to ensure that the debtor had been adequately made aware of 
the transfer, and, if he or she had, that was sufficient to amount to intimation.105 
However, Anderson criticises this case as weak authority due to the test established 
for determining whether intimation has taken place.106 He purports that the test fails 
to fulfil the first function of an intimation which he stipulates as ‘a provision of a 
certain date of transfer’.107  
The second function, namely to ‘interpel’ the debtor (i.e. to inform him or her 
that payment must now be made to the assignee’) was the only function that the test 
addressed.108  Anderson makes reference to postal delivery, as authorised under 
section 2 of the Transmission of Moveable Property (Scotland) Act 1862 as a 
plausible means of providing a certain date of transfer. 109  Under this rule, the 
assignee sends a certified copy of assignation by post and obtains a written 
acknowledgment of receipt from the debtor as evidence of intimation having been 
made.110  
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However, a difficulty may arise where the notice or acknowledgment 
becomes lost in the post. If the client becomes insolvent, it is questionable what the 
position of the factor will be where an acknowledgment has been sent of the 
intimation but the factor has failed to receive it due to it becoming lost in the post. 
The reliance on postage to perfect intimation essentially detracts from the notion that 
the assignee has control over his or her impending ‘ownership’ of the debts. In 
addition to this, where the client has assigned several debts to one factor or various 
factors, the time, nuisance and cost inherent in notifying the numerous debtors will 
be onerous for the factor.  
A further concern is that the requirement of intimation for a transfer of 
ownership undermines the use of invoice discounting in Scotland, where notice is 
not part of the arrangement. Therefore, it may be troublesome when determining 
whether the factor has ‘ownership’ of the debts where notice cannot be given within 
the agreement between the client and the factor. Promoting debt finance alternatives 
(in particular invoice finance) is crucial in the wake of the recession, but these efforts 
are inevitably hindered by the rule of ‘intimation’ in Scotland. Therefore, it seems 
that businesses in Scotland are restricted to factoring agreements alone, effectively 
preventing businesses from retaining confidentiality with regard to the sales of the 
debts.  
In sum, the requirement of intimation appears to be burdensome for the 
factor. He or she cannot even rely on post to transfer the intimation, as there is no 
guarantee that the notice will safely arrive in the hands of the debtor. It would 
appear to be much easier to obtain ‘ownership’ of debts under English law, 
especially under an equitable assignment where the process of transferring 
‘ownership’ is faster and uncomplicated. In Scots law, the otherwise simple 
mechanics of invoice financing appear to have been beset by complexity. 
  
F. Law of Trusts  
 
Given the above, a question arises as to how the factor is to protect himself or herself 
when he or she lacks title, whilst waiting for the impending intimation to be 
perfected by the debtor acknowledging the notice. More so, the question needs to be 
answered whether there is a way to implement invoice discounting in Scotland 
when notice is not given. Ruddy professes that there is one successful method used 
to circumvent the issue of intimation, which involves the use of a trust.111  The 
famous case of Tay Valley Joinery v CF Financial Services approved this principle, 
mitigating the difficult position in which factors had inevitably been placed.112 The 
case established that debts may become the subject matter of a trust without the 
owner divesting himself or herself thereof by means of an intimated assignation.113 
The process operates as follows: once a debt has been sold by the client to the 
factor and after assignation has been performed, while the factor only holds a 
personal right vis-à-vis the client to obtain the debts, the client can hold the title to 
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the debt in trust for the factor.114 In practice, an SME declares a trust over its own 
property (the invoices) in favour of the factor (the beneficiary) making the SME both 
the trustor and trustee. Hence, like all trustees, they are subject to fiduciary duties, 
meaning that they must fulfil the purposes of the trust and carry out their powers in 
a manner that prioritises the interests of the beneficiaries.115 This protects the factor 
of the property, who has paid for, but not yet received, title. Although there were 
uncertainties as to the legality of a declaration of oneself as a trustee of one’s own 
property, this was accepted and established in the case of Allans Trustees v Lord 
Advocate.116  
The beauty of declaring oneself a trustee is that there is no need to intimate 
the formation and declaration of the trust to the debtors. 117  It makes invoice 
discounting a practicable, viable option in Scotland. Essentially, the debtor continues 
to pay their debts to the client. This preserves the attractive aspect of invoice 
discounting whereby there is no need to give notice to the debtor of the transfer of 
debts, therefore retaining confidentiality. The debts that he or she holds in trust for 
the factor will not be attachable by the client’s creditors when undergoing 
insolvency, thereby protecting the factor against the liquidator, administrator or the 
trustee of the factor’s client.118 
It is necessary to note at this point that the law of trusts also operates as an 
invaluable device in relation to non-assignment clauses in English law. The case of 
Re Turcan held that a non-assignment clause does not preclude the client from 
holding the debts on trust for the factor.119 Lomnicka describes the creation of a trust 
as granting a proprietary right to the factor in addition to the right of breach of 
contract that he or she already has against the client. 120  This proprietary right 
essentially gives the factor priority should the client become insolvent, producing a 
similar effect to the Scots law of trusts.  
However, a disadvantage to a debtor exists wherever a factor, as a beneficiary 
under a trust, can sue the debtor directly, in cases where the client does not take 
steps to enforce performance or bring an action against the debtor.121 In such cases, 
the purpose of the non-assignment clause would be undermined. Although a 
‘limited trust’ was proposed by Lightman J as a solution to this problem, whereby 
rights are granted to the beneficiary (factor) ‘vis-à-vis the trustee’ but where no 
rights are conferred on the beneficiary (factor) against the debtor,122 the courts were 
less eager to accept this as a valid principle in the case of Barbados Trust Co Ltd v Bank 
of Zambia.123 
In conclusion, although the process of assigning debts comes with problems 
such as non-assignment clauses, it does not render the factor entirely without rights 
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enforceable under the contract. The problem can be addressed via the device of a 
trust, something which is undeniably beneficial to factors in Scots law who, after 
assignation but before intimation, hold no title over the debts but have only a 
personal right thereto against the client. The use of trusts within an assignation (or 
assignment) of the debts essentially results in three different laws involved in the 
agreement: property, contract and trusts. This is arguably cumbersome for the 
parties to the agreement and may negatively influence their decision to use invoice 
financing. However, so long as legal advice is sought on the matter, the simple 
process of invoice financing and its benefits should be unequivocally appealing to 
SMEs. 
 
 
4. Invoice Financing versus Bank Lending 
 
This article suggests that, while bank lending has its advantages, certain aspects 
thereof can pose serious risks to SMEs. This section of the article aims to provide an 
analysis of the supposed benefits of invoice finance. It will explore whether this 
mode of financing is an intrinsically good alternative to various forms of bank 
lending and whether the traditionally negative perceptions of this finance technique 
should be re-assessed.  
It was submitted earlier in the paper that SMEs rely on bank lending to obtain 
working capital with more than half of SMEs in the past three years seeking finance 
through their main bank.124 This is primarily due to SMEs’ assumption that bank 
lending is the most suitable option thanks to its flexibility and the exceedingly easy 
access to credit that it provided prior to the financial crisis.125 Furthermore, research 
collected by the Forum of Private Business shows that many SMEs remain 
apprehensive with regard to alternative lending; they express uncertainty as to the 
long-term feasibility of such options, with one in four stating that they were ‘a 
temporary phenomenon due to current economic conditions’.126 In addition, only 1 
per cent of SMEs use invoice finance, which highly contrasts with the third of SMEs 
that use overdrafts and term loans. 127 
Fundamentally, this has contributed to the emergence of an advice gap as 
regards the financial alternatives available to SMEs; indeed, fewer than 12 per cent 
were aware of invoice financing.128 Essentially, this means that a large percentage of 
SMEs lack awareness of other suitable options for their business.  
The next sections focus on bank lending. Since overdrafts and term loans are 
the most commonly used facilities by SMEs, where reference is made to ‘bank 
lending’ below, consideration will be paid to both.  
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A. Overdrafts  
 
An overdraft is a form of debt financing intended generally to cover short-term 
loans.129 It is operated through a customer’s current account and arises when the 
business exceeds its available balance.130 An overdraft is particularly attractive due 
to the attendant flexibility of borrowing the exact amount needed at a specific time 
and it is relatively quick to arrange.131 This is advantageous for SMEs which operate 
in a fast-paced environment, where an injection of capital is usually needed 
immediately to meet daily obligations. The limit of the amount that can be 
withdrawn is usually agreed beforehand, for which facility (known as an authorised 
overdraft) the business may be required to pay a commitment fee.132 Overdrafts can 
also be unauthorised, but a higher rate of interest will be imposed on such 
borrowing and further charges will be incurred by the business; hence it is of benefit 
to the SME to undertake an authorised facility.133  
On the other hand, invoice financing is linked to the client’s sales ledger, not 
the balance sheet, and so the facility is allowed to grow with the business. 134 
Essentially, no debt arises as it is purely a transaction of advancing cash against the 
unpaid debt, with no consequent increase to balance sheet liabilities. An overdraft, 
by contrast, is written off as an expense of the business. The cost could even escalate 
higher than planned if the business overdraws above the overdraft limit or fails to 
abide by the repayment terms. 
Ferran purports that there is a requirement attached to the facility for the 
debts to be ‘repayable on demand’, which refers to a loan made where no time 
repayment is specified or where it is expressly stated to be repayable ‘on demand’.135 
In addition to this, even where a set period has been agreed for the overdraft, the 
bank can still demand repayment before this time has elapsed.136 
Arguably, a ‘repay on demand’ requirement would be ill-suited to the 
unexpected, often unavoidable, deficits to which SMEs are vulnerable. Where an 
SME is required to repay on demand, it may not have sufficient funds to repay the 
money borrowed via the overdraft facility. This is what occurred in Cripps 
(Pharmaceutical) Ltd v Wickenden, where a bank was held still to be within its rights 
when it appointed a receiver to enforce its rights less than two hours after it had 
demanded repayment, even when it was evident that the business did not have the 
capacity to pay at that precise time.137 Similarly, a delay of just one hour between 
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making the demand and sending in the receivers was held to be justified in the case 
of Bank of Baroda v Panessar.138 
As the two aforementioned cases make clear, reliance on an overdraft facility 
could severely prejudice an SME. Where the SME has insufficient funds to repay the 
overdraft on demand and the receiver is appointed to sell the business’ assets to 
repay the debts to the appointer (bank),139 it can be postulated that the business is 
facing imminent insolvency. 
This can be contrasted with a factoring agreement, wherein a proper notice 
period is required by both sides, reassuring the borrower that the supply of funds 
will not be cut off at a crucial time during the operation of the business.140 
 
B. Term Loans 
 
Another lending facility used by banks is the term loan. Here funds are granted to 
the borrower for a specified period, requiring repayment either at the end of that 
period,141 or during the period in accordance with the agreed repayment schedule.142 
The primary use of term loans differs from that of an overdraft where the loan is 
used for start-ups, to fund a project or to acquire assets, usually equipment for the 
business.143 Hence, this form of financing is suitable for the long term. 
An interest charge is also levied in addition to the obligation to repay the 
principal sum.144 The interest charge is either fixed for the term or variable through 
LIBOR, the London Inter-Bank Offered Rate, a benchmark giving an indication of the 
average rate at which a LIBOR contributor bank can obtain unsecured funding in the 
London inter-bank market for a given period, in a given currency.145 
With regard to repayment of the loan, there are three ways in which the 
repayment can be executed. An agreement may stipulate that the whole loan is to be 
repaid at one time, amounting to a ‘bullet repayment’.146 An ‘amortized repayment’ 
comprises repayment in instalments over a period of time and, where the final 
payment is the largest instalment of the repayments made over the period, this is 
known as a ‘balloon repayment’.147 Additionally, where more money is required, 
instead of applying for a fresh loan, the business can acquire the funds through a 
revolving credit facility.148 
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C. Conditions Precedent  
 
Naturally, a bank’s priority in lending money is to ensure that the business is able to 
repay the loan. As such, prior to lending money to a business, banks will carry out 
credit assessments. The key factors shaping the bank’s decision are: Character, 
Ability, Margin, Purpose, Amount, Repayment and Insurance (CAMPARI).149 The 
process by which CAMPARI operates essentially allows the bank to obtain certain 
constitutional and financial documents which form part of the ‘conditions precedent’ 
stage that must be satisfied before the business can draw down funds.150 
Where the business’ operations and financial documents are heavily 
scrutinised at such an early stage, this constitutes a significant hurdle to borrowing. 
This assessment stage may harm the prospects of a business seeking to start up 
because such a business will lack certain attributes required under the assessment.  
For example, where the banks look to the ‘Ability’ element of making a 
successful business, essentially they are enquiring as to whether the business owner 
has the relevant sector experience or the skills adequately to control and expand the 
business. 151  The business owner who is starting up may not have previous 
experience, which may hinder the bank’s decision whether to lend.  
The element of ‘Amount’ concerns how much the business is seeking to 
obtain and how much the business itself is willing to contribute.152 Where a business 
is a start-up, the owner may have insufficient or non-existent personal savings, 
hence relying wholly on a bank loan.  
The element of ‘Repayment’ may be the most difficult requirement to fulfil for 
both start-ups and established SMEs, as, unsurprisingly, the borrower’s ability to 
repay the money lies at the very heart of the bank’s assessment process.153 Here, the 
bank carefully examines the business’ annual accounts, management figures and 
financial projections, thereby scrutinising the business’ credit history.154 Where, as 
will often be the case with a start-up, the relevant documents display slow progress 
in its cash flow statement or the business has experienced a significant loss 
discernible from its profit and loss account, a problem naturally not confined to 
start-ups, this may act as a warning sign to the bank, suggesting that the business in 
question is a high-risk borrower. In essence, there is often a vicious circle: bank loans 
are undeniably important to the survival and growth of businesses; at the same time, 
a business will struggle to obtain such credit if it cannot produce evidence, based on 
past borrowing, of its ability to repay the sums borrowed.  
The last stage, known as ‘Insurance’, looks to the form of security that the 
business can offer.155 If the sum sought is a relatively small amount, the bank will 
lend against the business’ credit history and impose covenants within the loan to 
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ensure that the business retains its ability to repay the loan; even so, in such cases, 
the bank does not usually require a security.156 However, for larger amounts, the 
bank will offer a secured loan whereby it will impose either fixed or floating charges 
upon the assets of the business and use those assets to satisfy the loan in the event of 
default.157 Additionally, where the start-up has no or insufficient collateral to serve 
as security, the bank may agree to an unsecured loan where onerous covenants can 
hinder the growth of the start-up.  
With invoice financing, the factor also examines the business’ operations in 
terms of obtaining status reports, audited accounts and enquiring about the business 
owner’s past experience within the sector.158 However, in this case, the focus is 
shifted entirely on to the debtor in terms of their ability to repay the debts as 
opposed to bank lending where the focus is primarily on the business.159 Herein lies 
a disadvantage of this financing technique. Where the majority of the approval is 
based upon the credit strength of the debtor, a poor ‘debt turn’ (i.e. the average 
period of credit taken by debtors)160 can negatively influence the factor’s decision as 
to whether to enter into the factoring agreement.  
  However, a factoring agreement does not require security in terms of 
corporeal moveable or heritable property.161 This renders the business free from the 
interference of a bank potentially seizing its assets and enables the business to use 
those assets, for example its plant and machinery, to free up additional cash under 
the other devices of asset- based financing. Ultimately, then, with regard to the 
business’ assets, SMEs are more protected under invoice financing than they are 
under bank lending.  
Another element of meeting the ‘conditions precedent’ is the representations 
and warranties produced by the business. 162  These are statements of facts, 
(accompanied by promises attesting to the accuracy of those statements) which are 
subsequently included in the agreement to serve as a basis for protection of the bank 
throughout the life of the loan.163 As Ferran purports, the onus is on the business to 
repeat the representations and warranties at specified intervals.164  
Clearly, bank lending is an area that still requires the business’ involvement 
even after the loan has been granted, in order for them to be actively aware of 
changes, big or small, and to have them disclosed promptly to the bank. This is time-
consuming and constitutes an additional burden on the owner, above and beyond 
the running of the business, as an inaccurate representation, even one made in good 
faith, or failure to notify the bank of the smallest change will entitle the lender to call 
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for repayment of the whole loan at once and to sue for the amount due if the 
borrower refuses to pay.165 
 
D. Covenants 
 
Once the bank has agreed to lend the desired sum or sums, subject to the fulfilment 
of the conditions precedent, it will continue to ensure protection throughout the life 
of the loan by including covenants in the agreement.166 The function of the covenants 
is to restrict certain business-related conduct to ensure that the credit rating does not 
decline whilst the loan is outstanding, 167  thereby protecting the bank’s primary 
interest of ensuring full repayment from the business. Where a covenant is breached, 
this amounts to an event of default allowing the bank to terminate the loan 
agreement.168 The covenants included in an agreement will differ from one loan to 
another, depending on: a) the credit risk of the business; b) whether the loan is to be 
secured or unsecured; and c) the bargaining strength of the business and the amount 
of the loan.169 
A majority of the covenants commonly found in agreements place financial 
constraints on the business such as ensuring that its current assets exceed its current 
liabilities. 170  The borrower must also ensure that its paid up share capital and 
reserves exceed a particular threshold.171 Whilst this appears to be beneficial in the 
long run as the control performed appears to operate to support the survival of the 
business, the other covenants may restrict the growth thereof, specifically the 
covenant that restricts the change of the business.172  
For example, an established SME may produce a viable business idea that fills 
a gap in a particular market. However, at the bank’s discretion, this may be regarded 
as a ‘material adverse change’, which is where the change significantly affects the 
company’s ability to perform its obligations under the relevant agreement, resulting 
in a prohibition of the business from carrying out a commercially successful idea 
which would lead to increased turnover.173 Likewise, with regard to a very young 
business, the flexibility to change the business plan without consulting the bank may 
be the determinant of whether it will have a successful start-up or not. Such a 
covenant will not be found in an invoice financing agreement. The onus on the client 
is solely to abide by certain financial undertakings that inherently benefit the 
business and their relationship with the factor, not to restrict its own economic 
growth. 
A certain degree of control can be identified in some factoring agreements. 
However, in contrast to a bank loan agreement, this type of control is desired by the 
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client. He or she does this by choosing to include as part of the factoring agreement 
the non-financial functions of factoring, namely the administration and collection 
service.174 In relation to the sales ledger administration, the factor ensures that the 
sales ledger is kept on an ‘open item’ basis, which allows ‘all respective invoices, 
unpaid parts of invoices and unallocated credit notes and payments to be listed in 
the sales ledger’,175 enabling the factor to make informed credit decisions from the 
efficient provision of how much is owed by each customer. This subsequently allows 
the factor to send clear statements and reminders to the debtors in a timely 
manner.176  
Furthermore, the additional service of credit security (factoring without 
recourse to the client) is the most important benefit of factoring.177 It is generally 
understood that SMEs do not wish to be encumbered by bad debts and late 
payments as this leads to adverse effects on the business and imposes unnecessary 
stress on the business owner. As the factor bears the risk of unpaid debts, this 
renders the client’s profit margin fully protected.178 Hence, these additional services 
offered are of great benefit to the business where credit expertise is provided by the 
factor in controlling the sales ledger, freeing up time for the owner to focus on the 
priorities of the business such as production, sales and planning – therefore paving 
the way to economic success. Evidently, factoring safeguards the SME from making 
a loss through bad debts. In contrast, when it comes to bank lending, where the 
business struggles to meet its obligation of repaying the overdraft or loan, the 
business faces further charges added on top of the debt. Moreover, a bank will 
normally include a ‘negative pledge covenant’ (NPC) in a loan agreement whereby 
the business is prohibited from creating further security over its assets without the 
consent of the bank.179 Issues arise where the business requires more funds in order 
to implement a project or a purchase. The bank may make inferences that the 
business is in a financially unstable position and refuse to grant an extension to the 
loan. In the event that the business seeks finance elsewhere, the NPC stands to 
preclude this additional funding, thereby leaving the business inadequately 
financed. Where a breach of a covenant amounts to an event of default,180 and if the 
imposed covenants are exceedingly strict in nature, making it more likely that the 
business will default, this has the potential to trigger the bank to enforce their right 
to accelerate repayment of the loan before the end of the agreed period. Hence, the 
purpose of the loan may be undermined where the covenants attached thereto 
preclude the business from utilising the funds as intended. Furthermore, where 
some businesses are unable, or choose not, to afford a lawyer to scrutinise the bank’s 
drafted contract, that business may have no choice but to accept the agreement 
exactly as drafted by the bank. As a consequence, these businesses will be subject to 
unnecessarily restrictive covenants, hence more likely to fail.  
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In sum, and in agreement with Wood, it is submitted that there are dangers in 
having exceedingly restrictive covenants: such constraints could damage a business’ 
potential for economic growth by preventing it from pursuing worthwhile 
investment and financing opportunities.181 In some cases, onerous covenants could 
even prevent the rescue of a company that is in serious financial difficulties or 
hinder the successful start-up of a new business.  
 
E. Cost 
 
Generally, with a bank loan, the repayment consists of the principal sum borrowed 
together with the interest charge.182 Notably, where the loan is secured and the 
business has defaulted, the business risks losing its assets in addition to repaying the 
principal and interest, which results in a great loss for the business. Further, where 
the business wishes to repay the loan earlier than the agreed period, extra charges 
will be incurred. On the other hand, where the loan is unsecured, the business’ 
growth may be constrained through onerous covenants, thereby restricting the 
attainment of profits.  
As expressed by Petri Mäntysaari, invoice financing, in particular factoring, 
tends to be more expensive than bank lending. 183  This is primarily due to the 
inclusion of administration and collection services and credit protection, which are 
calculated by a fixed percentage over the sales turnover.184 Another aspect of invoice 
financing that contributes to the idea that it is an expensive facility is the percentage 
of discount charged by the factor within the range of 1.5-3 per cent of the invoice.185 
For instance, where the factor purchases an invoice of £10,000 for £9,700, this means 
that the client has discounted the invoice by 3 per cent of its face value, resulting in a 
loss in profit. Essentially, a client is placed in a dilemma: either he or she can choose 
to wait for full payment, which may cause problems with cash flow, or he or she can 
pay a factor a fee for immediate prepayment of debts, triggering a loss in profits.
 The cost of invoice financing may, at first glance, be greater than the cost of 
bank lending. However, the costs of factoring are easily justified where prepayment 
of debts allows the business to grasp new business opportunities and meet day-to-
day obligations in the time that they would otherwise wait for their invoices to be 
paid, which, in some instances, can be up to two months.186 Therefore, it may be a 
price worth paying where cash flow can be predicted, enabling the client to plan 
ahead.  
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F. Time 
 
Whilst arranged overdraft applications take as little as three days to be approved, 
Khaled Soufani notes that bank loan approval can be a lengthy process, especially 
for new customers with a high credit risk.187 This can be detrimental to businesses in 
need of immediate cash and where the negotiation stage itself can take up to three 
months.188 
Conversely, within invoice financing, setting up a new agreement with the 
factor will usually take five to ten days where an advance of up to 90 per cent of the 
debts is funded within twenty-four hours of submitting an invoice.189 The latter 
inevitably applies where an established relationship already exists between the 
factor and the client.  
The immediacy of the advance to which invoice financing gives rise is of 
particular benefit to businesses operating within seasonal industries. 190  Where a 
business’ customers may take months to pay their invoices, the business may 
struggle to meet obligations that persist throughout the year, such as paying wages 
and rent, maintaining plant and machinery and investing in raw materials. 
Consequently, the prepayment schedule that a factor provides allows the business to 
function continuously even when they are not actively transacting.191 
Thus, taking into consideration the nature of SMEs and the fast-paced 
environment in which they operate, the time taken to approve a bank loan does not 
suit obligations that must be met in a timely manner. This places a constraint on the 
cash flow, potentially damaging the owner’s reputation and precluding his or her 
ability to take advantage of any business opportunities arising at short notice.  
By contrast, both a loan and overdraft constitute a liability for the business 
where a debt is created. This debt could be exacerbated where events of default 
trigger the bank to accelerate payment of the loan or, under secured lending, assets 
are seized from the business. Additionally, the element of repaying on demand 
under the overdraft facility can pose some serious risks to a business. Moreover, 
where flexibility to act upon gaps within a market is paramount to expansion, the 
mandatory inclusion of covenants within a loan agreement jeopardises the business’ 
economic growth particularly with regard to restrictions on changes to the business.  
The significantly faster process of setting up an invoice finance agreement 
partnered with the prompt advance of up to 90 per cent of the debts cannot be 
rivalled by the bank lending process, making the former a more convenient and 
efficient source of funding. Additionally, not only does invoice finance present itself 
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as an effective financing technique; it also combats one of the biggest problems 
currently confronting SMEs: that of late payment of debts. The prepayment of the 
unpaid debt allows a predictable cash flow to be maintained and enables the SME to 
continue with its customary business obligations. As a result, survival is 
safeguarded.  
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
It has been argued that, for SMEs, invoice financing deserves to be recognised as an 
acceptable alternative to the conventional overdraft and term loan. However, there is 
a lack of educational advice and support on this matter. The evident advice gap 
must be closed in order to promote the advantageous effects of this financing 
method.  
As well as adequately combatting the ongoing issue of late payment of debts, 
and consequently easing the burden of cash flow problems, it is evident that the 
intrinsic benefits of invoice finance can extend beyond the scope of temporarily 
assisting SMEs in the wake of the recession. This is because the technique of invoice 
financing allows the business to access working capital without creating a debt 
obligation. Such a facility can be very cost-effective, which is why invoice financing 
may also provide ongoing financial assistance to SMEs.  
Although transferring ownership of debts is straightforward in English law, 
under Scots law this may prove difficult due to the associated requirement of 
‘intimation’ of the assignation to the debtor. However, the use of trusts can be 
applied to circumvent this issue. While this can create complexity in theory, in 
practice the process of invoice financing is uncomplicated for both the SME and the 
factor. Despite the fact that invoice financing comes with potentially high costs, 
particularly as regards factoring, this may be preferable to the often much larger 
losses occasioned by the restrictive covenants associated with bank lending.  
  Collectively, SMEs make the largest contribution to the UK economy. Any 
process that improves their performance should therefore be given serious 
consideration. The immediate prepayment of debt within an invoice financing 
arrangement bears the potential to allow SMEs to control their cash flow effectively; 
to manage their operations in a better way; and to take advantage of business 
opportunities. To SMEs and, by extension, the economy, invoice financing would 
constitute an invaluable catalyst. 
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Abstract 
 
The European Union’s Emissions Trading System (ETS) was implemented in 2005 with the objective 
of cutting down the EU’s greenhouse gas emissions from the highest emitting industry sectors. By 
putting a cap on the total amount allowed to be emitted and by permitting allowances to be traded, the 
ETS has put a price on carbon, aiming to stimulate a reduction in emissions and to incentivise 
investments in low-carbon technologies. Nevertheless, the system has been criticised for its over-
allocation of allowances, a move which led to those allowances being priced at lower rates than 
expected, and hence, arguably, a failure to spur large-scale investments and innovation. In 2015, the 
decision for the implementation of a Market Stability Reserve was adopted. The Reserve will come 
into operation in 2019 and is supposed to function by removing or adding a predetermined amount of 
allowances from the market. This is regarded as a significant improvement, but there have been a 
number of concerns in relation to the Reserve’s ability to address the over-allocation issue. The 
present paper critically examines the relevant changes and argues that while the Reserve is a step in 
the right direction, its structure must be altered in order to give the Reserve flexibility to respond to 
the external changes and to encourage greater investment in long-term decarbonising strategies. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The European Union’s Emissions Trading System (ETS), implemented in 2005, is 
concerned with cutting down emissions from the EU industry sectors emitting the 
highest levels of greenhouse gases (GHG). The ETS was first introduced to ensure 
that the EU would meet its targets under the Kyoto protocol. However, nowadays it 
is regarded as the centrepiece of EU policy for reducing emissions by at least 20 per 
cent by 2020. It functions by putting a cap on the total amount of GHG allowed to be 
emitted by those companies covered by the system and by permitting so-called ‘EU 
allowances’ (EUAs) to be traded, thus permitting the market to determine the price 
of them. The higher the price of EUAs, the higher the incentive will be to switch to 
cleaner technologies and to employ new abatement strategies. While in theory 
emissions trading is one of the most effective tools for GHG reduction, recent history 
has demonstrated that the reality is a little more complicated. Over-allocation of 
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allowances, and the consequent reduction in carbon prices, has resulted in a lack of 
investment in clean technologies. 
The ETS has undergone a number of changes over the years with arguably the 
most important being the 2015 decision for the implementation of a Market Stability 
Reserve (MSR). The Reserve will come into operation in 2019 and will function by 
adding or removing a predetermined amount of allowances to or from the market. It 
aims to secure a stable price signal to allow companies to anticipate more accurately 
future fluctuations in prices and to make the ETS more robust in its response to 
unforeseen changes in allowance demand. This has been regarded as a significant 
improvement, but there have been a number of concerns in relation to the Reserve’s 
ability to address the over-allocation issues associated with the trading system. 
The present paper examines whether the MSR will be able to address the 
concerns voiced in the literature. Section 2 provides some general background 
information on emissions trading as well as an overview of the ETS and its history. 
Section 3 proceeds with an evaluation of the ETS and the current extent to which it 
can reduce emissions and spur investment in low-carbon technologies. That section 
proposes that a correlation exists between the over-allocation of allowances and the 
currently low price of carbon. Thereafter, it is argued that the price of carbon has 
been insufficiently high to spur investments in low-carbon technologies, thus 
preventing the EU from decarbonising the economy in a cost-effective way. Section 4 
examines whether the implementation of the MSR was necessary; how the system 
will function; what aim it pursues; and whether it will be able properly to address 
the issues voiced in the literature. The section will also argue that the Reserve will 
make the ETS more robust and better able to respond to external shocks in demand, 
as well as addressing the current problem of over-allocation by placing the back-
loaded allowances directly into the Reserve. The triggers, intervention rates, reaction 
periods and the decision to implement the Reserve as early as 2019 are critically 
analysed. In essence, this paper argues that the MSR is suitable to address the 
currently low carbon price and that it represents a positive step towards addressing 
the flaws associated with the ETS. However, more must be done to the structure of 
the MSR in order to give it the flexibility needed to respond to changing 
circumstances and new technologies, and to spur more investment in long-term 
decarbonising strategies by returning scarcity to the market more quickly. 
 
 
2. Background 
 
This section examines how emissions trading systems function in theory and what 
aims they seek to achieve. It also serves as an introduction to the structure and 
history of the EU ETS, scrutinising the first two trading phases, which were 
characterised by decentralised rules, and analysing the movement towards greater 
harmonisation at the beginning of the first phase (phase I). 
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A. Emissions Trading 
 
Emissions trading systems have been one of the more liberal tools employed by 
different states to promote emissions reduction, as they allow flexibility for the 
market to determine the most cost-effective way of achieving a given target. They 
are considered environmentally successful as they ensure that a certain limit of 
pollution will never be exceeded; however, if executed inadequately they may result 
in merely short-term abatement decisions with little effect on long-term investment 
strategies and decisions to switch to clean technologies. It will be argued that this 
problem is true of the ETS.  
 
i. Cost-Effective Emissions Reduction 
The main objective of emissions trading systems is effectiveness and efficiency: that 
is, to reduce carbon emissions at the lowest practicable cost. 1  Environmental 
effectiveness is achieved as the total quantity of allowances is capped.2 Companies 
are free to decide between investing in improving efficiency to lower emissions and 
buying allowances from others to cover their excess emissions. Ideally, under an 
emissions trading system, some firms will be more incentivised actively to reduce 
their emissions than others because of allowances’ opportunity costs – the 
opportunity to sell their excess EUAs.3 Thus, a company will be free to choose 
whether to reduce emissions or to pay someone else to do so,4 an approach which 
creates strong economic incentives for reducing emissions: 
 
Economic theory suggests that from the moment carbon is priced, industry 
will react and develop strategies to reduce emissions in order (…) either [to] 
buy [fewer] allowances, or [to] sell excess allowances resulting from its 
reduction activities. (…) Thus, the buyer is paying a charge for polluting and 
the seller is being rewarded for having reduced emissions.5 
 
A reasonable GHG-emitter would choose the cheapest option. This is believed to 
ensure that, ‘the market price of carbon is equal to the lowest marginal abatement 
cost amongst all controlled sources’; it allows regulated companies to identify and 
choose the most cost-effective means of reducing emissions. 6 
 
 
                                                 
1 E Woerdman, M Roggenkamp and M Holwerda, Essential EU Climate Law (Edward Elgar Pub 2015) 
44-45. 
2 M Bell, ‘Improving the EU Emissions Trading Scheme’ (Centre Forum 2008) 1 
<www.centreforum.org/assets/pubs/ets.pdf> accessed 25 March 2016.  
3 Point Carbon, ‘EU ETS Phase II – The Potential and Scale of Windfall Profits in the Power Sector’ 
(2008) 7 <www.wwf.org.uk/filelibrary/pdf/ets_windfall_report_0408.pdf> accessed 25 March 2016.  
4 European Commission, ‘EU ETS Handbook’ (European Commission) 6 
<http://ec.europa.eu/clima/publications/docs/ets_handbook_en.pdf> accessed 25 March 2016. 
5 C Egenhofer and others, ‘The EU Emissions Trading System and Climate Policy towards 2050: Real 
Incentives to Reduce Emissions and Drive Innovation?’ (Centre for European Policy Studies 2011) 8 
<http://observgo.uquebec.ca/observgo/fichiers/88303_The%20EU%20ETS%20and%20Climate%20P
olicy%20towards%202050-5.pdf> accessed 25 March 2016. 
6 ibid 2. 
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ii. Investment and Innovation 
Another objective of emissions trading systems is to encourage innovation and 
investment in low-carbon technologies.7 Indeed, one of the key aims of the ETS is to 
influence decision-making regarding low-carbon technologies. 8  One means of 
achieving this goal has been the establishment of a New Entrants’ Reserve,9 as well 
as the utilisation of auction revenues for supporting the deployment of new 
technologies; however, a major driver of low-carbon investments is the price of 
carbon itself – the higher that is, the greater the incentive for cutting emissions will 
be.10  
In order for the system to stimulate the switch to low-carbon alternatives it 
must provide a stable price signal allowing investors to make decisions in the long 
term.11 However, during ‘phase I’ and ’phase II’ of the operation of the ETS, one of 
the major concerns expressed related to significant price fluctuation: ‘low allowance 
price combined with periodic instability meant that the ETS has had [a] limited 
impact on low-carbon investments.’12 Furthermore, prices below €20 per tonne of 
CO2 have been seen as too low to drive investment in low-carbon technologies.13 
Low prices have the effect of stimulating short-term, rather than long-term, 
investments, a problem which seems to characterise the ETS. This has also 
highlighted the need for greater certainty, something which can only be achieved by 
setting long-term goals to restore investors’ confidence and to reduce price 
volatility.14  
 
B. The European Union’s Emissions Trading System 
 
The EU ETS is the largest greenhouse gas emissions system in operation. It was 
introduced in 2005 by Directive 2003/87/EC and has so far been running for three 
phases – ‘phase I’ from 2005 to 2007, ‘phase II’ from 2008 to 2012, and ‘phase III’ 
                                                 
7 Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 2003 
establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community and 
amending Council Directive 96/61/EC, OJ L 275/32, para 20.  
8 T Laing and others, ‘Assessing the Effectiveness of the EU Emissions Trading System’ (Centre for 
Climate Change Economics 2013) para 3.1 <www.lse.ac.uk/GranthamInstitute/wp-
content/uploads/2014/02/WP106-effectiveness-eu-emissions-trading-system.pdf> accessed 25 
March 2016.  
9 Directive 2003/87/EC, art 10a(7) as amended by Directive 2009/29/EC.  
10 European Commission, ‘The EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS)’ (European Commission 2013) 
5 <http://ec.europa.eu/clima/publications/docs/factsheet_ets_en.pdf> accessed 25 March 2016. 
11 C Egenhofer, A Marcu and A Georgiev, ‘Reviewing the EU ETS Review? Report of the CEPS Task 
Force on Does the Market Produce the “Right” Price Signal’ (Centre for European Policy Studies 2012) 
3 <www.ceps.eu/system/files/TF%20Report%20Reviewing%20the%20EU%20ETS_0.pdf> accessed 
25 March 2016.  
12 M Grubb, ‘Strengthening the EU ETS: Creating a Stable Platform for EU Energy Sector Investment’ 
(Climate Strategies 2012) 14 <http://climatestrategies.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/cs-
strengtheningtheeuets-fullreport.pdf> accessed 25 March 2016. 
13 S Tilford, ‘How to make EU Emissions Trading a Success’ (Centre for European Reform 2008) 16 
<www.cer.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/attachments/pdf/2011/p_769-275.pdf> accessed 
25 March 2016. 
14 Bell (n 2) 4. 
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from 2013 to 2020. 15  The system was first introduced in order to ensure the 
achievement of the targets set by the Kyoto protocol, which has been signed by 192 
countries to date.16  
The system works by effectively putting a cap on all emissions and reducing 
that cap over time.17 Member States are allocated allowances for the emission of 
certain greenhouse gases, and they can auction those allowances off or distribute 
them for free between specific companies within their territory. The cap represents 
the maximum amount of greenhouse gas emissions that are allowed to be emitted by 
all installations covered by the regime.18 In 2013, the cap was set to decline by 1.74 
per cent annually,19 and it was recently proposed to increase this rate of reduction to 
2.2 per cent.20 
Each company applies for a Greenhouse gas permit21 and is then allocated 
allowances, each permitting the emission of one tonne of carbon dioxide or its 
equivalent for a specified period. 22  At the end of each year companies must 
surrender an amount of allowances equivalent to what they have emitted during 
that period.23 If a company is unable to do so it will incur heavy fines, set in a 
manner which makes them ‘effective, proportionate and dissuasive’.24 Since ‘phase 
II’, all allowances that are not surrendered at the end of the year, are carried over to 
the next one, a practice known as ‘banking’.25 Each operator of an installation is 
required to monitor and report their emissions levels to the competent authority 
every year, 26  and Member States must ensure that the reports are verified in 
accordance with a set of criteria. 27  Since the beginning of ‘phase III’, issued 
allowances have been held in the Community registry.28 Companies are free to trade 
allowances between themselves in order to ensure compliance. Any issue, transfer or 
                                                 
15 European Parliament and Council Directive 2003/87/EC of 13 October 2003 establishing a scheme 
for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community and amending Council 
Directive 96/61/EC [2003] OJ L 275/32; European Commission (n 4) 4. 
16 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, ‘Status of Ratification of the Kyoto 
Protocol’ (UN 2014) <http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/status_of_ratification/items/2613.php> 
accessed 25 March 2016. 
17 Directive 2003/87/EC, art 9. 
18 Woerdman Roggenkamp and Holwerda (n 1) 53.  
19 European Parliament and Council Directive 2009/29/EC amending directive 2003/87/EC so as to 
improve and extend the greenhouse gas emission allowance trading scheme of the Community [2009] 
OJ L 140/63, art 9.  
20 European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
amending Directive 2003/87/EC to enhance cost-effective emission reductions and low-carbon 
investments’ COM (2015) 337 final, art 1(3). 
21 Directive 2003/87/EC, art 5. 
22 ibid art 3(a). 
23 ibid art 6(2)(e). 
24 ibid art 16. 
25 Commission Regulation No 920/2010 of 7 October 2010 for a standardised and secured system of 
registries pursuant to Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council; Decision 
No 280/2004/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, art 57. 
26 Directive 2003/87/EC, art 14(3). 
27 ibid art 15. 
28 ibid art 19. 
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cancellation of allowances is recorded in a transaction log maintained by a Central 
Administrator.29 
Additionally, under the Kyoto Protocol, Member States are permitted to use 
project credits under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), which are 
awarded to firms investing in projects in developing countries, or under the Joint 
Implementation (JI) system, awarded for projects in other developed countries,30 in 
order to cover their excess emissions. 31  The beginning of ‘phase III’ imposed a 
limitation on their use. 
 
C. The 2009 Amendments 
 
The main objective of the EU ETS is to reduce emissions. Thus, ‘it is crucial to 
understand whether the first two phases have encouraged participating installations 
to abate.’32 A number of significant changes were introduced by the 2009 Directive, 
which aimed to address the concerns associated with the system.  
 
i. Cap and Scope  
The ETS was divided into a number of trading phases. During ‘phase I’ and ‘phase 
II’, Member States were to submit National Allocation Plans (NAPs) to justify the, 
‘total number of allowances created for the trading period, provide a list of covered 
installations, and explain how those allowances [were] to be distributed.’33 The cap 
effectively represented the total number of allowances from the different Member 
States combined. This was criticised for being too decentralised and in need of 
greater harmonisation, since national circumstances would influence the amount of 
and allocation method for allowances within each jurisdiction.34  
Member States were responsible for determining a number of factors such as 
administrative arrangements in relation to auctioning, monitoring and verification 
procedures.35 This resulted in different practices being adopted and led to some 
types of installation being included in some Member States but not in others. These 
practices included the exclusion of combustion installations which did not produce 
electricity in the UK during the first two phases.36 
                                                 
29 ibid art 20. 
30 National Audit Office, ‘European Emissions Trading Scheme’ (National Audit Office 2009) 14 
<www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/0809_EU_emissions_trading.pdf> accessed 25 
March 2016. 
31 Directive 2003/87/EC, art 30(3). 
32 R Martin, M Muûls and U Wagner, ‘An Evidence Review of the EU Emissions Trading System, 
Focussing on Effectiveness of the System in Driving Industrial Abatement’ (Department of Energy 
and Climate Change 2012) 16 
<www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/48449/5725-an-
evidence-review-of-the-eu-emissions-trading-sys.pdf> accessed 25 March 2016. 
33 AD Ellerman and PL Joskow, ‘The European Union’s Emissions Trading System in Perspective’ 
(Pew Centre on Global Climate Change 2008) 5 <www.c2es.org/docUploads/EU-ETS-In-Perspective-
Report.pdf> accessed 25 March 2016. 
34 ibid 5. 
35 National Audit Office (n 30) 18. 
36 ibid. 
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At the end of ‘phase I’ it became apparent that the allocation had been too 
generous, as allowances exceeded verified emissions by almost 7 per cent.37 Thus, the 
beginning of ‘phase II’ saw the Commission reducing the NAPs of twelve Member 
States in order to align them with Kyoto reduction targets.38 The 2009 Directive 
substituted NAPs with an EU-wide emissions cap, which was to decrease annually 
by 1.74 per cent.39 The earlier phases of the system have been criticised for ‘a general 
lack of ambition’,40 with, ‘the NAP process prov[ing] to be [a] long, laborious, and 
unrewarding procedure for all concerned.’41 Nevertheless, NAPs were a necessary 
compromise in order to, ‘get any system agreed at all’, even at the risk of sacrificing 
its effectiveness at achieving emissions reductions.42  
It must also be noted that the amending Directive broadened the scope of 
covered installations to include, inter alia, oil refineries and steel works, 43  with 
aviation to be added to the list from 2012 onwards.44 Extending the scope to more 
sectors is beneficial; it will permit emissions reduction to take place in the contexts 
where this would be most efficient.45 It has been said that, ‘[t]he broader the scope of 
a cap and trade scheme, the greater the resources available for reducing emissions 
and the less[er] the impact on competitiveness.’46 
 
ii. Allocation 
During ‘phase I’ and ‘phase II’ respectively, 95 per cent and 90 per cent of all 
emissions allowances were allocated for free to all the covered installations,47 the aim 
being to address the initial ‘teething problems’.48 Free allocation was necessary at the 
start in order to gain acceptance from the industry sector.49 However, it remained 
                                                 
37 European Environment Agency, ‘EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) Data Viewer’ (European 
Environment Agency 2016) 6 <www.eea.europa.eu/data-and-maps/data/data-viewers/emissions-
trading-viewer> accessed 25 March 2016. 
38 M Verdonk and others, ‘Evaluation of Policy Options to Reform the EU Emissions Trading System: 
Effects on Carbon Price, Emissions and the Economy’ (PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment 
Agency 2013) 8 <www.pbl.nl/sites/default/files/cms/publicaties/PBL_2013_Evaluation-of-policy-
options-to-reform-the-EU-ETS_934.pdf> accessed 25 March 2016. 
39 Directive 2003/87/EC, art 9 as amended by Directive 2009/29/EC. 
40 S Bell, D McGillivray and O Pedersen, Environmental Law (8th edn, OUP 2013) 553.  
41 AD Ellerman, C Marcantonini and A Zaklan, ‘The EU ETS: Eight Years and Counting’ (European 
University Institute 2014) 3 
<http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/29517/RSCAS_2014_04.pdf> accessed 25 March 
2016. 
42 Bell, McGillivray and Pedersen (n 40) 553. 
43 Woerdman, Roggenkamp and Holwerda (n 1) 54. 
44 Directive 2008/101/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 2008 
amending Directive 2003/87/EC so as to include aviation activities in the scheme for greenhouse gas 
emission allowance trading within the Community [2009] OJ L 8/3. 
45 Bell (n 2) 8-9. 
46 Tilford (n 13) 12. 
47 Point Carbon (n 3) 6. 
48 European Commission, ‘Report on the functioning of the European carbon market Accompanying 
the document Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: Climate 
action progress report, including the report on the functioning of the European carbon market and the 
report on the review of Directive 2009/31/EC on the geological storage of carbon dioxide’ COM 
(2015) 576 final, 6. 
49 Woerdman, Roggenkamp and Holwerda (n 1) 56. 
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doubtful whether it had managed to secure that aim. Furthermore, ‘grandfathering’ 
(i.e. allocation based on historical emission levels) was the preferred method for 
allocation during the first two phases.50 It was criticised as favouring ‘dirtier’, less-
efficient firms by allocating more allowances to those that emit a higher amount of 
greenhouse gases. It has also been submitted that this method of allocation 
encouraged firms to increase their emissions in order to receive a higher number of 
allowances in the future,51 which arguably led to the, ‘perverse effect of encouraging 
investment in carbon heavy power generators over low-carbon alternatives’. 52 
‘Grandfathering’ was criticised for incentivising firms to keep heavily polluting 
installations in operation for longer in order to retain the associated allowances.53 
From 2013 onwards, companies were allocated free allowances based on 
established ‘benchmarks’ determined on the, ‘average performance of the 10 per cent 
most efficient installations in a sector (…) in the years 2007-2008.’54 This has been 
seen to encourage the use of the most efficient technologies. 55  Furthermore, in 
creating a level playing field for producers in every country, this method of 
allocation arguably achieves a greater degree of harmonisation.56 While this method 
poses its own difficulties, for example disagreements on uniform product 
benchmarks,57 it should be welcomed as a positive step towards the implementation 
of the ‘polluter pays’ principle and towards encouraging the deployment of cleaner 
technology.  
Since 2013, all allowances that have not been allocated for free are to be 
auctioned.58 Higher emphasis was placed on auctioning in ‘phase III’, making it the 
default method of allocation. 59  At least 50 per cent of allowances are to be 
auctioned,60 and Member States are to use at least 50 per cent of the revenue raised 
to combat climate change by such means as reducing both greenhouse gas emissions 
and deforestation, and by supporting renewable energy development, et cetera.61 
Auctioning is believed to be more efficient as companies will only buy what they 
need in order to cover their emissions. Furthermore, it will reduce the cost of 
running the system as well as the bureaucracy associated with the allocation process. 
Lastly, it will require polluters to pay by internalising the cost of their pollution. 
These changes are to be welcomed as a positive movement which rewards cleaner 
companies; stimulates innovation; and scores higher on efficiency. The risk of carbon 
                                                 
50 S de Bruyn and others, ‘Does the Energy Intensive Industry Obtain Windfall Profits through the EU 
ETS? An Econometric Analysis for Products from the Refineries, Iron and Steel and Chemical Sectors’ 
(CE Delft 2010) 13 
<www.ce.nl/publicatie/does_the_energy_intensive_industry_obtain_windfall_profits_through_the_
eu_ets/1038> accessed 25 March 2016. 
51 National Audit Office (n 30) 25. 
52 Bell (n 2) 5. 
53 National Audit Office (n 30) 26. 
54 Directive 2003/87/EC, art 10a(2) as amended by Directive 2009/29/EC. 
55 National Audit Office (n 30) 26. 
56 Ellerman and Joskow (n 33) 37-39. 
57 ibid 36. 
58 Directive 2003/87/EC, art 10(1) as amended by Directive 2009/29/EC. 
59 Woerdman, Roggenkamp and Holwerda (n 1) 56. 
60 Bell, McGillivray and Pedersen (n 40) 552. 
61 Directive 2003/87/EC, art 10(3) as amended by Directive 2009/29/EC. 
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leakage (discussed further below) undeniably exists.62 Nevertheless, firms that have 
been identified as ‘at risk’ of carbon leakage would still receive a part of their 
allowances for free, thus minimising that risk.63 This is an acceptable compromise 
between ensuring a cost-optimal distribution of allowances and addressing the 
concerns associated with shifting production abroad. 
 
iii. Carbon Leakage 
Member States had to take into consideration the effect that a carbon price would 
have on the international competitiveness of EU companies. Higher production costs 
would incentivise companies to shift their, ‘productive capacity from one country to 
another as a result of [a] differential emissions pricing policy’,64 commonly referred 
to as carbon leakage.65 
Economic theory suggests that firms would pass through the cost of the 
allowances obtained for free if that enhanced their profitability and outweighed the 
additional costs.66 Evidence has been put forward suggesting that the ETS has not 
impeded the competitiveness of firms and sectors that can simply pass on the costs 
for EUAs to the final consumer. 67  However, many firms may not have the 
opportunity to pass on the carbon costs without any negative consequences such as 
losing market shares – something which would undermine ‘the environmental 
effectiveness and political acceptability’ of the system.68 Free allocation has a lesser 
impact on companies;69 however, free allocation would not be sufficient on its own 
to dissuade industries in global competition from relocating their businesses. Other 
factors such as high levels of regulation, higher minimum wages etc, have added a 
cost to EU businesses, influencing their decision to relocate.70 Thus the extent to 
which free allocation has prevented carbon leakage should be regarded as limited.71 
 
 
3. Evaluation of the EU ETS 
 
The system was first introduced to ensure fulfilment of the emissions targets under 
the Kyoto protocol, and would later grow to become one of the central elements of 
EU environmental policy and legislation.72  Its primary objective is to, ‘promote 
reduction of greenhouse gas emissions in a cost-effective and economically efficient 
                                                 
62 Bruyn and others (n 50) 15. 
63 Directive 2003/87/EC, art 10a as amended by Directive 2009/29/EC. 
64 Laing and others (n 8) para 4. 
65 Verdonk and others (n 38) 41. 
66 Bruyn and others (n 50) 7. 
67 Martin, Muûls and Wagner (n 32) 27. 
68 ibid 24. 
69 Bruyn and others (n 50) 14. 
70 Bell (n 2) 6-7. 
71 ibid 7. 
72 European Commission, ‘Impact Assessment Accompanying the document Proposal for a Decision 
of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning the establishment and operation of a 
market stability reserve for the EU greenhouse gas emission trading scheme and amending Directive 
2003/87/EC’ SWD (2014) 17 final, 11. 
Aberdeen Student Law Review – Volume 7 
89 
manner.’73 The EU has a goal to reduce emissions by at least 20 per cent by 2020 
compared with 1990 levels,74 and emissions trading is considered to be the most cost-
efficient means of meeting that target.75 
The EU ETS has a secondary aim: the stimulation of investment in low-carbon 
technologies. In order to understand why the 2015 reform was necessary and 
whether the changes are fit to remedy the flaws of the current system, one must first 
identify those shortfalls. The following section examines the question whether the 
ETS has been successful at achieving carbon emission cuts in a cost-effective way 
and whether it has contributed to investment in technological innovation.  
 
A. Over-allocation 
 
Over-allocation is problematic for two reasons: it fails to encourage emissions 
reduction, and it fails to incentivise investment in low-carbon technologies. During 
‘phase I’, verified emissions were lower than allocated allowances by almost 7 per 
cent.76 The lack of consistent historical data prior to 2005 was identified as the main 
reason behind the EU’s failure to set sufficiently tight emissions caps. 77  States 
allocated allowances generously in order to safeguard the competitiveness of their 
industries.78 Allocations were largely based on industries’ predictions of how much 
they would need; 79  predictions which, in hindsight, seem to have been overly 
optimistic.80 However, the over-allocation in ‘phase I’ did not have a major effect 
afterwards, seeing as unused allowances could not be banked for ‘phase II’ 
compliance purposes. 
‘Phase II’ saw the Commission reducing NAPs by an average of 10 per cent.81 
However, the economic crisis in 2008-2009 resulted in a lowered production output 
and hence reduction in emissions, which led to a fall in demand for EUAs.82 The 
financial crisis had a noticeable effect on both GDP and industrial output:83 ‘[t]he 
combined impact of [the] recession, [the] response to the carbon price in 2008-2011, 
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and complementary measures, ha[s] led to a surplus of allowances that will last out 
to 2020’.84 Additionally, the sale of the 300 million unused allowances held in the 
New Entrants’ Reserve contributed to the lack of scarcity in the market.85  
Lower economic activity reduces the demand for allowances. However, while 
in a natural market this would result in the supply side reacting to that change as 
well,86 in the ETS the supply is fixed.87 In ‘phase II’ the total supply exceeded the 
total demand by 2,095 credits, which were banked for ‘phase III’,88 carrying forward 
a total of about 2 billion tonnes.89 EUA banking helped to stabilise the price and 
resulted in diminished price volatility;90 however, it was regarded as potentially 
having an adverse impact on the effectiveness of the ‘phase III’ cap.91 
Furthermore, the use of international credits under the CDM and JI have 
further deepened the issue. 92  On the one hand, the use of CDM and JI would 
promote the transfer of investments and technology in poorer countries and thus 
would increase the cost-effectiveness of the system by allowing companies to reduce 
emissions where this can be done cheaply.93 Moreover, a limit on the total number of 
credits which could be used would ensure a certain level of domestic reduction.94 On 
the other hand, the allowable emissions exceed the cap since they also include 
allowable project credits.95 Installations which have sufficient EUAs to cover their 
emissions might choose to sell them and buy cheaper Certified Emissions 
Reductions (CERs) or European Reduction Units (ERUs).96 This is problematic since: 
 
[o]ffset programs [sic] award credits based on reductions from a projected 
business-as-usual scenario, thereby creating perverse incentives to exaggerate 
pre-project emissions in order to ‘earn’ additional credits, even while absolute 
emissions increase.97 
 
Moreover, interaction with other policy instruments, such as the EU’s target to make 
20 per cent of energy consumed renewable and to improve energy efficiency by 20 
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per cent by 2020, has contributed to the issue.98 The success of other policies has led 
to further abatement by companies covered by the ETS, which additionally reduces 
the demand for EUAs.99 The EUA price fell ‘significantly’ after the approval of the 
Energy Efficiency Directive. 100  It is, additionally, worth noting that individual 
Member States can adopt domestic climate change and energy policies, which would 
also have an effect on emissions.101 It is submitted that the existence of these other 
instruments creates problems. Because the ETS is unable to respond to their success 
the price of EUAs will be vulnerable to further reduction.  
Emissions reduction is the central objective of the ETS.102 If the supply of 
EUAs exceeds demand, the ETS will not incentivise emissions-reduction seeing as 
‘business-as-usual’ emissions will fall below the cap. Some commentators regard 
cap-and-trade markets as a ‘technologically neutral instrument of price discovery’.103 
The ETS is a quantity-based instrument, which means that the carbon market is free 
to determine the price, which would normally be the least costly option.104 Thus, as 
long as emissions do not exceed the cap, there will be no basis for intervention. 
However, the driving idea behind the ETS was to reduce emissions below ‘business-
as-usual’ levels; otherwise the cap would not be regarded as binding: 105  ‘[t]he 
stringency of the emission[s] cap can be interpreted as [an] indication of the 
environmental effectiveness of the emissions trading system.’106 Furthermore, over-
allocation creates a problem because it leads to low prices, which, in turn, would fail 
to spur investment in low-carbon technologies: ‘[a] large surplus (…) strongly 
confounds the signal for investments, which are necessary for the transition into a 
low-carbon economy’. 107  The effects that low and fluctuating prices have on 
abatement and investment strategies are examined in greater detail further below. 
Some commentators have argued that the initial over-allocation has become 
‘less of a problem’, since now caps are determined with regard to past verified 
emissions and the linear reduction factor has aided the establishment of an 
appropriate cap, based on all the data collected in previous years.108 However, fears 
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that the oversupply of allowances will continue past 2020 have been expressed in the 
literature.109  The total surplus of allowances was estimated to have reached 2.7 
billion from 2013-2014,110 and, assuming a scenario where no further measures are 
adopted, the surplus would be expected only to decline to 1.5 billion by 2028.111 
 
B. The Carbon Price  
 
The start of the system marked prices around €5-€10, which quickly rose and stayed 
above €20. Nevertheless, in April 2006 when verified emissions reports were 
published and it became apparent that ‘phase I’ emissions would not exceed the cap, 
the prices plummeted to almost €0 in late 2007. The beginning of ‘phase II’ saw 
prices above €20 until the 2008 economic crisis slowed production and lowered CO2 
emissions, which led to prices of about €10. ‘Phase III’ marked no major fluctuations; 
however, prices remained at levels lower than expected – below €8.112 The price of 
carbon is a major driver for innovation; hence, it is important to evaluate the effect 
that price fluctuation has had on driving investment in low-carbon technologies and 
to determine whether the current price level is able to promote investments in 
innovation.  
The ETS is not a naturally developing market in the sense that there is no 
correlation between supply and demand for allowances. There is always a degree of 
government intervention in setting the cap and allocating allowances.113 Economic 
theory suggests that when the supply of a certain commodity remains constant while 
the demand therefor drops, the price consequentially drops as well. In the ETS, the 
supply is set at a certain level – the cap – while the demand fluctuates due to a 
number of economic factors, including, ‘changes in economic activity, weather 
events, fuel prices, and technology developments.’114  In fact, the ETS allowance 
prices have been less volatile than those of other commodities such as fossil fuels 
and even oranges and coffee.115 Some commentators have pointed out that price 
volatility is part of the regular functioning of the market and that this should not be 
taken as a sign of market failure.116 Others have suggested that the lower prices 
following the recession have, ‘softened the impact of pollution regulations on 
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businesses during the difficult economic times’; however, subsequent economic 
growth has not been accompanied by an increase in prices.117 
  The fall in the price of EUAs at the end of 2007 could be attributed to the lack 
of ‘bankability’ of those allowances, meaning that firms which finished the year with 
a surplus of ‘phase I’ allowances could not use them for compliance purposes in 
‘phase II’.118 Therefore, banking of allowances is seen as promoting early reduction 
and as saving the excess EUAs in anticipation of future higher prices and more 
stringent emissions caps.119  
The main reason why market participants bank allowances is to meet future 
carbon needs, thus lessening exposure to adverse variations in price – also known as 
hedging.120 Other motives include arbitrage (buying allowances and signing future 
contracts) and speculation (carrying the risk in anticipation of a future rise in 
prices).121 Such practices as hedging are common amongst participants in a number 
of markets as a means of minimising exposure to price fluctuations.122 Hedging in 
order to safeguard against future uncertainties is the reason why the carbon price 
did not fall to €0 in ‘phase III’. 123  Nevertheless, allowing producers to hedge 
allowances has provided them with the option of delaying low-carbon 
investments.124 While banking allowances prevented prices from plummeting at the 
end of ‘phase II’, it increased the cap in ‘phase III’, which led to the current low price 
level.125 
Price volatility in the ETS, resulting from the inflexibility of supply, is greater 
than in natural markets and it has had a major impact on investment decisions. On 
the one hand, some commentators claim that low EUA prices have managed to spur 
investment in low-carbon technologies since, ‘the expectation of a carbon price five, 
ten and twenty years from now is far more important in influencing the long-term 
investment that is essential for low-carbon development.’ 126  However, the 
expectation that fossil fuels will become more expensive and eventually scarce 
would also act as an incentive in much the same manner as a future high carbon 
price. It has, consequently, been stated that, ‘additional tools are needed to accelerate 
the natural rate of investment and technological change’.127   
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On the other hand, a number of studies have concluded that price fluctuations 
and regulatory instability have stifled investment.128 One observes that: 
 
The knowledge that prices will remain high over a relatively short time 
horizon is enough to sway a decision in favour of gas and away from coal, or 
to justify investment in greater energy efficiency. But it is not sufficient to 
persuade companies to invest in new technologies, such as CCS (Carbon 
Capture and Storage). The time horizons for such investments are very long 
(…) so companies need to be confident that carbon will remain expensive 
throughout the term of the investment.129 
 
The price of carbon has become a driver for small-scale investment decisions.130 
There is a need for a clear price signal – lower or fluctuating price levels, combined 
with regulatory uncertainty, have contributed to the failure of the system to 
incentivise major investments in low-carbon technologies.131 In order for the ETS to 
be efficient, it must provide incentives for innovation as well as emissions 
abatement.132 Investments will only be made if they are considered sound by their 
investors, and so, ‘the carbon price will only influence the type of investment by 
making high-carbon investments less profitable.’133  
The low carbon prices have been criticised for being unable to spur 
innovation, which in turn may lead to companies investing in carbon-intensive 
technologies, thus making investment ‘stranded’.134 If companies expect prices to 
remain low, they may choose to invest in carbon-intensive capital stock, making it 
extremely difficult to switch to low-carbon technologies in the future. 135 
Furthermore, ‘the learning curve [associated] with new low-carbon technologies 
may become too steep to keep ambitious emissions reductions by mid-century 
within [cost-effective] reach’.136 In other words, the earlier low-carbon technologies 
are implemented, the more experience industries will gain. While those arguments 
are not invulnerable to criticism, especially since they tend to disregard factors such 
as capital costs and investment lead-times,137 there has been a consensus that in 
order to drive investments in low-carbon technologies, a credible price signal is 
necessary.138 The level of price required to incentivise investments varies between 
sectors; however, ‘a price of €10/tCO2 or lower would mean that the ETS has little 
impact on investment decisions, and might also lead to a wider lack of confidence in 
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EU climate policies’.139 Generally, prices below €20 have been accepted as being 
much too low to incentivise investments.140  
A low carbon price would not, in itself, hinder the reduction of greenhouse 
gas emissions, as long as the cap were not exceeded.141  However, incentivising 
investment in low-carbon technology is necessary to keep the EU on the cost-optimal 
pathway to decarbonising the economy. The lower the EUA prices are, the less 
incentivised companies will feel to invest therein at present, and thus the further the 
EU will shift from the cost-effective path to decarbonisation.  
 
C. The Impact of the EU ETS  
 
Despite the number of shortfalls associated with the EU ETS, it can still be viewed as 
a partial success. It is necessary to examine the effect that the system has had on 
emissions abatement so far in order to determine whether the 2015 reforms were 
necessary. 
A number of studies have attempted to establish a link between the ETS and 
emissions abatement, but there are some inherent difficulties in relation thereto. It 
has been submitted that if emissions are below the cap, this should not be taken as 
evidence of the success of the system since, especially during ‘phase I’ and ‘phase II’, 
allowance supply was determined by reference to ‘business-as-usual’ forecasts, 
which could prove inaccurate and misleading for a variety of reasons.142 Firstly, it is 
difficult to make accurate ‘business-as-usual’ predictions, given that they, ‘involve 
the construction of counterfactual estimates of what emissions would have been in 
the absence of the ETS (…) taking into account actual economic growth, energy 
prices, and weather’.143 Secondly, the effects of different policy instruments could be 
difficult to disentangle. 144  Lastly, the information gap and the difficulties of 
obtaining commercially sensitive information make an assessment of the system’s 
effectiveness even more problematic.145 
‘Phase I’ saw a ‘best estimate’ of reductions around 200 MtCO2 in 2005-2006,146 
and an overall estimate of up to 3 per cent across all sectors and countries for the 
entire period,147 regardless of the over-allocation and lack of banking provisions. 
However, many view ‘phase I’ as a success since its purpose was to establish a 
functioning market for carbon emissions, which was achieved:148 ’82 per cent of 
respondents had traded carbon allowances and overall 40 per cent considered the 
Scheme had had some or significant impact.’149  
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In ‘phase II’, while emissions rose to a ‘business-as-usual’ level in 2007, the 
effect of the economic crisis has been identified as the, ‘main driver of the concurrent 
fall in emissions.’150 Furthermore, while the ‘bulk of abatement’ has been in the form 
of fuel switching, which could be attributed to the effect of the ETS,151 oil price 
shocks could have had such a profound effect on companies’ behaviour as to render 
business-as-usual projections unreliable.152 
One of the system’s objectives, namely to reduce the investment in carbon-
intensive assets, has been achieved, even if there are doubts as to how much of this 
success can be exclusively attributed to the implementation of the system. 153 
Nevertheless, only a small number of surveyed firms considered the ETS to have 
had a significant impact on their emissions.154  Furthermore, where a company’s 
emissions had decreased, a number of other factors were listed as having a greater 
impact on the board’s decisions.155 
Although it has been considered not possible to attribute falls in emissions to 
the ETS,156 the system has had the effect of changing company behaviour. A 2011 
study of six countries found that a large number of the eight hundred firms 
considered were pursuing some measures to reduce their emissions and were 
investing in research and development aimed at curbing emissions or achieving 
energy efficiency.157 The study concludes that there has been some impact from the 
ETS on investment and innovation; however, it also notes that, ‘there is no strong 
evidence that ETS firms in general differ in their innovativeness from non-ETS 
firms’, finding certainty rather than price to be more relevant for research and 
development decisions.158  
In conclusion, the carbon price has been factored into decision-making, but it 
has been unable to impact long-term capital projects; something which is necessary 
to effect the transition from a carbon-intensive to a low-carbon economy. This is 
largely due to oversupply of allowances and a low carbon price.159  
 
 
4. The Market Stability Reserve 
 
On 6 October 2015, Decision (EU) 2015/1814 on the establishment and operation of a 
Market Stability Reserve for the EU ETS was adopted by the European Parliament 
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and the Council. The Reserve will become operational on 1 January 2019,160 and it 
will function as a supply-demand adjusting mechanism. The Reserve seeks to 
address the current oversupply of allowances and, ‘to improve the system’s 
resilience to major shocks.’161 The following section examines whether the Reserve 
will be able properly to address those issues and to deliver a stable and reliable 
carbon price signal in order to stimulate investment in low-carbon technologies and 
improve the overall functioning of the system.  
 
A. Is it Necessary to Intervene? 
 
Before examining the contribution that the Reserve can make towards the 
functioning of the ETS, one must first consider whether structural intervention is 
justified.  
Some commentators have argued that the ETS is a ‘technologically neutral 
instrument’, which will be successful as long as the cap is observed.162 A low carbon 
price is a reflection of the fundamental principle of cost-effectiveness behind the 
ETS.163 The MSR is deemed to ‘interfere with the market’ in an unnecessary way,164 
exacerbating the lack of predictability for market players. Indeed, regulatory 
uncertainty has been one of the major criticisms associated with the ETS’ inability to 
drive investment in low-carbon technologies: ‘the speed and scale at which carbon 
prices can drive the switch in innovation and investment depends on the strength of 
the price signal created, both in terms of magnitude and long-term credibility.’165 In 
general, investors are facing a number of uncertainties regarding such general 
considerations as energy prices, but also regarding the question whether and, if so, 
how the ETS could be revised in the future.166 Uncertainty surrounding the long-
term supply of allowances and the design of the system makes it difficult for market 
participants to form long-term expectations as to price. 167  Commentators have 
consequently pointed out that one of the aims of any measure that intervenes in the 
normal functioning of the market should be the avoidance of an ‘unacceptable level 
of uncertainty’;168 otherwise the impact of market failures will be exacerbated.169 The 
Commission has consistently emphasised the central importance of the system being 
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cost-efficient. 170  Current EUA prices are much lower than the level required to 
incentivise fuel switching. 171  Firms have been focusing primarily on short-term 
abatement with the carbon market failing to influence long-term investment 
decisions.172 From the above it follows that the need to intervene outweighs the 
attendant perils. 
Furthermore, as this article already highlighted above, the ETS is not robust; it 
does not have, ‘the ability to respond to persistent changes in economic 
circumstances, technological development and overlapping policies’, owing to the 
inelastic features of the supply side.173 It has been said that, ‘An emissions market 
requires both scarcity of emission allowances to create the price signal, and also 
long-term clarity and predictability of rules and targets.’ 174  The economic crisis 
highlighted this shortfall perfectly by demonstrating the effect that ‘rapid and 
dramatic changes in economic output’ can have on the price of carbon.175 Arguably, 
the MSR would provide the flexibility needed to respond to unforeseen events by 
revising and adjusting the EUA supply correspondingly.176 
 
B. Purpose and Functioning of the Reserve 
 
The MSR will become operational in January 2019.177 The Reserve will automatically 
regulate the supply of allowances each year by removing 12 per cent of the number 
of allowances in circulation for a period of 12 months beginning 1 September of that 
year with a minimum of 100 million allowances,178 if the pre-defined 833 million 
EUAs threshold is exceeded.179 It will re-inject 100 million EUAs, or all EUAs if there 
are fewer than 100 million EUAs in the Reserve, when the total number of 
allowances in circulation falls below 400 million. 180  Furthermore, 100 million 
allowances shall be released when the average allowance price for the period of six 
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consecutive months is over three times more than the average price of EUAs in the 
two preceding years pursuant to Article 29a.181 
Each year, the Commission shall publish the total number of allowances in 
circulation by 15 May of the subsequent year. This shall include the total sum of all 
allowances issued and used project credits minus verified emissions. 182  The 
adjustment of allowance supply should happen, ‘without undue delay following the 
publication of the total number of allowances in circulation[.] The adjustment (…) 
should be spread over a period of 12 months following a change to the relevant 
auctioning calendar.’183  
In order to address the large surplus of allowances at the end of ‘phase III’, 
900 million allowances are to be removed from auctioning and placed in the 
Reserve.184 Furthermore, EUAs not allocated to installation because they have ceased 
operation,185 shall also be placed in the Reserve.186 
The Commission will monitor the performance of the reserve, and within 
three years from the start of its operation, and once every five years thereafter, will 
analyse the Reserve and submit a proposal if necessary.187 
As mentioned already, one problem associated with the EU ETS is its lack of 
robustness and the fact that it is not sufficiently ‘flexible’ to, ‘adapt to unforeseen 
events.’188 The main purpose of the Reserve is to make the supply of allowances 
more flexible and sensitive to demand,189 thus making the ETS more resilient to 
future supply-demand shocks190 and unforeseen developments.191 It aims to address 
the inflexibility of supply in the short term without affecting the total long-term 
supply in place.192 The MSR should, ‘ease costs for businesses when times are hard 
(…) but require that businesses pay more for carbon when times are good’.193 The 
Reserve has no effect on the overall cap; thus robustness is the driving principle 
objective behind the MSR.194 
The EU has recognised the large surplus of allowances, which, if no action is 
taken, is expected to reach 2.6 billion EUAs by 2020.195 It has been stated that: 
 
While the environmental objective is guaranteed by the cap, the presence of a 
large surplus reduces the incentives for low-carbon investment and thereby 
negatively affects the cost-efficiency of the system.196 
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The MSR would ensure a stable and sufficiently high carbon price in order to 
incentivise investments in low-carbon technologies. Furthermore, ‘a flatter carbon 
price growth trajectory’ would allow market participants to form price expectations 
and thus make long-term investment decisions.197 The Reserve would, ‘address the 
concerns that investment decisions were being made against the background of an 
oversupply of allowances, resulting in a less than economically efficient way of 
reaching the ambitious mid-to-long term EU greenhouse gas reduction objectives.’198 
An appropriate carbon price signal is necessary in order to reach the EU’s long-term 
decarbonisation target in a cost-effective manner.199 Periodic instability combined 
with low EUA prices have been highlighted as the reasons for the ETS’s failure to 
incentivise low-carbon investment, potentially resulting in a carbon lock-
in. 200 Furthermore, the Reserve will reduce the uncertainty that permeates 
international negotiations.201 It will send a clear political message about the EU’s 
commitment to reducing greenhouse gas emissions, showing that the ETS is the 
primary tool for achieving that aim in a cost-efficient way.202 
 
C. Is the MSR Fit for Purpose? 
 
There are at least four indicators that could determine whether the MSR’s design 
will be effective: (1) it must ensure cost-efficient emissions reduction; (2) it must 
create a stable price and price trajectory consistent with the expectations of policy-
makers and market actors; (3) it must restore the ETS to its long-term decarbonising 
trajectory; (4) it must make the ETS more robust and better able to respond to 
external shocks.203 This paper submits that the design of the MSR would make the 
ETS better suited to respond to new information. It is also argued that, at the same 
time, the MSR would boost the price of allowances and ensure that participants can 
form reasonable future expectations and thus make long-term investment decisions. 
Nevertheless, a number of concerns have been identified in relation to its structure, 
which will be examined for the remainder of the section. 
 
i. The Triggers 
Quantity-Based Triggers 
The MSR will be triggered when the number of allowances reaches certain levels. By 
adopting a predominantly quantity-based mechanism of adjustment, policy-makers 
have chosen certainty as to the number of EUAs over their price.204 At first sight this 
does not seem to address the criticism of EUAs’ prices being too low to stimulate 
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innovation. Article 29a is also of little help since it is only concerned with prices 
being too high.205 
Nevertheless, ‘volumetric triggers’ serve as an ‘indirect price shaper’: 
economic theory suggests that a shortage of allowances would drive the price up, 
and while there are some concerns about their ability, ‘accurately [to] capture 
changes in external conditions’, they are perceived as purer from a market 
perspective and necessary for reasons of simplicity.206 A quantity-based mechanism 
ensures that the ETS remains ‘cap neutral’.207 As the inflexibility of the system to 
respond to changes in demand has been identified as the ‘root cause’208 of the price 
collapse, the triggers should be set with reference to the desired target price.209 If the 
triggers are determined in line with the hedging demands of the industry the 
Reserve will deliver ‘scarcity pricing’.210 Clear indications must be demonstrated as 
to policy makers’ determination only to tighten carbon regulations in the future; thus 
investors will be convinced of the merits of investing in low-carbon technologies 
regardless of the short-term allowance prices. 211  If the rules are sufficiently 
transparent and clear, participants in the market will be able to form clear 
expectations about the short-term adjustments.212  
Some concerns have been raised regarding the implementation of the Reserve. 
First, the current triggers have been determined based on hedging assumptions.213 
This has been criticised as being ‘accident prone’, as those assumptions could prove 
to be wrong or might change in the future.214 Many study respondents believe the 
energy companies’ hedging demands to exceed 900 million; thus the upper trigger 
has been viewed as appropriate. However, uncertainty exists in relation to the lower 
threshold.215 The need for careful review has been highlighted since the hedging 
demands of the energy sector are prone to differ over time.216 Setting quantity-based 
triggers inappropriately risks removing too many allowances, leading to, ‘expensive 
forms of short-term demand reduction’ or the opposite – not removing enough in 
order to stimulate steady investment. 217  Underestimating hedging demands and 
setting triggers too high could result in lower-than-desired prices, while thresholds 
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that are too low may result in an, ‘unexpectedly high upward price spike in the case 
of rigid hedging/banking demand’.218 Moreover, it has been argued that an upper 
limit should be placed on the amount of allowances that could be held in the Reserve 
in order to prevent the weakening of future climate action.219 That proposal can be 
rejected since that would mean that the Reserve would have an effect on the overall 
cap and it could reduce its ability to respond to future demand spikes. 
Some concerns have been voiced over the speed at which the MSR would be 
able to rectify the current over-allocation. A higher rate of extraction would return 
the scarcity faster.220 Many studies have suggested that the 12 per cent removal rate 
per annum would mean that balance would not be restored to the market for the 
continuation of ‘phase IV’.221 Therefore, commentators have called for a reduction in 
the sensitivity of the triggers by making them, ‘33% of the difference between the 
supply and the nearest supply trigger’, which would result in larger adjustments the 
further the supply moves from the threshold. 222  Hence, if the total surplus of 
allowances reached 2 billion, the MSR would remove only 240 million while the 33 
per cent factor would result in over 385 million EUAs being placed in the Reserve. 
Such was the French proposal, which suggested a 33 per cent difference adjustment, 
combined with an extension of the corridor – 800 million to 1.3 billion.223 This would 
allow for a, ‘more gradual approach towards the threshold’.224 The present paper 
supports this proposal since the 12 per cent rate, ‘risks taking unnecessarily long to 
get the supply down’. 225  Furthermore, once the triggers are reached a higher 
percentage would ensure that emissions stay closer to the desired corridor. 
Another suggestion is to allow the triggers to decline predictably over time, 
thus adapting to lower hedging demands by the energy sector,226 which is expected 
to adopt more low-carbon technologies.227 This paper supports the adoption of a 
lower percentage from the start of the MSR, which would avoid drastic 
interventions. However, a higher percentage, for example 50 per cent, should be set 
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as the quantity of EUAs in circulation approach the upper threshold since this would 
ensure better confinement within the identified desired corridor.228 Alternatively, 
some commentators have suggested using a percentage of the cap as a trigger since 
that would allow it to change in tandem with changes to the cap and hedging 
demands.229 This may result in a more flexible system, better equipped to respond to 
changes in demand, and thus lead to a more stable price signal.  
Lastly, the injection of 100 million EUAs into the market has been criticised 
for being too inflexible, and calls have been made to adopt symmetrical criteria for 
return and withdrawal of allowances to and from the market.230 A more symmetrical 
approach is favoured by market participants.231 A fall in EUAs below the lower 
threshold would result in a stronger reaction by market actors. Consequently, the re-
injection quantity should not be set in ‘absolute terms’:232 ‘[w]hile setting an absolute 
intervention level provides predictability to the market, a percentage would allow 
the corrective action to reflect the scale of imbalance.’233 A ‘discontinuity problem’ is 
raised by the requirement that a minimum of 100 million allowances be removed, 
especially in situations where the EUAs in circulation are even just a little over the 
threshold. This could be problematic in the long-term as it is regarded as a ‘relatively 
strong intervention in the market’.234  
The MSR has been praised for being transparent and predictable and thus for 
respecting the ‘principle of automaticity’.235 The risk of market manipulation by 
companies is lower since, in order to trigger the release of EUAs, an increase of 
emissions is required and thus companies will use their own allowances. 236 
Furthermore, by boosting current prices the Reserve can prevent companies from 
delaying abatement efforts for future years, which would have led to higher prices in 
the future.237 Therefore, it is likely that the Reserve will guide the market towards 
the most cost-optimal pathway.238 It has been remarked that:   
 
[A] quantity based MSR (…) provides additional flexibility through publicly 
banking surplus allowances, thus incentivizing higher abatement levels early 
on and shifting firms’ abatement profiles closer to the optimal abatement cost 
pathway.239 
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To summarise, this paper calls for a higher percentage to be adopted for both 
withdrawal and reinjection of EUAs in order to bring scarcity to the market faster 
and to allow for that percentage to grow to respond to the ebb and flow of 
behaviour, hedging demands, and deployment of new technologies.  
 
Article 29A and Price-Based Triggers 
If the price is regarded as one of the main concerns driving the structural reform, a 
price-based trigger would seem to be a better option since this would reduce price 
volatility and limit uncertainty for investors:240 ‘[a] price trend over a given period 
would be the simplest, most transparent and least easily manipulated trigger.’241 It 
would reduce the incentive for firms to distort investment decisions in order to 
trigger the subsequent release or withdrawal of EUAs. 242  Some authors have 
suggested the adoption of an article similar to Article 29A in relation to withdrawal 
of allowances based on price trends that are lower than expected.243 However, one 
has to bear in mind that this would result in higher complexity; it would upset the 
nature of the ETS; and it would reduce flexibility for market participants. 
Article 29A’s main function is to provide a safeguard against the possibility of 
volume-triggers being set inappropriately.244 It aims at addressing, ‘abrupt price 
strikes[,] without being specific on the cause of the price movement’ but it does not 
respond to depressed prices, for which it has been criticised.245 It provides a price 
element which upsets the nature of the ETS as a quantity mechanism and could 
cause firms to deviate from cost-optimal pathways.246 It is seen as, ‘too complex’ and 
is considered to add, ‘uncertainty to the system’ as it could be, ‘heavily influenced by 
financial players’.247 Moreover, the one-sided adjustment in response to higher prices 
and its effect on price after the injection of 100 million EUAs back into the market 
remains unclear.248 There is no justifiable objection to the introduction of a low-price 
trend trigger,249 which would serve as a ‘secondary check’.250 However, a number of 
difficulties can be identified in relation to creating a price-trend corridor which fall 
outwith the scope of the current article.  
The proposal for reforming the ETS into a hybrid mechanism, influenced by 
both price and quantity, was not supported during stakeholder consultations.251 
Price-based triggers would raise the issue of effectively determining the desired 
‘price’.252 Reduced price volatility comes at the cost of an increase in emissions 
volatility.253 A supply-based trigger, ‘seems to be a sensible political compromise’;254 
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however, to adopt a price-based mechanism would also mean changing the 
quantity-based market nature of the ETS.255 Therefore, implementing volume-based 
triggers respects the, ‘market-based nature of the EU ETS and ensures continuity of a 
system that allows price discovery’.256 Thus, the application of Article 29A has been 
criticised as confusing the objective and nature of the ETS and the MSR.257 Lastly, 
quantity-based triggers would improve the ETS functioning across key performance 
criteria by pushing it closer to the efficient abatement pathways.258 Therefore, the 
decision to adopt a primarily volume-based trigger is the most appropriate method 
of adjusting the supply of allowances to the carbon market. 
 
ii. The Back-Loaded Allowances 
Although permanent cancellation of the back-loaded allowances would reduce the 
flexibility of the Reserve and possibly burden European companies in periods of 
economic growth, thus increasing the risk of carbon leakage, it would nevertheless 
help achieve the identified desired level of allowances quicker and return the EU to 
the cost-efficient decarbonisation path. 
Back-loading the 900 million allowances259 into the Reserve is necessary in 
order to address the current over-supply and the criticism that the 12 per cent 
extraction rate is insufficient to restore scarcity in a timely manner.260 Nevertheless, 
back-loading alone would be insufficient to address the accumulated allowance 
quantity. Additional measures, such as raising the linear reduction factor to 2.2 per 
cent, have been proposed to tackle the over-allocation issue further.261 The supply of 
allowances for the period 2008-2020 has been, ‘set on the assumption of much better 
economic circumstance[s]’.262 Placing the 900 million allowances in the MSR has 
been criticised as having little effect on mid-to-long-term price expectations as 
market actors would predict their future reinjection. 263  Therefore, some 
commentators have called for the cancellation of the 900 million EUAs.264  
On the one hand, cancellation could reduce the Reserve’s robustness and 
ability to address shifts in demand since, in times of major economic growth, when 
the need for CO2 allowances increases together with emissions, there will be a need 
for, ‘sufficient liquidity for an efficient market’.265 Thus the Reserve should hold a 
sufficient amount of EUAs to meet demand: ‘the carbon market must function in line 
with the principles of sustainable development, in that the environmental and 
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economic aspects must be balanced’.266 An argument exists for allowing flexibility 
for the Reserve to adjust supply levels to novel circumstances and to ensure the 
proper functioning of the Reserve. Indeed, room should be left to ease businesses in 
decoupling economic growth from carbon intensity. On the other hand, cancellation 
would directly address the oversupply problem, which it perceives as the core issue 
associated with the ETS,267 and would restore the balance as intended at the time of 
adopting the cap.268 It could rectify the ‘political mistakes of the past’ and prevent 
the watering down of future targets occasioned by the return of those allowances to 
the market.269 Clearly, cancellation would lead to decarbonisation and abatement in 
a manner that is cost-efficient. The best way of addressing the evident oversupply is 
to cancel some of the excess amount. This would also showcase the EU’s 
determination to decarbonise the economy. While carbon leakage might be an issue, 
it could be addressed through other means,270 the details of which fall outwith the 
scope of the current article. 
 
iii. Early Start and Reaction Times 
Two of the most important changes introduced by the MSR decision compared with 
the Commission’s proposal concerned the earlier implementation of the reserve and 
quicker response times for supply adjustment. 
The majority of commentators have pointed to the importance of 
implementing the MSR as soon as possible in order to achieve an, ‘earlier restoration 
of the effectiveness of the EU ETS’.271 This would ensure that the, ‘surplus reaches 
the hedging corridor earlier’, thus increasing early abatement efforts. 272  Some 
commentators have called for the MSR to become operational as soon as 2016.273 
Earlier implementation would reduce later abatement costs since the increase in 
experience would reduce the mitigation costs.274 An earlier start would ensure a 
price signal more in line with the supply scarcity that a natural market would 
provide; however, it may affect regulatory confidence as it would have an impact 
within ‘phase III’ and would be inadvisable with regard to carbon leakage 
uncertainty.275 Consequently, the chosen date seems adequate. 
                                                 
266 Marcu (n 103) 3. 
267 Acworth (n 176) 5. 
268 Grubb (n 12) 6. 
269 Deutsche Emissionshandelsstelle (n 218) 19. 
270 G Erbach, ‘Post-2020 Reform of the EU Emissions Trading System’ (PE 568.334, European 
Parliamentary Research Service 2015); see also A Marcu and others, ‘Carbon Leakage: Options for the 
EU’ (Centre for European Policy Studies 2014) 
<www.ceps.eu/system/files/CEPS%20Special%20Report%20No%2083%20Carbon%20Leakage%20O
ptions.pdf> accessed 25 March 2016; A Marcu and others, ‘Carbon Leakage: An Overview’ (Centre for 
European Policy Studies 2013) 
<http://aei.pitt.edu/46163/1/Special_Report_No_79_Carbon_Leakage.pdf> accessed 25 March 2016. 
271 International Emissions Trading Association (n 174) 6. 
272 Schopp and others (n 237) 14. 
273 Sandbag (n 214) 6. 
274 Schopp and others (n 237) 18. 
275 Marcu (n 103) 6. 
Aberdeen Student Law Review – Volume 7 
107 
The Commission’s initial proposal suggested a time lag of two years between 
the year when the allowance circulation is estimated and the adjustment year.276 
However, Decision 2015/1814 provides for adjustment ‘without undue delay’ after 
the publication of allowances in circulation in May the following year.277 This would 
improve the effectiveness of the MSR and would reduce price volatility,278 since, the 
longer the period allowed to elapse between announcement of plans to interve and 
actual intervention, the greater the level of volatility that will be experienced: 
‘[i]ncreasing the response rate as well as the speed of the reserve to react to 
unforeseen shocks within one instead of two years can increase robustness and 
dynamic efficiency.’279 Nevertheless, sellers would want to sell before the additional 
allowances were reinjected, while buyers would prefer to wait: ‘since the injection 
would still go ahead independently of how the market responds to the 
announcement (…) the supply in the market would increase even further’.280 The 
surplus of allowances can be determined only once a year and thus reaction times 
have been criticised for running the risk of intervening at a time when the market 
has balanced itself.281  
The MSR is deemed to provide ‘confidence and predictability’, which allows 
market participants to anticipate supply adjustments.282 Nevertheless, the scheduled 
review every five years and potential changes could lead to additional uncertainty 
and have an impact on the long-term credibility of the Reserve.283 Therefore, the 
review criteria should be published as soon as possible in order for the parameters to 
be monitored systematically over the time period.284  
Although some concerns have been identified, the MSR is believed to increase 
the robustness of the system to respond to external shocks.285 It will allow for a 
continued price discovery by the market and will make the ETS able to respond to 
the success of energy efficiency, renewable energy, and other policies.286 The reform 
should thus be embraced, albeit with an emphasis on the importance of effective 
monitoring in order both to determine the MSR’s effectiveness and to respond 
adequately to changes in knowledge, technology and participants’ behaviour. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The EU ETS effectively managed to put a price on carbon, which led to a reduction 
in emissions and incentivised investment in low-carbon technologies. Nevertheless, 
the system has been characterised by an over-allocation of allowances, estimated to 
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number two billion by the beginning of ‘phase III’. The economic crisis, the influx of 
international credits and the success of other policy instruments were amongst the 
factors deepening the gap between the supply of and demand for allowances. This 
has been something of a problem: the oversupply led to a fall in allowance prices, 
which failed to incentivise the switch to low-carbon technologies. This paper has 
argued that, as a consequence of this fall in prices, intervention was necessary in 
order to achieve a balance between supply and demand. Creating shortage would 
result in a higher and more stable price, thus allowing market actors to form long-
term investment expectations and returning the EU to the cost-optimal path towards 
decarbonisation. 
The MSR aims to correct the inelasticity of the supply side. By making the 
system more robust in its response to unanticipated changes, the Reserve can 
achieve a stable carbon price determined by a shortage of allowances. A high and 
sufficiently stable price is desirable in order for market participants to be able to 
make long-term investment decisions. Nevertheless, some concerns have been 
voiced regarding the structure of the Reserve and whether it will be able properly to 
address the current problem of over-supply.  
Four criteria were identified by which the MSR’s effectiveness could be 
judged: cost-efficient reduction; stable price and trajectory; restoring the EU to its 
long-term decarbonising trajectory; and improving robustness. This article has 
demonstrated that the decision to implement the MSR earlier than 2019, as well as a 
shorter response time to avoid an unreasonable period between identifying the need 
to intervene and actual intervention, have been praised as positive steps towards 
price stability. As regards the placement of back-loaded allowances directly into the 
Reserve, rather than permanently cancelling them, the article has made the following 
argument: while cancellation would potentially limit the Reserve’s ability to respond 
to fast economic growth in the future, it would also serve to address the problem of 
over-supply directly and to ensure that the EU decarbonises the economy in a faster 
way. The use of volumetric triggers as an indirect price shaper is welcomed as it 
ensures that emissions reduction is cost-effective. The paper has compared 
volumetric triggers to a price-based threshold, arguing why the former is preferable 
to the latter, and has questioned the decision to implement a price trend threshold 
under Article 29a. It is submitted that the thresholds should be made more flexible 
by allowing them to grow in line with the annual reduction factor, allowing for 
greater robustness and making them more responsive to changes in energy 
companies’ hedging demands, economic conditions, technology developments and 
novel information. Furthermore, this paper endorses the adoption of higher 
percentage reduction rates in order to restore market balance in a timely manner.  
In summary, the MSR can be regarded as an appropriate measure to correct 
the ETS’s market failures and to ensure a flatter carbon price growth trajectory for 
long-term investment certainty. Nevertheless, in so far as the structure aims to 
facilitate a cost-efficient transition to a low-carbon economy, there is certainly room 
for improvement.  
Aberdeen Student Law Review – Volume 7 
109 
The Lost Symbol: A Semiotic Analysis of the 
Psychoactive Substances Act 2016 
 
NICHOLAS BURGESS1 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Due to the resource-intensive and time-consuming requirement to provide evidence of a drug’s harms 
before it can be controlled under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971, and the unprecedented rate at which 
New Psychoactive Substances (NPS), colloquially known as ‘legal highs’, have been appearing, the 
Psychoactive Substances Act 2016 has been created to make the sale, production, importation, and, in 
some cases, possession, of psychoactive substances illegal, subject only to certain exemptions. 
However, in its attempt to curb the flow of NPS, the present Government seems to have created a law 
that is ambiguous and contradictory, and which symbolises an uncompromising stance on the 
prohibition of drugs. By using Bart van Klink’s recent work to assist evaluation, this article offers a 
critical analysis of the semiotics of the new statute, concluding that it is a flawed piece of legislation, 
even in symbolic terms. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Intuition tells us that products labelled ‘plant fertiliser’ and ‘bath salts’ are probably 
not for human consumption. Even so, people who are prepared to consume products 
thus labelled should, for the sake of their health, be discouraged from doing so. Over 
the past decade, a rapidly increasing proportion of the worldwide population has 
been ingesting products labelled in this way for recreational intoxication, typically 
buying them online or from high-street retailers.2 These products can collectively be 
referred to as ‘New Psychoactive Substances’ (NPS), i.e. drugs which are used for 
their recreational effect and which are not prohibited by any UN Convention or (in 
the UK) by the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 (MDA).3 Typically, these substances are 
designed to mimic the effects of controlled drugs: e.g. ‘synthetic cannabinoids’ have 
been developed to be similar in their psychoactive effect to cannabis. 4  The 
                                                 
1 The author graduated from the University of Aberdeen with a First-Class LLB (Honours) in 2016. 
2 European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction, ‘Legal Approaches to Controlling New 
Psychoactive Substances’ (Publications Office of the European Union 2015) 1 
<www.emcdda.europa.eu/attachements.cfm/att_211257_EN_EMCDDA_POD_2013_Controlling%20
new%20psychoactive%20substances.pdf> accessed 12 February 2016. 
3 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, ‘New Psychoactive Substances’ (UNODC 2013) 2 
<www.unodc.org/documents/drugs/printmaterials2013/NPS_leaflet/WDC13_NPS_leaflet_EN_LO
RES.pdf> accessed 19 January 2016. 
4 O Bowden-Jones and others, ‘One New Drug a Week: Why Novel Psychoactive Substances and Club 
Drugs Need a Different Response from UK Treatment Providers’ (Faculty Report FR/AP/02, Royal 
College of Psychiatrists 2014) 7 <www.rcpsych.ac.uk/pdf/FR%20AP%2002_Sept2014.pdf> accessed 
27 February 2016. 
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descriptions attached to these drugs, such as ‘plant fertiliser’, are, of course, entirely 
false, but this is not to mislead the customer: the purpose of such mislabelling is to 
allow entrepreneurs to sell drugs with impunity from trading standards and 
medicine laws. 5  In just a few years, a very successful, growing and essentially 
unregulated market has emerged,6 but very little is known about the dangers of the 
substances sold on this market and, in many cases, even what chemicals they 
contain. 7  Following a number of deaths attributed to these drugs, 8  the present 
Conservative Government has reacted by creating a new framework in order to 
combat the problem of NPS. This framework is the Psychoactive Substances Act 2016 
(hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ and/or ‘the PSA’), which received Royal Assent 
on 28 January 2016 and came into force on 26 May 2016.9 In contrast to previous 
attempts at prohibitive legislation – which allowed everything that was not 
expressly forbidden10 – the Act employs a new, blanket ban approach, whereby the 
production and supply of all psychoactive substances is illegal by default, with 
exemptions made for certain substances. 
Politicians’ desire to be seen as perpetually tough on crime, and the 
astronomical output of legislation on criminal law in recent times,11 suggests that a 
key intention behind many modern statutes is to serve as a symbol demonstrating, 
inter alia, that something is being done about the problem. The Expert Panel created 
to inform the drafting of the Act set out a number of ‘guiding principles’ when 
evaluating various potential approaches, which (in addition to the professed need 
for a proportionate, evidence-based response to the problem of NPS, and for a 
limitation of the involvement of organised crime in the illicit drug market) included 
numerous references to communicating a message that NPS use is unacceptable.12 
Such statements suggest that the Act is intended to be (at least in part) symbolic. The 
primary focus of this article is to explore the argument that the PSA serves an 
important and worthwhile symbolic function. By using Bart van Klink’s useful 
                                                 
5 European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction, ‘Legal Approaches to Controlling New 
Psychoactive Substances’ (Publications Office of the European Union 2015) 2 
<www.emcdda.europa.eu/attachements.cfm/att_211257_EN_EMCDDA_POD_2013_Controlling%20
new%20psychoactive%20substances.pdf> accessed 12 February 2016. 
6 EMCDDA, ‘New Psychoactive Substances in Europe: An Update from the EU Early Warning 
System’ (Publications Office of the European Union 2015) 6 
<www.emcdda.europa.eu/attachements.cfm/att_235958_EN_TD0415135ENN.pdf> accessed 15 
January 2017. 
7 ibid 5. 
8 52 deaths in England and Wales in 2012: ‘New Psychoactive Substances Review: Report of the 
Expert Panel’ (Home Office 2014) 12 
<www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/368583/NPSexpertRe
viewPanelReport.pdf> accessed 17 March 2016. 
9 See generally ‘Trade in So-called “Legal Highs” Now Illegal’ (Home Office 2016) 
<www.gov.uk/government/news/trade-in-so-called-legal-highs-now-illegal> accessed 24 
November 2016. 
10 Misuse of Drugs Act 1971, s 2(1)(a). 
11 See generally J Chalmers and F Leverick, ‘Tracking the Creation of Criminal Offences’ [2013] Crim 
LR 543. 
12 ‘New Psychoactive Substances Review: Report of the Expert Panel’ (Home Office 2014) 5 
<www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/368583/NPSexpertRe
viewPanelReport.pdf> accessed 17 March 2016. 
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‘positive’ and ‘negative’ conceptions of symbolic laws as a toolkit for evaluation,13 it 
will be demonstrated that the PSA is a questionable symbolic law, as well as being 
an inadequately drafted statute as a whole. 
 
 
2. Is the PSA Symbolic? 
 
Symbolic legislation is characterised by, ‘a layered structure of meaning: on the 
primary or literal layer of meaning, we find the conceptual content of the substantive 
provisions (rules of behaviour) and the provisions to secure (…) compliance (…), 
whereas the secondary or symbolic layer contains immaterial values that are 
attached to this conceptual content’.14 There are a number of features common to all 
symbolic legislation, which are useful in determining whether a particular statute is 
indeed symbolic. The following section seeks to demonstrate how the PSA conforms 
to this description.  
 
A. Typical Aspects of Symbolic Laws 
 
According to Bart van Klink, who has recently developed a very useful tool for 
analysing and evaluating the well-established concept of legislative symbolism, the 
criteria of obscurity and vagueness are facets of all symbolic laws.15 This is where the 
text of the law is incomprehensible and/or ambiguous, presenting serious 
interpretive challenges both to the public and to those acting in a professional 
capacity. The Act’s attempt to define a ‘psychoactive substance’ to the express 
inclusion of NPS and the express exclusion of substances which are objectively 
legitimate,16 is vague, obscure and lacking in legal certainty. As previously noted, 
the Act follows the ‘general prohibition’ or ‘blanket ban’ approach. Section 2 thereof 
attempts to define a psychoactive substance as:17  
 
(…) any substance which (…) is capable of producing a psychoactive effect in 
a person who consumes it [by allowing the substance, or fumes given off by 
the substance, to enter the person’s body in any way] (…) if, by stimulating or 
depressing the person’s central nervous system, it affects the person’s mental 
functioning or emotional state 
 
                                                 
13 See generally B van Klink, ‘Symbolic Legislation: An Essentially Political Concept’ in B van Klink, B 
van Beers and L Poort (eds), Symbolic Legislation Theory and New Developments in Biolaw (Springer 
2015). 
14 ibid 22. 
15 ibid. 
16 By ‘objectively legitimate’ is meant substances which most people would not regard as worthy of 
criminalisation/categorisation along with the NPS that are the target of the Act, such as nutmeg or 
ornamental flower seeds. Such substances are discussed in detail below.  
17 Psychoactive Substances Act 2016, s 2. 
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This, though, is subject to the exemptions contained in schedule 1, which exist for: 
controlled drugs, medicinal products, ethyl alcohol products, nicotine and tobacco 
products, caffeine, and food and drink.18 
Significantly, the words ‘new’ and ‘synthetic’ are missing from the definition 
of a psychoactive substance, which would have gone some way to limiting the scope 
of the ban to the NPS that are the target of the legislation.19 Instead, a potentially 
endless list of substances could be prohibited under the Act. For example, the seeds 
of some species of common ornamental flowers would be covered by the above 
definition due to the presence of psychoactive substances within them. Ipomoea 
Tricolor (morning glory) seeds contain both ergonovine, an essential medicine used 
in obstetrics, and ergine, a hallucinogen and precursor to the Class A20 drug LSD.21 
In short, the definition of a ‘psychoactive substance’ includes the NPS that are the 
target of the legislation, but also, arbitrarily, a multitude of legitimate substances, 
with no guidance on how to distinguish the legal from the illicit. 
The exemption for food and drink also creates a degree of uncertainty in the 
law. While the given definition of food and drink as, ‘any substance which (…) is 
ordinarily consumed as food, and does not contain (…) any psychoactive substance 
(…) which is not naturally occurring in the substance, and (…) the use of which in or 
on food is not authorised by an EU instrument’,22 is largely unproblematic, the spice 
Myristica Fragrans (nutmeg) presents interpretive difficulties. Nutmeg is commonly 
used in food, but naturally contains the deleriant Myristicin,23 and so is sometimes 
used for its psychoactive, as opposed to its culinary, properties.24 The question arises 
whether such use is captured by the ‘ordinarily consumed’ definition. It is difficult to 
envisage criminal convictions being imposed for the sale of a common spice, but if 
the nutmeg is sold for recreational, psychoactive use, and if the criminal courts 
adopt the ‘mischief’ approach to statutory interpretation – which would militate in 
favour of conviction, as such behaviour is precisely the ‘mischief’ that the Act was 
drafted to remedy – this will at least be a possibility. Thus, due to the numerous 
issues in defining a psychoactive substance to include NPS, but to exclude legitimate 
substances such as ornamental flower seeds and nutmeg, the above hypotheticals 
demonstrate that the PSA fulfils van Klink’s criteria of vagueness and obscurity. 
Another feature common to all symbolic laws is what Van Klink calls the 
‘criterion of discrepancy’, i.e. where the legislative provisions lack effective 
enforcement mechanisms.25 The Act does give the police stop and search powers, 
                                                 
18 ibid sch 1. 
19 S Barber, ‘The Psychoactive Substances Bill 2015’ (House of Commons Briefing Paper CBP 7334, 16 
October 2015) 35 <http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/CBP-
7334#fullreport> accessed 10 February 2016. 
20 Misuse of Drugs Act 1971, sch 2. 
21 See generally Erowid, ‘Morning Glory Chemistry’ (Erowid, 29 April 2000) 
<www.erowid.org/plants/morning_glory/morning_glory_chemistry.shtml> accessed 17 March 
2016. 
22 Psychoactive Substances Act 2016, sch 1, para 7. 
23 H Hallström and A Thuvander, ‘Toxicological Evaluation of Myristicin’ (1997) 5 Nat Toxins 186, 
186.  
24 MK Abernethy and LB Becker, ‘Acute Nutmeg Intoxication’ (1992) 10 Am J Emerg Med 429, 429.  
25 B van Klink, ‘Symbolic Legislation: An Essentially Political Concept’ in B van Klink, B van Beers 
and L Poort (eds), Symbolic Legislation Theory and New Developments in Biolaw (Springer 2015) 24. 
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and also allows for premises and prohibition notices, whereby the police can require 
someone to take reasonable steps to prevent prohibited activities occurring at a 
designated place.26 Also, websites selling NPS can be forced to cease trading under 
the PSA.27 However, these powers are also found in the Irish equivalent28 of the Act 
(on which the PSA was largely based) and/or the MDA, 29  which have both 
struggled to eliminate drug production, supply and use. Although the sample size 
was small (consisting of a mere five hundred interviewees), a European Commission 
Eurobarometer survey has indicated that NPS use in Ireland increased from 16 per 
cent to 22 per cent between 2011 and 2014.30 Additionally, the survey showed that 
NPS use in Ireland is the highest in the EU amongst the 16-24 age group.31 Therefore, 
the enforcement mechanisms in the PSA might not be as effective as intended. 
Additionally, convictions may be precluded by the various definitional issues in the 
Act noted above. Indeed, the ambiguity in the PSA might make establishing a 
prosecution case difficult in many situations: the Government’s Advisory Council on 
the Misuse of Drugs (ACMD) has also warned that, ‘psychoactivity cannot be 
unequivocally proven’ without human trials.32 Human trials of this nature would 
raise serious ethical issues, and would be inconsistent with the intended purpose of 
the Act, i.e. to protect humans from becoming intoxicated by NPS ingestion.  
The fulfilment of all these criteria (obscurity, vagueness and discrepancy) 
strongly indicates that the Act can, and should, be regarded as an example of 
symbolic legislation. The ‘umbrella’ category of symbolic legislation is further 
divided by van Klink into two sub-categories: ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ symbolic 
laws, both of which are defined and discussed in the next two sections. These are 
helpful concepts for further analysing and evaluating the PSA.  
 
B. The PSA: A Positive Symbolic Law? 
 
Positive symbolic laws seek to create a ‘communicative framework’ between the 
Government and the public, ‘in order to de-automatise current patterns of 
thinking’. 33  In other words, positive symbolic laws seek to encourage the co-
production of laws between the public and the state, based on society’s widely 
recognised fundamental values.  
If it is possible to frame the PSA in this positive sense, then the argument that 
the Act serves an important symbolic purpose will be of some weight. This is 
                                                 
26 Psychoactive Substances Act 2016, ss 13, 14 and 36. 
27 ibid s 5. 
28 Criminal Justice (Psychoactive Substances) Act 2010 (IE), ss 7-14. 
29 Misuse of Drugs Act 1971, s 23. 
30 TNS Political and Social, ‘Flash Eurobarometer 401: Young People and Drugs’ (European 
Commission 2014) 8 <http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/flash/fl_401_en.pdf> accessed 17 January 
2016. 
31 ibid 9. 
32 ‘Letter from the Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs to the Home Secretary’ (2 July 2015) 2 
<www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/441400/2-7-15-
_ACMD_advice_on_PS_Bill.pdf> accessed 16 January 2016. 
33 B van Klink, ‘Symbolic Legislation: An Essentially Political Concept’ in B van Klink, B van Beers 
and L Poort (eds), Symbolic Legislation Theory and New Developments in Biolaw (Springer 2015) 27. 
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because positive symbolic laws can play a valuable role in society. They may serve 
an ‘epistemic function’, i.e., ‘[where] a symbolic law offers a vocabulary that affects 
the way in which legal and political actors perceive reality [as] accessed through the 
concepts and distinctions provided by the law’.34 A prime example of this is the 
concept of ‘human dignity’ found in the UN Universal Declaration on Human 
Rights.35 The term ‘human dignity’ is symbolic, as it conforms to the criteria of 
obscurity and vagueness due to its abstract nature, and also to the criterion of 
discrepancy as it does not in itself provide a mechanism for enforcement. ‘Human 
dignity’ is positively symbolic as it offers legal actors (such as judges) an interpretive 
vocabulary which can be used to influence the reality of what constitutes a human 
rights violation. This is achieved via a ‘communicative framework’ which, instead of 
(in this case, supra-national) law-makers issuing concrete parameters on what might 
lead to a breach of human rights, allows for a more adaptable law which might 
better reflect society’s expectations of justice. In this way, a symbolic concept can 
benefit society, which is what proponents of the PSA would hope to achieve.  
Another way in which positive symbolic laws can be of benefit is by 
redistributing status in society. One example might be the UK legislation forbidding 
employment discrimination on the grounds of race, sex, disability et cetera. 36 
Enforcing crimes under this legislation is difficult due to the difficulties in proving 
that the discrimination was a product of racism, sexism, ableism etc.,37 but such laws 
seek to change attitudes where they cannot offer any immediate solutions. As what 
follows will demonstrate, the PSA does not fulfil the criteria for a positive symbolic 
law.  
The communication criterion requires that, for a law to be positively 
symbolic, it must play a central role in the public debate on the matter regulated by 
the legislation.38 In other words, ‘a structured procedure [of public consultation] 
enhances the chances for a high quality statute’.39 It is submitted that the Act fails to 
fulfil the communication criterion, as it actually does the opposite, silencing the 
national debate before it has even had the chance to begin. This is evident in the 
manner in which the Government created the Act, dismissing the opinions of 
various organisations, and drafting the provisions before even consulting their own 
experts, the ACMD.40 The ACMD expressed various concerns with the Psychoactive 
Substances Bill on a number of occasions, 41  which included its definition of 
                                                 
34 ibid 25.  
35 Universal Declaration on Human Rights (adopted 10 December 1948) UNGA Res 217 A(III) 
(UDHR) Preamble. 
36 E.g. the Equality Act 2010. 
37 LH Krieger, ‘The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and 
Equal Employment Opportunity’ (1995) 47 Stan L Rev 1161, 1163.  
38 B van Klink, ‘Symbolic Legislation: An Essentially Political Concept’ in B van Klink, B van Beers 
and L Poort (eds), Symbolic Legislation Theory and New Developments in Biolaw (Springer 2015) 24. 
39 A Siehr, ‘Symbolic Legislation and the Need for Legislative Jurisprudence: The Example of the 
Federal Republic of Germany’ (2008) 2 Legisprudence 271, 277.  
40 Release and Transform, ‘Parliamentary Briefing: Psychoactive Substances Bill (2nd Reading House of 
Lords)’ (9 June 2015) 1 <www.tdpf.org.uk/sites/default/files/Psychoactive-Substances-Bill-briefing-
2015.pdf> accessed 22 March 2016. 
41 See generally L Iversen, ‘ACMD’s Final Advice on Definitions for Psychoactive Substances Bill’ (23 
October 2015) 
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psychoactive substances in lay (rather than scientific) terms, and the consequent lack 
of a reference to pharmacology or neurochemistry. Such criticisms were met with the 
reply that many of the ACMD’s recommendations simply could not be implemented 
for the token reason that they were not the Government’s intentions. 42  The 
recommendations of two pressure groups on drug laws, Release and Transform, were 
similarly ignored, as demonstrated by the fact that their concerns regarding legal 
certainty,43 including the aforementioned ‘nutmeg’ problem, were not addressed.44 
Additionally, despite the fact that the World Health Organisation has recommended 
that people not be criminalised for possession of drugs for personal use,45 the PSA 
makes it illegal to possess a psychoactive substance in a custodial institution,46 and 
also criminalises purchasing NPS for personal use ‘through the back door’ in cases 
where the substance was bought from a foreign website.47 This is not an illustration 
of constructive debate, or a ‘framework of communication’, whereby the views of 
experts are taken on board. In the face of recent international efforts to end criminal 
sanctions for drug use, supply and production, such as the decriminalisation of all 
drugs in Portugal48 and the legalised regulation of cannabis in Uruguay and some 
North American states,49 the UK Government’s selective approach to the evidence 
appears all the more striking. Whatever the merits of these alternatives to 
criminalisation, the fact that they were not even considered in the drafting of the Act 
is telling in itself. Viewed against this comparative backdrop, the blanket ban does 
not symbolise the Government engaging in discussion; far from it, it suggests that 
the Government is acting on a pre-formed view and ignoring any contrary evidence.  
Finally, the criterion of ‘symbolic working’ requires that positively symbolic 
laws, ‘succee[d] gradually in achieving the goals intended through communication 
and interaction’.50 As at the time of writing, the PSA has been in force for little more 
than half a year; hence concrete statements cannot be made about whether the 
statute will conform to this criterion. However, based on the fact that people still use 
drugs despite the MDA having been in operation for over forty-five years, it is at 
least conceivable that the PSA will fail to serve its symbolic purpose of persuading 
people not to take drugs. This point is extensively expanded on below in section 3 of 
this article. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
<www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/470421/ACMD_defini
tions_advice_final-23-October-2015.pdf> accessed 12 February 2016. 
42 ibid 1.  
43 Release and Transform, ‘Joint Submission to the Public Bill Committee into the Psychoactive 
Substances Bill’ (29 October 2015) 4. 
44 See above: text to nn 22-24. 
45 World Health Organisation, Consolidated Guidelines on HIV Prevention, Diagnosis, Treatment and Care 
for Key Populations (2014 WHO) 86-9. 
46 Psychoactive Substances Act 2016, s 9. 
47 ibid s 8. 
48 S Jones, Criminology (2013 OUP) 14. 
49 A Travis, ‘UN Drugs Body Warns US States and Uruguay Over Cannabis Legalisation’ The Guardian 
(London, 3 March 2015) <www.theguardian.com/society/2015/mar/03/un-drugs-body-warns-us-
states-and-uruguay-over-cannabis-legalisation> accessed 6 January 2016. 
50 B van Klink, ‘Symbolic Legislation: An Essentially Political Concept’ in B van Klink, B van Beers 
and L Poort (eds), Symbolic Legislation Theory and New Developments in Biolaw (Springer 2015) 25. 
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C. The PSA: A Negative Symbolic Law? 
 
In contrast to positive symbolic laws, negative symbolic laws can be defined as laws 
whose ‘main purpose is to give expression to values in the political sphere’.51 In this 
understanding, they refer to instances of the legislature attempting to transmit to the 
public an uncompromising message about what constitutes legitimate behaviour, 
based on what politicians themselves subjectively see as right and wrong. It will be 
demonstrated that it is to this category of symbolic legislation that the PSA is most 
akin. 
These symbolic laws are typically drafted in response to societal 
circumstances which demand an immediate Government reaction: what van Klink 
terms ‘the crisis criterion’.52 The applicability of this criterion to the Act is illustrated 
by the rapidly increasing prevalence of NPS, both worldwide and in the UK.53 The 
fear that this increasing prevalence has generated, of unknown drugs with unknown 
risks being sold to teenagers and others on the high street and the internet, has 
incentivised the Government to be seen to be acting with swift conviction. 
A further aspect of negative symbolic laws is that they are made to, ‘enunciate 
and reinforce what is understood as right and wrong’, 54  and that the relevant 
legislative actor views, ‘the enactment of the law as a moral victory’.55 A prohibitive 
stance on drugs has long been attached to conceptions of moral superiority.56 It is 
also worth noting the pride evident in such Government proclamations as, ‘we have 
already banned 350 substances and have been quicker to respond to this challenge 
than most other countries’.57 Arguably, the current Government views prohibition 
not only as the correct approach to the NPS problem but also as evidence of some 
perceived ethical high ground.  
In sum, negative symbolic laws can be understood to be a product of the 
legislature identifying a controversial societal problem and choosing with firm (and 
possibly misguided) conviction a side of the fence on which to land. For the reasons 
given immediately above, the PSA clearly conforms to this negative, rather than a 
positive, conception of symbolic legislation. What exactly the Act symbolises will 
now be discussed and assessed in order to determine the value, or otherwise, of 
creating a negative symbolic law in response to the problem of NPS. 
 
                                                 
51 ibid 22. 
52 ibid. 
53 European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction, ‘Legal Approaches to Controlling 
New Psychoactive Substances’ (Publications Office of the European Union 2015) 1 
<www.emcdda.europa.eu/attachements.cfm/att_211257_EN_EMCDDA_POD_2013_Controlling%20
new%20psychoactive%20substances.pdf> accessed 12 February 2016. 
54 K Daly, ‘Aims of the Criminal Justice System’ in M Marmo, W de Lint and D Palmer (eds), Crime 
and Justice: A Guide to Criminology (4th edn, Lawbook Co 2012) para 17.05. 
55 B van Klink, ‘Symbolic Legislation: An Essentially Political Concept’ in B van Klink, B van Beers 
and L Poort (eds), Symbolic Legislation Theory and New Developments in Biolaw (Springer 2015) 22. 
56 HS Becker, Outsiders (The Free Press 1963) 148. 
57 ‘Government Response to the New Psychoactive Substances Review Expert Panel Report’ (October 
2014) 2 
<www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/368498/ResponseNPS
reviewExpertPanelReport.pdf> accessed 10 January 2016. 
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3. Evaluating the Negative Symbolism in the PSA: Discouraging Drug Use 
 
Proponents of the Act argued that a blanket ban on all psychoactive substances 
would symbolise that the production, supply and use of recreational drugs is 
unacceptable behaviour.58 There is a good reason for sending such a message: certain 
drugs do cause some people serious harm,59 and people should be encouraged to 
pursue more productive activities, hobbies or employment in order to increase their 
individual and collective quality of life and well-being. What the following section 
calls into question is not so much the merits of such an ‘anti-drugs’ message, but 
rather the effectiveness with which that message has been conveyed by the 
provisions of the PSA.   
 
A. The Blanket Ban is an Unclear Symbol 
 
The objective of the negative symbolism of the PSA, i.e. public recognition of the 
notion that involvement in recreational drugs in any capacity is wrong, may be 
frustrated by the sheer vagueness of the symbol used to communicate that message. 
In other words, the superficial symbolism of a blanket ban loses its value when the 
breadth of the definition of a ‘psychoactive substance’ under the PSA, and the 
absence of any distinction between varying levels of harm, is taken into account. Just 
as person A may conclude that a blanket ban is a clear indication of unacceptable 
conduct, person B may conclude that, due to the mechanics of the blanket ban, the 
PSA does not clearly delineate legitimate and illegitimate behaviour: if the 
recreational use of all psychoactive substances is to be condemned, should person B 
refrain from purchasing nutmeg or certain species of ornamental flowers, or even 
from drinking alcohol, a substance which would have fallen within the Act’s 
definition of a ‘psychoactive substance’ had an exemption not been made?60 Many 
would deem that an absurd suggestion. However, hypotheticals such as these show 
that the message symbolised by the blanket ban may not be as precise as it appears 
at first glance. In other words, if someone like person B feels the Act to be internally 
incoherent, they will fail to grasp the message that the Government is attempting to 
convey. It could be argued that the public at large is unlikely to be attuned to the 
definitional inconsistencies contained in the PSA, so will grasp the superficial 
message, rather than taking person B’s viewpoint. However, this can be questioned 
for a number of reasons. Firstly, one need look no further than the coverage of the 
PSA in the UK’s tabloid press, which slated the Act,61 to show why the public may 
reach the conclusion of person B. Secondly, this argument does not address the Act’s 
deficiencies (such as its lack of legal certainty) but rather pretends that they do not 
                                                 
58 ‘New Psychoactive Substances Review: Report of the Expert Panel’ (Home Office 2014) 5 
<www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/368583/NPSexpertRe
viewPanelReport.pdf> accessed 17 March 2016. 
59 See generally NHS, ‘The Effects of Drugs’ (NHS Choices, 13 May 2015) 
<www.nhs.uk/Livewell/drugs/Pages/Drugsoverview.aspx> accessed 22 March 2016. 
60 PSA, s 3 and sch 1, para 3.  
61 See, e.g., D Bloom, ‘Legal Highs Bill: Theresa May is Silencing Her Own Drugs Experts, Warns 
Former Top Cop’ The Mirror (London, 22 June 2015) <www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/legal-
highs-Act-theresa-silencing-5929408> accessed 10 March 2016. 
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exist, which is at best a dubious rationale for creating a law. At worst, it is an 
indictment of the selective-evidence policy which has been the backbone of the PSA 
since its inception. 
 
B. The Blanket Ban Symbolises that the Law is Asinine 
 
Law and order considerations also militate against the symbolism of a blanket ban. It 
has been argued that if society does not demonstrate solidarity in denouncing 
certain actions as intolerable, the inclination to abide by its rules will decrease.62 
However, it could be argued that when ineffectual laws such as the MDA are 
perpetuated and expanded upon – as is the case with the PSA – this symbolises, 
especially for the target group consisting of those who continually break these laws, 
that the law is an ‘ass’.63 This is especially pertinent due to the PSA being a negative 
symbolic law, where the submissions of those who represent this section of the 
populace have been largely ignored, rather than having been taken on board. If the 
PSA is to be regarded as a symbol that people should change their behaviour and 
abstain from involvement in psychoactive substances, then alienating those people 
who are the target of this Act is counter-productive, and this brings the whole 
purpose of legislative symbolism into disrepute.  
 
 
4. Evaluating the Negative Symbolism in the PSA: Putting Government 
Interests First 
 
A. Government is in Control 
 
In conforming to the crisis criterion, negative symbolic laws are an attempt by the 
Government to symbolise that the crisis, in this case the proliferation of NPS, is 
under control. In this regard, the PSA could be seen as beneficial to society as it 
might communicate that psychoactive substances are not an unregulated ‘free for 
all’, and this may discourage those who produce and supply them. Additionally, it 
could convey to those affected by NPS that the Government is taking a proactive 
approach to resolving the problem. However, this view is potentially misconceived. 
Arguably, in its symbolic display of control, the Government is misleading the 
population at large. Firstly, the blanket ban will allow the demand for NPS to be 
supplied by criminal organisations (who care not for, e.g., imposing age restrictions 
on their products, and are unable to resort to legitimate legal channels to resolve 
disputes),64 thus leaving the Government unable to control NPS any better than they 
have managed to control ‘conventional’ recreational drugs under the MDA. 
Ironically, this is in contrast to the pre-PSA position, whereby tax-paying 
                                                 
62 JR Gusfield, ‘On Legislating Morals: The Symbolic Process of Designating Deviance’ (1968) 56 CLR 
54, 55.  
63 A notion popularised by the novel, Oliver Twist. See C Dickens, Oliver Twist (1st edn 1837-8, rev 
edn, Penguin Books 2003) 436: ‘If the law supposes that (…) the law is [an] ass – [an] idiot.’  
64 P Goldstein, ‘The Drugs/Violence Nexus: A Tripartite Conceptual Framework’ (1985) 39 Journal of 
Drug Issues 493, 497.  
Aberdeen Student Law Review – Volume 7 
119 
‘headshops’ (high street retailers of NPS and drug paraphernalia) could ensure 
responsible retail practices by not selling products to minors or intoxicated 
individuals.65 Thus, an unregulated ‘free for all’ is precisely what the PSA will create. 
Secondly, the weaknesses and inadequacies of the legislation caused by dismissing 
expert opinions66 – and the indications from Ireland that NPS use has increased since 
the passage of the Irish equivalent of the PSA67 – indicate the opposite of a proactive 
approach.  
 
B. Political Expediency? 
 
Arguably, there are political points to be scored by implementing the PSA other than 
giving the appearance of control. At the very least, it could be hazarded that the PSA 
represents the path of least resistance when it comes to tackling the problem of NPS. 
By alluding to the supposedly devastating health harms, societal problems and 
immorality of NPS, the Government, ‘reap[s] the political benefits of voting for 
[health]’, but ‘sidesteps’ difficult policy and regulation questions.68 Drug prohibition 
was a feature of the Conservative Party manifesto in 2015,69 and by furthering the 
prohibition of drugs by introducing a blanket ban on psychoactive substances, rather 
than trialling radical reforms such as those in Portugal, there was arguably little 
danger of alienating voters with a traditionalist outlook on the drugs problem: 
persons who might be referred to broadly as conservatives with a small ‘c’. This 
move also made particular strategic sense in the 2015 General election. It allowed the 
Conservative party to distance itself from the Liberal Democrats, who (inter alia) 
adopted a non-prohibitionist stance on drugs near the end of the 
Conservative/Liberal Democrat coalition Government.70 The impression that these 
circumstances create, namely that the Act was potentially the product of political 
expediency, further taints its value as a symbol. This is even the case if, contrary to 
appearances, the Act was motivated purely by a desire to tackle the NPS problem in 
an effective manner. This article is considering the effectiveness of the NPS in as 
much as it constitutes a symbol, and a symbol, by definition, is only as effective as 
what it appears to be. However noble or well-meaning the drafters’ actual intentions 
might have been, the Act seems to have been the product of political expediency, if 
only because of the aforementioned circumstances surrounding its enactment. Thus, 
as a piece of symbolic legislation purporting to adopt a clear, uncompromising 
stance on the NPS issue, the PSA is of somewhat questionable worth.  
 
                                                 
65 ‘New Psychoactive Substances Review: Report of the Expert Panel’ (Home Office 2014) 14 
<www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/368583/NPSexpertRe
viewPanelReport.pdf> accessed 17 March 2016. 
66 As discussed in Section 2B.  
67 As discussed in Section 2A.  
68 JP Dwyer, ‘The Pathology of Symbolic Legislation’ (1990) 17 Ecology LQ 233, 233 and 316. 
69 ‘The Conservative Party Manifesto 2015’ (Conservative Party 2015) 9 <https://s3-eu-west-
1.amazonaws.com/manifesto2015/ConservativeManifesto2015.pdf> accessed 22 March 2016. 
70 ‘The Liberal Democrats Manifesto 2015’ (Liberal Democrats 2015) 125 
<https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/libdems/pages/8907/attachments/original/1429028133/
Liberal_Democrat_General_Election_Manifesto_2015.pdf?1429028133> accessed 22 March 2016. 
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5. Conclusion 
 
The mere fact that a law is symbolic is not necessarily a criticism, as symbolic laws 
can and do exist in a positive sense. Thus, the PSA, and the arguments of those who 
support it on the basis that drug use must be seen to be discouraged, might have had 
merit despite the fact that it is unlikely to achieve its stated aims of reducing demand 
for NPS, and limiting the involvement of organised crime in the illicit drug market et 
cetera. However, in the pursuance of being seen not to condone drug use, the knee-
jerk reaction to NPS by the present Government actually sends a negative message. 
It has been shown why it is unlikely that the PSA will serve as an effective symbol 
for discouraging drug use, and that instead it symbolises political self-preservation. 
As other countries start to question the merits of prohibition, the UK Government 
has chosen to widen the prohibition of drugs, creating a severely deficient law, and 
ignoring evidence which is inconsistent with their own agenda. 
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The Classification of Murder and Slaughter in the 
Justiciary Court from 1625-1650: Malice, Intent and 
Premeditation - Food ‘Forethought’? 
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Abstract 
 
The prosecution of homicide in Scotland during the early seventeenth century is all too 
relevant to a wider appreciation of the law, government, legal profession and society of the 
time. It is, consequently, surprising that this subject has hitherto received little in the way of 
scholarly attention. By re-examining various historical records (both archival and printed) 
this article aims to answer important questions about the classification of the law of 
homicide, with a specific focus on the prosecution of murder and slaughter. It considers the 
key differences between these crimes with regard to various issues, most notably: (1) the role 
of ‘malice’ in the prosecution of slaughter and (2) the term ‘forethought’ and how that 
influenced the prosecution of murder.  
 
Keywords: Evidence, Procedure, Seventeenth-Century, Homicide, Scots Criminal Law, Archival 
Material, Malice, Forethought 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This article explores the classification of homicide in seventeenth century Scotland. It 
is important first to understand the distinction between murder and slaughter in that 
period; thereafter, the further classifications within these categories are examined.  
In the first half of the seventeenth century, acts of homicide could be placed 
into one of two broad categories: ‘slaughter’ and ‘murder’. As shown below in Table 
1, the overwhelming majority of homicide cases heard before the Justiciary Court 
from 1625-1650 were for the crime of ‘slaughter’ (more than 76 per cent).2 The next 
                                                 
1 PhD candidate, University of Aberdeen. This article is part of a thesis that was presented for the 
degree of Masters of Law (by Research) at the University of Aberdeen in September 2016. 
2 There are two principal sets of sources from which the Justiciary Court cases were taken. Firstly, 
there were three volumes contained in the National Records of Scotland: JC2/6 High Court Book of 
Adjournal - Old Series (7 Oct 1619 - 24 Mar 1631) (hereinafter, ‘JC2/6’); JC2/7 High Court Book of 
Adjournal - Old Series (29 Mar 1631 - 15 Nov 1637) (hereinafter, ‘JC2/7’); and JC2/8 High Court Book 
of Adjournal - Old Series (17 Nov 1637 - 17 Jul 1650) (hereinafter, ‘JC2/8’). Secondly, the cases can be 
found in printed editions of SA Gillon (ed), Selected Justiciary Cases: 1624-1650, Vol 1 (Stair Society 
1953) (hereinafter, ‘SJC (Vol 1)’); JI Smith (ed), Selected Justiciary Cases: 1624-1650, Vol 2 (Stair Society 
1972) (hereinafter, ‘SJC (Vol 2)’); JI Smith, Selected Justiciary Cases: 1624-1650, Vol 3 (Stair Society 1974) 
(hereinafter, ‘SJC (Vol 3)’). Given the nature of the archival material it is often difficult to provide 
pinpoint paragraph references. The references made throughout this article are to the modern 
pagination provided by the National Records of Scotland, which can be found on the bottom left-
hand corner of each page. The manuscripts, at least those contained in the three Justiciary Court 
volumes used here, do not include paragraph numbers. In some of the ‘case law’ citations below, 
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most prevalent accusation to feature in this period was that of ‘murder and 
slaughter’, with just over 12 per cent of the cases accounting for that double charge. 
As explored in greater detail below, this double charge might have been used by 
pursuers who, despite wishing to libel murder, were not confident of fulfilling the 
burdens of proof associated with that crime.   
 
Crimes Number of Cases Percentage* 
‘Slaughter’ 126 76.8% 
‘Murder and slaughter’ 21 12.8% 
‘Murder’ 14 8.5% 
‘Murder under trust’ 1 0.6% 
‘Treasonable murder’ 1 0.6% 
‘Accidental slaughter’ 1 0.6% 
Total Cases 164 100% 
~TABLE 1:  SHOWING THE NUMBER OF HOMICIDE CASES FROM 1625  - 1650  THAT 
CAME BEFORE THE JUSTICIARY COURT (*PERCENTAGES ROUNDED TO ONE 
DECIMAL PLACE).   
 
There is very little secondary literature on the topic of the classification of murder 
and slaughter in the seventeenth century. This was recognised by David Sellar, who 
remarked that, apart from writings on the payment of assythment, blood-feuds in 
early Scottish society and violence more broadly, little has been written about the 
development of the law of homicide in Scotland.3 His study on ‘forethought felony’ 
is the most comprehensive examination of the classification of murder and slaughter, 
and so is examined here in detail. Sellar suggested that the notion of ‘forethought 
felony’ was part of Scots law for more than five hundred years.4 He traced the 
classification of murder starting with the earliest known classification of homicide in 
Scots law to Regiam Majestatem, in the early-fourteenth century. That source 
specifically associates the term ‘murder’ with a secret killing.5  
                                                                                                                                                        
more than one page number will be mentioned. This has been done because the case in question 
appears more than once in the volume, the aim being to provide the reader with as much information 
as possible.  
3 D Sellar, ‘Forethocht Felony, Malice Aforethought and the Classification of Homicide’ in WM 
Gordon and TD Fergus (eds), Legal History in the Making: Proceedings of the Ninth British Legal History 
Conference Glasgow 1989 (Hambledon Press 1991) 47. With regard to this perceived lack of scholarship 
Sellar cites the following works: R Black, ‘Historical Survey of Delictual Liability in Scotland for 
Personal Injuries and Death - Part I, Early History’ (1975) 8 Comp & Intl LJ S Afr 46; CHW Gane, ‘The 
Effect of a Pardon in Scots Law’ [1980] Jur Rev 18; J Wormald, ‘Bloodfeud, Kindred and Government 
in Early Modern Scotland’ (1980) 87 Past and Present 54; and KM Brown, Bloodfeud in Scotland, 1573-
1625 (John Donald 1986). Little else has been written following these sources on the classification of 
homicide in the seventeenth century.  
4 Sellar, ‘Forethought Felony’ (n 3) 45.  
5 ibid 48. Sellar cites the Stair Society edition of Regiam Majestatem: J Skene, Regiam Majestatem and 
Quoniam Attachiamenta (TM Cooper ed, Stair Society 1947) 4,5. The edition used for this article was J 
Skene, Regiam Majestatem: The Auld Lawes and Constitutions of Scotland (Thomas Finlason 1609). See 
generally 4,5.    
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The law of homicide was further developed by legislation. A statute of 1370 
enacted that the King should not grant a remission for homicide until an inquest had 
determined whether the killing had been committed, ‘per murthyr vel per 
praecogitatam malitiam’ (‘by murder or malicious forethought’).6 Two years later an 
Act required that an assize or inquest determine whether the accused had killed 
another, ‘ex certo et deliverato proposito vel per forthouchfelony sive murthir vel ex calore 
iracundiae viz chaudemellee’ (‘according to the certain and deliberated proposition, 
either by forethought felony or murder, or from heat of passion, namely 
chaudemellee’).7 The 1372 statute mentioned the assize adjudicating on the possible 
existence of ‘forethocht felony’ or ‘chaudemella’.8 According to Sellar, at least two 
fifteenth-century Scottish statutes mentioned ‘forethocht felony’ and contrasted it 
with actions on a ‘suddante’ or ‘chaudemella’.9 By the eighteenth century, the term 
‘murder’ seemed to have moved from its older, restricted meaning of secret killing to 
cover all killing done with forethought felony.10 However, Sellar said little of the law 
in the seventeenth century.  
This topic has also been addressed in the work of Alexander Grant, who 
discusses the classification of the law of homicide with reference to Regiam 
Majestatem,11 as well as Skene’s De Verborum Significatione,12 and the importance of 
the classifications contained in these works to the context of feuding in medieval 
Scotland.13 Grant suggests that secret killing was central to the concept of murder 
and retained this meaning until at least the end of the fifteenth century.14 He quotes 
Skene’s definition of murder (or murthurum), which is provided in De Verborum 
Significatione:  
 
Whereof of some is called private, that is manslaughter, whereof the author is 
unknown, whereof the inquisition belongs to the crowner; as where a person 
is found slain, or drowned, in any place or water. Other is public committed 
by forethought felony. And murder is committed by forthought felony and 
not by suddenty.15  
 
                                                 
6 APS i 509, as cited in Sellar, ‘Forethought Felony’ (n 3) 48. See also ‘1370/2/12‘ in KM Brown and 
others (eds), ‘The Records of the Parliaments of Scotland to 1707’ (St Andrews, 2007-2016) 
(hereinafter, ‘RPS’) <www.rps.ac.uk/trans/1370/2/12> accessed 17 February 2017. The version of 
this statute consulted by Sellar seems to differ in its wording from the ‘RPS’ version thereof.  
7 APS I, 547-48, as cited in Sellar, ‘Forethought Felony’ (n 3) 48; this statute can also be found in the 
Records of the Parliaments of Scotland’: RPS 1372/3/6.  
8 Sellar, ‘Forethought Felony’ (n 3) 48. See RPS 1372/3/6. This seems to be the only statute in 1372 that 
refers to murder and chaudemella. 
9 Sellar, ‘Forethought Felony’ (n 3) 49. In fact, there seem to have been at least three such statutes. See 
APS II, 9, c 7, RPS 1426/10; APS II, 21, c 7, RPS 1432/3/8; and APS II, 95, c 11, RPS 1469/25.  
10 Sellar, ‘Forethought Felony’ (n 3) 49.  
11 (n 5). 
12 Skene, De Verborum Significatione: The Exposition of the termes and difficull words (EG 1641). 
13 A Grant, ‘Murder Will Out: Kingship, Kinship and Killing in Medieval Scotland’ in S Boardman 
and Julian Goodare (eds), Kings, Lords and Men in Scotland and Britain, 1300-1625: Essays in Honour of 
Jenny Wormald (Edinburgh University Press 2014) 222.  
14 ibid 224.  
15 See both Skene, De Verborum Significatione (n 12) 69 and Grant, ‘Murder Will Out’ (n 13) 224.  
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Grant’s reading of Skene’s definition is that murder came under ‘forethought felony’ 
and that it was still ‘non-public, with unknown perpetrators’, meaning that it had 
essentially retained its clandestine aspect.16  
 The main influence on Scots criminal law was undoubtedly Civilian. This can, 
for example, be observed in Mackenzie’s division of homicide into four categories 
borrowed from the Civilians: homicide committed casually, in defence, culpably and 
wilfully.17 More particularly, according to Sellar, this division could ultimately be 
traced to the Canonist source, Decretals. 18  For instance, the term ‘de homicidio 
voluntario vel casuali’19 can be taken to prefigure the distinction, later recognised by 
Mackenzie, 20  between homicide committed casually and homicide committed 
wilfully.21 
Sellar argues that the development of homicide and the terms associated 
therewith, ‘points to the consistent and uninterrupted use of the term malice 
aforethought to describe a premeditated, rather than a merely deliberate homicide, 
from at least the later fourteenth until the eighteenth century’. 22  However, 
exploration of the Justiciary Court records reveals some, admittedly minor, 
variations in terminological classification. The term ‘aforethought felony’ was 
successfully prosecuted once 23  and mentioned only one other time. 24  The term 
‘malice aforethought’ was not in frequent use during the early seventeenth century, 
which is not to say that Sellar is incorrect; at worst, his observations simply belie the 
terminology, as against the concepts, used by the courts during the early seventeenth 
century. The use of these terms is explored more fully below in the section on 
slaughter. As this article shows, the terminology relating to homicide was not used 
consistently in practice; rather, the pursuer would allege slaughter, murder or both 
in reference to particular circumstances from which ‘malice’ or ‘intention’25 on the 
part of the ‘panel’ (i.e. the accused) could be inferred. At times, evidence would also 
be produced in court, to disprove the murder or slaughter charge.26 For instance, the 
case of Thomas Crombie and others (1625) featured the averment of medical evidence. 
However, reliance on such expert evidence was notable for its relative rarity in the 
seventeenth century; it seems, in other words, to have been the exception rather than 
the rule. 
                                                 
16 ibid.  
17 Sellar, ‘Forethought Felony’ (n 3) 58. Mackenzie’s classification of homicide can be found in Sir 
George Mackenzie: The Laws and Customs of Scotland in Matters Criminal (OF Robison ed, Stair Society 
2012) 1,11.  
18 Decretals (Compiled by St Raymund of Penafort for Pope Gregory IX, 1234) V,xii. This source was 
discussed in Sellar, ‘Forethought Felony’ (n 3) 58. It was not directly consulted for the purposes of this 
article.   
19 This translates roughly as ‘homicide wilful or accidental’. 
20 Sir George Mackenzie, Matters Criminal (n 17) 1,11,6-8.  
21 Sellar, ‘Forethought Felony’ (n 3) 58.  
22 ibid 56.  
23 In the case of Robert Walker and others (1642), SJC (Vol 3) 536.  
24 In the case of Johnne Bell (1644), JC2/8, 374.  
25 By ‘intent’ is meant ‘thinking in advance of an act’ or ‘planning in advance of an act’; it should not 
be understood in the looser, more modern sense of the word. A further discussion is provided in 
section 3 below. 
26 For example, see the case of Thomas Crombie and others (1625), SJC (Vol 1) 18 and JC2/6, 324. 
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 From the foregoing it would appear that, in order truly to understand the law 
pertaining to homicide in seventeenth century Scotland, it will be necessary to re-
examine the classification of murder and slaughter as distinct forms of homicide in 
the light of the seventeenth century evidence. By reference to the Justiciary Court 
records, this article examines the crimes of slaughter, murder, and thereafter the 
double charge of ‘murder and slaughter’. To that end, specific reference is made to 
the procedure of the Justiciary Court and to the pleadings brought before it. The 
ultimate aim of this historical survey is to furnish a richer understanding of court 
practice in seventeenth century homicide cases and, more generally, a greater 
appreciation of the concept of homicide in Scottish legal history.  
 
 
2. The Crime of Slaughter 
 
A. Overview of Findings 
 
This section explores the prosecution of ‘slaughter’ before the Justiciary Court from 
1625-1650. Re-examining the prosecution of this crime allows for interesting 
conclusions to be drawn regarding the classification of homicide, for instance the 
determination that, in contrast to ‘murder’, ‘slaughter’ was never libelled on the 
grounds of express ‘intent’ or ‘deliberate’ killing. It is also possible that ‘slaughter’ 
was used, in the early seventeenth century, as a general term for homicide. 
‘Slaughter’ was libelled in three principal ways: ‘slaughter chaudemella’, ‘slaughter 
with precogitat malice’, and ‘accidental slaughter’.  
As many of the sources considered below make clear, ‘slaughter with 
precogitat malice’ was the killing of another maliciously by a deadly wound. The 
malice in these cases concerned the conduct or verbal words exchanged between the 
‘panel’ (i.e. the accused) and the ‘defunct’ (i.e. the alleged victim) prior to the latter’s 
death. The precogitata (i.e. thinking in advance) did not appear to relate to the actual 
act of killing; rather ‘slaughter with precogitat malice’ seemed to concern the scenario 
of killing preceded by a more general, non-homicidal sentiment of malice and ill-
will. The notion of ‘accidental slaughter’ can be discerned from the single case so 
termed,27 and also from the cases in which this term was invoked as a defence 
against an allegation of ‘slaughter with precogitat malice’.28 In other words, the panel 
might plead that, although there had been a homicide, this had been committed 
without precogitat malice. This defence, explored more fully below, was often 
accepted by the court. The practice before the Justiciary Court indicates that 
‘slaughter chaudemella’ was, like ‘accidental slaughter’, different from ‘slaughter with 
precogitat malice’, though the confines of that classification are not made explicitly 
clear. There was specific reference to statutory material, explored in the sub-section 
                                                 
27 James Mathiesone (1640), SJC (Vol 2) 395. 
28 See for example the cases of: Johnne Young (1630) SJC (Vol 2) 313 and JC2/6, 667; William Jamesoun 
and another (1632) SJC (Vol 1) 201 and JC2/7 102 & 103 & 105; and James Heart (1637) SJC (Vol 2) 332. 
The varying page numbers listed for the case of William Jamesoun have been provided so that 
consultation of the case itself is easier.  
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below, that provides an indication of the meaning of chaudemella in the period under 
consideration.  
It is sometimes difficult to pinpoint the meaning of the term ‘malice’ in this 
period: the pursuers tended simply to libel slaughter committed with ‘malice’ 
without any precise explanation as to the meaning of the latter term and, based on 
the content of the criminal letters29 and evidence presented before it, the court would 
conclude whether said ‘malice’ had existed. This lack of definitional clarity could be 
taken to suggest that the lawyers of the period had not reached a complete 
consensus as to the word’s meaning.  
The present section focuses on homicide in connection with the different 
classifications that emerge from the Justiciary Court records: ‘slaughter chaudemella’, 
‘slaughter with precogitat malice’ and ‘accidental slaughter’. Thereafter, the 
evidential implications of the allegations of slaughter through the nature of the 
wound are considered. The Justiciary Court records indicate an increasing tendency 
on the part of pursuers to include ‘deadly wound’ within the libel or to mention 
expressly the location of the wound and the effect that it had on the body of the 
defunct. Prior to the 1630s, libels had not always mentioned ‘deadly wound’.30 The 
subsequent tendency to mention this concept in the ‘libel’ could be attributed to a 
change in practice. The need to prove that the wound was deadly, or, in other words, 
that the defunct had died therefrom, suggests that there existed a requirement of 
causation in all but name. The notion of ‘deadly wound’ and the requisite severity of 
the wound to secure a conviction are explored further below. 
 
B. Malice 
 
The records show that ‘malice’ had an important connection to the charge of 
‘slaughter’, simply libelled as such, in the Justiciary Court from 1625-1650. The idea 
of malice in connection to slaughter can be seen in the panel’s defences to the crime. 
It seems that the panel would allege, as a defence to slaughter, that there had been 
no malice in connection with the homicide committed and therefore that a charge of 
slaughter could not be sustained. The following section considers the different forms 
of ‘slaughter’ in descending order of gravity.  
 
i. Slaughter with Precogitat Malice 
It seems that malice was an important element in the successful prosecution of most 
cases involving a libel of ‘slaughter’. In such cases, this was referred to as ‘precogitat 
malice’, which consisted of malice borne by the panel to the defunct prior to the 
                                                 
29 The criminal letters were a central part of Scottish criminal procedure during the seventeenth 
century. The records suggest that the criminal letters consisted of a formal written accusation drawn 
up on behalf of the pursuers and served on the panel before the trial. Generally speaking, the criminal 
letters identified the panel(s) directly by name(s) and made reference to various key details: for 
instance, where and when the alleged crime took place, the circumstances of the death, and when the 
defunct died. Sometimes there was specific reference to the ‘dittay’, which seems to have been the 
substantial legal point contained within the criminal letters. However, the criminal letters would 
contain a substantial legal point even where there was no reference to the ‘dittay’. 
30 For examples of cases that do not mention the concept of a ‘deadly wound’, see Robert Buchannane 
and others (1626) SJC (Vol 1) 54 and Robert Andersone (1627) SJC (Vol 1) 69.   
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latter’s death. This could find expression through, for instance, hateful words. 
Crucially, however, this did not entail homicidal premeditation. The presence of 
‘malice’ might signify a desire on the panel’s part to injure the defunct or to do him 
or her an ill turn, but it did not, in itself, bespeak a desire to kill the defunct.  
In ‘slaughter’ cases (i.e. those cases where the term ‘slaughter’ was specifically 
used in court or the criminal letters) the pursuer had to show that some form of 
malice had occurred in connection with the homicide. This can be seen in the court 
pleadings of Thomas Bryce and another (1639). The accused in that case were charged 
with the cruel slaughter of the defunct.31 Contained within the criminal letters was 
the allegation that the panels had openly vowed an ‘evil turn’ on the defunct and to 
‘wind him ane pirne’ him.32 Given the context it seems that ‘wind him ane pirne 
[him]’ signified a threat to do the defunct a physical injury. The King’s Advocate, 
who appeared as a pursuer alongside the defunct’s mother and sisters, submitted to 
the court that the malice only applied to Thomas Bryce (the father who was then art 
and part panel with his son) and not to Robert Liddell (the other co-accused).33 
Liddell and his advocate submitted to the court that since only one strike had been 
given to the defunct, as alleged in the criminal letters, the charge of slaughter was 
not relevant to the said Robert Liddell. The defenders and pursuers then debated at 
great length the law of accomplice, namely whether Liddell’s harbouring of Bryce 
meant that he was a party to the crime and could be charged as such.34 The trial was 
‘continued’35 and does not reappear in the records for the selected period. However, 
the averment of circumstances suggestive of ‘precogitat malice’ in the criminal letters 
reflects the possibility that ‘precogitat malice’ was, at least as a general rule, a 
requirement for the successful pursuit of a slaughter charge.  
The element of ‘precogitat malice’ (i.e. malicious forethought) in connection to 
slaughter was further developed in the form of a defence invoked by panels in court. 
This is particularly apparent in the cases of Johnne Young (1630) 36  and William 
Jamesoun and another (1632).37 In these two cases the only defences provided were 
that the slaughters had not been committed with ‘precogitat malice’; the panels in 
both cases were acquitted. These two cases are now explored in detail to identify 
what, precisely, ‘no malice’ signified in connection to slaughter from 1625-1650 in the 
Justiciary Court.  
The trial of Johnne Young (1630) for the slaughter of Archibald Reid contained 
a particularly lengthy court discussion about the lack of malice.38  To, ‘clear his 
innocence’ the panel presented to the court and the assize a testimonial subscribed 
by the minister of Curmonnoche and in the name of the elders of the said Kirk and 
                                                 
31 SJC (Vol 1) 299.  
32 ibid.  
33 ibid 301.  
34 SJC (Vol 1) 299.  
35 The ‘continuation’ of a trial meant that it had been postponed. This was done by the Justice-Depute, 
usually without giving an explicit reason therefor. One reason for ‘continuing’ a case was to allow 
more time for witnesses to be called (William Andersone (1641), SJC (Vol 2) 409 and JC2/8, 122). 
‘Continued’ cases could, but did not invariably, reappear at some later date.  
36 SJC (Vol 2) 313 and JC2/6, 667.  
37 SJC (Vol 1) 201 and JC2/7, 102 & 103 & 105.  
38 SJC (Vol 2) 313 and JC2/6, 667.  
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Session.39 The ministers and elders testified that there was never malice or discord 
between the panel and the defunct.40 The panel had never uttered a word against, or 
borne any malice towards, the defunct for any cause whatsoever before his death or 
thereafter.41 The pursuers objected to the evidence submitted by the ministers and 
elders.42 Even so, the Justice-Depute allowed the evidence and the matter went 
before the assize.43 The assize returned a verdict of ‘innocent’ and acquitted Young 
of the charge of slaughter. It is unclear whether this evidence was the basis on which 
the assize acquitted the panel, but it could be argued that the absence of malice was 
a contributing factor to that outcome.  
 Likewise, in William Jamesoun and another (1632), which concerned two men 
charged with slaughter, the panels used as exculpatory evidence the fact that they 
had never borne any ‘precogitat malice’ towards the defunct or committed a previous 
felony against him and the fact that the strike inflicted upon the defunct had actually 
proceeded upon a ‘sudden passion and chaudemella’ by the father of Johnne 
Andersone.44 The case is slightly convoluted as the original entry charged William 
Jamesoun and Johnne Andersone as ‘art and part’ of this slaughter. It was then 
alleged that the father of Johnne Andersone was the one who had committed the 
strike and that William Jamesoun had only been there to witness the slaughter, 
which led the court to conclude that William Jamesoun (and also Johnne Andersone) 
could not have been art and part thereof. Clearly, in this case, ‘art and part’ liability 
for slaughter was seen to involve physical participation in the homicide. This 
seventeenth century understanding can be contrasted with later, more ‘modern’45 
conceptions of the term, according to which ‘art and part’ liability did not require 
each party involved to deliver a fatal blow or strike; rather, simply being present 
whilst the strike or fatal blow was delivered would have sufficed to render those 
present ‘art and part’. The key point to note, for present purposes, is that the assize 
in William Jamesoun and another acquitted William Jamesoun and Johnne Andersone. 
This could have been on the basis that they did not bear any malice towards the 
defunct. On the other hand, the verdict may have resulted from the allegation, made 
after the criminal letters had been drawn up, that the father of Andersone was the 
one who had committed the crime and that he had not been charged in the criminal 
letters. Thus, there are at least two possible explanations for the assize’s decision. 
Regardless, it can at least be said that the panel’s defence placed great emphasis on 
the absence of malice. In addition, this case can be seen to reinforce the distinction 
between ‘precogitat malice’, on the one hand, and a sudden passion (or chaudemella), 
on the other. The latter term is discussed below in relation to ‘slaughter chaudemella’.  
                                                 
39 ibid.  
40 ibid. 
41 ibid. 
42 ibid. 
43 ibid. 
44 SJC (Vol 1), 201 and JC2/7 102 & 103.  
45 This reference to ‘modern’ ‘art and part’ liability is to Sir Baron Hume’s treatise: Commentaries on the 
Law of Scotland. For a fuller discussion of ‘art and part’ liability, see D Hume, Commentaries on the Law 
of Scotland (2nd edn, Bell and Bradfute 1819), i, 273. For a more current understanding of ‘art and part’ 
see the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, s 293.   
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Later in the period under review, panels began to invoke not only the defence 
of a lack of malice but also that of the lack of a deadly wound. This was the case in 
James Heart (1637),46 in which the panel was charged with slaughter for giving a 
‘cruel and unmerciful’ deadly strike to the defunct.47 What follows in the court 
records is a rather elaborate discussion between the advocates and the Justices about 
the nature of the wound and the alleged ‘precogitat malice’ on the part of the panel. 
The panel contended that there had been no malicious discord and argued that, as 
such, he could not be accused of slaughter; further, he argued that he had not 
inflicted a mortal wound upon the defunct. 48  The Justice, having read and 
considered the ‘exceptions and duplyis’ made by the panel and the pursuer’s 
answers, found the criminal letters relevant and remitted them to the trial of an 
assize. The assize returned a verdict of ‘clean’ and ‘innocent’ and ‘acquit[ted]’ Heart 
of the slaughter. The assize would have been present in court when the panel, 
advocates and pursuers were making their arguments. Given the assize’s reliance on 
the criminal letters,49 it seems likely that the defence put forward by the panel, to the 
effect that there had been no ‘precogitat malice’ in connection to the slaughter, was a 
key reason for the acquittal.  
 This indicates that ‘slaughter’, when specifically libelled, tended to involve 
‘precogitat malice’ between the parties. If the panel could put to the court, in defence, 
that he or she had not harboured such malicious sentiments towards the defunct, 
there would likely be an acquittal. The above cases indicate a focus on a ‘precogitat 
malice’ in the sense of prior discord between the panel and the defunct, as opposed 
to forethought or planning of the actual killing. This is important to the internal 
classification of slaughter but even more important to the distinction between 
murder and slaughter. What appears to be the case, in connection to the libel of 
‘slaughter’, is that ‘precogitat malice’ consisted of hostile behavior or words towards 
a person; whether this had to occur immediately prior to the violent act leading to 
death is unclear. This can be compared with murder, explored in more detail below, 
whereby a specific circumstance would be libelled in connection to the killing from 
which premeditated homicidal intent could be inferred.  
 
ii. Slaughter Chaudemella 
‘Slaughter chaudemella’ was a different libel from ‘slaughter with precogitat malice’. In 
John Bell (1643),50 which concerned a charge of slaughter, the advocate stated that 
‘our auld law and practik’ distinguish between slaughter that is ‘chaudemella’ and 
murder ‘per precogitatam malitiam’, and that the crime of slaughter ‘without 
forthought fellony’ was of a different nature from slaughter ‘per precogitatam 
malitiam’.51 This case follows the classifications that were put forward in William 
Jamesoun and another (1632),52 which suggest that there were two principal ways in 
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48 SJC (Vol 2) 339.  
49 See n 29.  
50 SJC (Vol 3) 582.  
51 SJC (Vol 3) 586.  
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which slaughter could be libelled: that which was chaudemella and that which was 
precogitatam malitiam (characterised by prior malice). The former term is not defined 
in the Justiciary Court records. However, the Act of 1372 defines ‘chaudemella’ as 
‘the heat of anger’, and ‘forthought felony or murder’ as a ‘certain and deliberate 
purpose’.53 From the court discussion, and with reference to the statutory material, it 
seems that ‘slaughter chaudemella’ involved a culpable killing but one that lacked 
‘precogitat malice’. In other words, the term chaudemella seems to have referred to a 
killing committed in ‘hot blood’.  
 
iii. ‘Accidental Slaughter’  
Towards the end of the period under consideration, certain panels alleged that there 
had been no malice and that the killing had, in fact, been accidental. This 
classification seemed to indicate a special, exceptional category of ‘slaughter’, 
distinguishable from ‘slaughter with precogitat malice’. Williame Watsone (1639) 
concerned the alleged slaughter of Niniane Calderwoid. The panel and his advocates 
stated that if the defunct had been slain, as was alleged in the criminal letters, then it 
had been done ignorantly and without any ‘foirthoucht fellonie or precogitat malice 
borne towards’ the said defunct.54 The Justices continued the diet until 3 June. They 
ordered letters to be directed for the summoning of witnesses who would be able to 
attest to, ‘the verritie and the form and manner of the said slaughter’.55 Interestingly, 
the Justices accepted the declaration made by the panel and his advocates 
concerning the ‘maner and sudane accident’. It is unclear whether the above 
statement by the accused was meant to imply that he was only guilty of ‘accidental 
slaughter’, or if he was attempting to exculpate himself completely. Unfortunately, 
the case was ultimately deserted because of the Justices’ absence.  
There is only one case in which ‘accidental slaughter’ was specifically libelled. 
The pursuers in James Mathiesone (1640) alleged the ‘rashe and accidental’ slaughter 
of the defunct by causing stones to roll off of Edinburgh castle.56 The defunct was 
playing at the foot of the hill and was killed by the falling rocks. Mathiesone was 
convicted and banished. Mathiesone can be contrasted with Watsone, as the pursuer in 
the former case averred that the slaughter occurred because of accidental 
circumstances; the criminal letters only alleged ‘accidental’ slaughter. In Mathiesone, 
it seemed that there was genuinely no malice on the part of the panel. Still, he was 
not blameless in the eyes of the court, for the ‘rashe’ conduct libelled in connection to 
the slaughter ultimately led to his conviction and banishment. It is quite likely that 
the term ‘rashe’ here referred to the carelessness and negligence of his actions.  
The above cases illustrate the importance of distinguishing between libels and 
defences in ‘slaughter’ cases. The libel in Mathiesone expressly stated that the 
slaughter was ‘accidental’; the libel in the first case considered (Watsone) was simply 
one of slaughter, the panel attempting to prove that it was accidental by way of 
defence. As such, the case of Watsone is particularly illustrative of the distinction 
between ‘slaughter with precogitat malice’ and ‘slaughter without precogitat malice’ 
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54 SJC (Vol 1) 305 and JC2/8, 76.  
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(or ‘accidental slaughter’). It demonstrates that ‘slaughter’ was generally understood 
to be ‘slaughter with precogitat malice’; hence a successful conviction of slaughter 
usually required the pursuer to prove that there had been a precogitat malicious 
relationship. A panel’s argument, by way of defence, that the slaughter had been 
committed accidentally meant that he or she was attempting to obtain an acquittal, 
as in Watsone, or at least a more lenient sentence, as in Mathiesone.  
 
iv. Conclusions 
The above discussion on malice allows for certain conclusions to be drawn regarding 
the classification of slaughter. The first concerns the central importance of the 
criminal letters in the classification of the crime. It seems that the criminal letters 
needed to be very specific to the circumstances surrounding the crime of slaughter. 
One such circumstance that tended to be alleged by pursuers was the mental state of 
‘precogitat malice’. This thinking in advance seemed to have been connected to 
specific conduct, for instance hostile behaviour or words between the panel and 
defunct. Besides the central case of ‘slaughter with precogitat malice’, there appear to 
have been two other ways in which slaughter could be libelled: ‘slaughter 
chaudemella’ and ‘accidental slaughter’. 
 It could be that slaughter, more generally, was used as a term for homicide. 
This was alleged by Grant in his study of the sixteenth century.57 On that broad 
view, murder was simply a form of ‘slaughter’. Still, it remains to be considered 
what distinguished murder from ‘slaughter’ in the narrower sense of the word.  
As explored in section 3 (below), murder, like slaughter, entailed an element 
of thinking in advance. The important conceptual distinction between slaughter and 
murder was the fact that, in the latter case, the forethought concerned the act of 
killing itself, whereas the concept of forethought associated with slaughter 
(‘precogitat malice’) related to a more general, non-homicidal manifestation of 
hostility. However, it would potentially be an overstatement to argue that all cases of 
murder and slaughter in the early seventeenth century were distinguishable in that 
manner.  
The other types of slaughter besides ‘slaughter with precogitat malice’ can be 
referred to collectively as ‘slaughter without precogitat malice’. This category of 
slaughter sub-divides into ‘slaughter chaudemella’, which probably concerned a 
spontaneous, emotionally-fuelled killing not in any way prefigured by feelings of 
malice, and ‘accidental slaughter’, which, as the name suggests, encompassed cases 
in which there had not been any homicidal intent at all, premeditated or otherwise.  
  
C. Nature of the Wound 
 
The nature of the wound was an important aspect of the evidential burden 
associated with the prosecution of slaughter from 1625-1650. This section of the 
article examines three terms used to describe the injury inflicted by the defunct: 
namely, ‘diverse strikes’, ‘cruel strikes’ and ‘deadly wound’. It considers to what 
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extent, if any, these features of the pleadings bore upon the classification of 
slaughter.  
 
i. ‘Cruel’ Strikes in Connection to ‘Slaughter with Precogitat Malice’  
As discussed above, the main type of slaughter was that committed by ‘precogitat 
malice’. It could be that the way in which malice was inferred was through the use of 
the word ‘cruel’. In Jon Sagery (1625), the earliest case in the period selection, the 
panel was charged with the slaughter of Helene Thomestune by ‘severall crewall 
strikes’.58 The case was ‘continued’, and does not appear again in the period under 
review. The use of the term ‘cruel’ in connection to the strike can, however, be 
explored in a later case.  
In Margaret Dannills and another (1627),59 the panels were charged with the 
‘cruel slaughter’ of the defunct. 60  It was alleged in the criminal letters that the 
slaughter was committed by means of strikes to the defunct’s head, back and side 
and one cruel strike inflicted by one of the panels.61 The panels argued that the 
criminal letters were not relevant because of the way in which the strikes were 
libelled.62 The criminal letters did not give a clear impression as to who had given the 
cruel strike that caused the death of the defunct. They simply stated that, ‘one cruel 
strike was given by the panel’, causing confusion as to which of the panels had 
committed that specific act. This detail seems to have influenced the assize in its 
decision to acquit both Dannills and Bell. 
It is suggested here that the use of the term ‘cruel’ in relation to the injury 
inflicted was indicative of ‘precogitat malice’ towards a person; if the pursuer libelled 
a ‘cruel’ strike it would be possible for the court to infer from that word the 
allegation of malice. This follows from Armstrong’s suggestion, made in his study of 
medieval Justiciary Ayre cases, that the use of the word ‘cruel’ was meant to signify 
‘wickedness or mal-intent’.63  
 
ii. Diverse Strikes 
There are two cases in which the pursuers alleged that so-called ‘diverse strikes’ had 
been sustained by the defunct. ‘Diverse strikes’ were strikes given to several parts of 
the body rather than one part. The case of Peter Balmanno and others (1626) records 
the slaughter of the defunct by, ‘dyuers straikis ane grevous wound (…) in his breist, 
shoulderis, heid, bak, bellie and dyuers utheris partis of his body and thairby 
bruiseing and breaking his intrall and noble paris uithin him’:64 a rather detailed 
description of the location of the wound and the effect that it had on the body. This 
focus on the frequency of the strikes can also be seen in the case of Thomas Hunter 
and another (1627), in which the panels were charged with the slaughter given by 
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‘duyers deidlie strikies’. 65  This aspect of ‘diverse strikes’ may have featured 
prominently in the pleadings but it does not seem to have been a requirement for a 
successful conviction of ‘slaughter’.  
 
iii. Deadliness of Wound 
In slaughter cases, one aspect of the pursuer’s evidential burden was to prove that 
the strike(s) inflicted upon the defunct had been ‘deadly’ or, in other words, that 
they had caused the latter’s death. In Thomas Crombie and others (1625),66 it was 
alleged that the panel had slaughtered the defunct by striking him on his right arm. 
The court examined the nature of the wound libelled and the implications that this 
had on the panel’s culpability. The defunct had been struck with a short sword on 
his right arm and had died the following day.67 The panel refuted the libel, stating 
that the criminal letters were not relevant because they had not libelled the injury as 
a deadly wound. A doctor appeared before the court to give evidence that the 
wound was not lethal. Counsel for the pursuers, however, submitted to the court 
that, although the wound had not been deadly, the libel was still relevant because 
the panels gave the defunct a ‘crucial’ strike, resulting in a wound that became 
deadly. Given the context of the pursuers’ allegations it seems that they were 
attempting to illustrate that the ‘crucial’ strike was fundamental in causing the death 
of the defunct. The panels were found innocent of the charge of slaughter.68 It is 
possible that the initially non-deadly nature of the wound was what convinced the 
assize of their innocence. Clearly, the failure to libel, and subsequently prove in 
court, a deadly strike would have cast into doubt whether the panel had brought 
about the defunct’s death. 
The ‘deadly wound’ issue that featured in Crombie was one of causation in all 
but name. Interestingly, the facts of this case seem to suggest that the strike libelled 
could, under the modern ‘but for’ test,69 be deemed to have caused the defunct’s 
death. In other words, but for the strike, the defunct would not have died of a 
wound that became deadly; indeed, there would not have been a wound in the first 
place. This raises the question as to what was needed for a wound to be deemed 
causal in the seventeenth century. Seemingly, the wound would have only been 
deemed causal if it had been (1) sufficient, on its own, to bring about the defunct’s 
death and (2) sufficient at the time of infliction. The case of Thomas Crombie certainly 
supports that supposition, suggesting that a wound that was not deadly on its own, 
but which led to death later on (perhaps because, to give a hypothetical example, it 
became infected), would not have been deemed causal of the defunct’s death.  
 The trial of the panel in Johnne Young (1630) for the slaughter of Archibald 
Reid contained a lengthy court discussion about the nature of the wound and the 
defunct’s subsequent death.70 The panel alleged that the criminal letters were not 
relevant, ‘to pass to the knowledge of the assize’, as the strike was libelled to have 
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been inflicted on the defunct’s ‘schakill’, which can probably be interpreted as 
referring either to the defunct’s wrist or ankle.71 In either case, then, the blow had 
clearly not been directed at a vital part of the body.72 After the alleged strike, the 
defunct had been able to continue his ordinary work as a smith, ‘communing with 
his cronies, binding, staking and his other ordinary efforts up and down the 
country’, and he, ‘never lay bedfast all that time’, until shortly before his death, 
which was caused by a fever.73 The pursuers answered that the libel was relevant 
and argued that, ‘[although] the schakill bane [was not] a vital part’ of the body, ‘life 
consists [of] all (…) parts of the body’.74 The panel countered that when any man 
survives for forty days after a wound it cannot be presumed that he died thereof.75 
The defunct had lived for four or five months after the strike,76 and so easily satisfied 
this ‘forty day’ test. The panel was subsequently acquitted.  
 The cases of Young (1630) and Crombie (1630) make for a worthwhile 
comparison. In each, any prospect of conviction was thwarted by the lack of a 
deadly wound. The fact that both cases seemed to fail on that basis becomes 
interesting when one remembers that the defunct in Crombie survived for 
considerably less time (one day) than the defunct in Young (several months). In 
Crombie, the inference that the wound was not deadly was probably bolstered by the 
presence of medical evidence, which seemed to weigh compellingly in favour of a 
non-deadly wound, hence acquittal. By contrast, in Young, where the defunct 
survived for a much longer period, the evidence prayed in aid was of a much less 
specialised variety. For instance, the panel argued that the defunct had been able to 
continue his daily activities, notwithstanding his wound. Otherwise, however, the 
cases are very similar. Both essentially concerned causation and the inference that 
the wound inflicted had not been sufficient, on its own, to bring about the defunct’s 
death.  
 Several cases subsequent to the two discussed above started to include a 
‘deadly strike’ in the libel and to detail the location of the wound and the effect that 
it had had on the defunct, as shown in Table 2 below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
71 According to the Dictionary of Scots Language (hereinafter the ‘DSL’) the schakill was ‘a fetter for 
the ankle or wrist of a prisoner.’ ‘DSL’ <www.dsl.ac.uk/entry/dost/schakill_n> accessed 22 July 
2016.  
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Case Nature of stroke Verdict 
William Hangetsides 
(1632)  
‘deadly strike’ past simpliciter77  
James Wright (1632) 
‘deadly strike in the 
breast’ 
acquit  
Andro Grahame (1632) ‘deadly strike’  convicted  
Jon Waterstony and 
others (1632) 
‘deadly strike in his 
breast, bellie and sydies 
breaking of his internal 
and noble parts’ 
past fra78 
James Balfour (1632) 
‘deadly strikes hurting 
and wounds upon his 
breast, sides, bellie’  
deserted  
George Linly (1632) 
‘deadly and cruel strike in 
his body and upon his 
sidies and his head’ 
past simpliciter  
James Jonston and 
another (1634) 
‘deadly wounds in his 
head, breast, bellie and 
sides’ 
continued (i.e. does not 
appear again in period 
under review). 
Mr Gavin Dunbar and 
another (1637) 
‘cruel and deadly strikes 
in his head and under 
parts of his body’ 
continued 
Thomas Stott (1643) ‘cruel and deadly strike’ convicted  
~TABLE 2 – SHOWING THE CASE LIBELS TO INCLUDE THE WORDS ‘CRUEL’ AND/OR ‘DEADLY’ 
IN THE CHARGING OF THE PANEL.  
 
It seems that it was simply not enough to allege that the strike given had been cruel: 
the pursuer had to show that the wound had been deadly or, which amounts to the 
same thing, that the panel’s strike had caused the defunct’s death. If the pursuer 
failed to show this, or the panel provided evidence suggesting that the wound 
inflicted had not been deadly, there were several possible outcomes: the assize 
would acquit the panel; the case would be deserted entirely by the Justices; or the 
pursuer would agree to ‘past fra’.79 
 A detailed exploration of the evidence needed to show the deadliness of the 
wound was again illustrated in the case of Janet Corsair (1641). The panel was 
                                                 
77 ‘Past simpliciter’ was one of the verdicts returned by the Justiciary Court in homicide cases from 
1625-1650. According to the DSL, ‘simpliciter’ meant ‘simply, without qualification or condition being 
placed upon the event described; without further restriction’ (‘DSL’ 
<www.dsl.ac.uk/entry/dost/simpliciter> accessed 4 November 2016). Both the verdict of ‘past fra’ 
(see n 78 below) and that of ‘past simpliciter’ indicated that the pursuits had been dismissed. 
However, the verdict ‘past simpliciter’ seemed to differ from ‘past fra’ in indicating that the court, as 
against the pursuers, had decided to cease pursuit of the case.  
78 ‘Past fra’ was one of the verdicts returned by the Justiciary Court in homicide cases from 1625-1650. 
It seems, from the reading of the records, that a verdict of ‘past fra’ occurred when the pursuer agreed 
to forgo pursuit. The DSL does not define this verdict, nor do the records.  
79 See ibid.  
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charged with the cruel slaughter of James Johnstoun, an eight-year-old boy, by 
gripping him on his two ears and casting him with great force to the ground 
whereupon she gave him strikes with her hands, fists, knees and feet.80 The panel 
alleged that, though libelled as ‘deadly’, the strikes allegedly inflicted upon the child 
could not have been deadly as the child survived for six months after the alleged 
incident. Several witnesses were presented, who verified that two or three months 
after the incident the child was walking about in as good health as, ‘if not better’ 
health than, he had been in prior to the incident; these circumstances were deemed 
incompatible with the infliction of a mortal wound.81  
The panel also alleged that, a month after the incident, a great sickness of pox 
had raged for months among the children of Leith and Edinburgh, but that this child 
had subsequently managed to recover therefrom.82 Implicit in this statement was the 
argument that the child would not have survived the pox had the wound been 
deadly.83 The panel also presented to the court a surgeon called Patrik Johnstoun, 
who had visited and attended to the child before his death. He gave evidence that 
the child had died of another cause, namely the fluxes.84 The court continued to 
examine the issues of relevancy of defence witnesses to be called and ultimately 
acquitted the panel of the slaughter. The panel was able to prove to the court that the 
original wound was not deadly; hence a libel of the crime of slaughter was 
unsustainable. Clearly, the appearance of an expert witness, namely the 
aforementioned surgeon, would have facilitated that conclusion. Like Crombie and 
Young, the case of Corsair indicates the importance of connecting the panel’s 
wrongful conduct with the defunct’s subsequent death.  
  
D. Conclusions 
 
The above discussion shows that the nature of the wound was very important to a 
charge of slaughter. Firstly, it becomes apparent, from the prosecution of slaughter 
in all its sundry forms, that the pursuers had to prove that the wound had been 
‘deadly’. If, however, the panel could provide evidence to the contrary, the case 
would be deserted or the panel acquitted by the assize. The need for a ‘deadly’ 
wound was very much linked to causation. The pursuer had to prove that the 
defunct’s death had resulted from the wound inflicted upon him or her. The notion of 
a ‘cruel’ strike was very different: it was a circumstance from which malice could be 
inferred, hence it was specifically related to the mental element of ‘slaughter with 
precogitat malice’. In determining whether ‘malice’ had been present, some of the 
cases relied upon the wording of the criminal letters and the details therein of a cruel 
and deadly strike, while other cases relied on the testimony of witnesses to prove 
that there had been some form of hostile discourse between the panel and the 
defunct (as explored above). Finally, the term ‘diverse strikes’ was sometimes used 
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to describe injuries to multiple parts of the body. ‘Diverse strikes’ do not, however, 
seem to have been a requirement for a successful conviction of slaughter. 
It is important to consider what relevance, if any, the above three 
characteristics of a wound (‘deadly wound’, ‘cruel strikes’ and ‘diverse strikes’) had 
to the classification of ‘slaughter’ and the three different forms thereof. Clearly, the 
notion of a ‘cruel strike’ had great classificatory significance in distinguishing 
‘slaughter with precogitat malice’ from the other two types of slaughter. From the 
presence of so-called ‘cruel’ strikes could be inferred ‘malice’, and from ‘malice’ 
could be inferred ‘slaughter with precogitat malice’. Certainly, the notion of ‘diverse’ 
strikes was similar to ‘cruel’ strikes in its clarification of the nature of the wound, but 
the former does not seem to have played a classificatory role; it did not relate to a 
distinctive mental element. Finally, though the notion of ‘deadly’ wound was very 
significant, given that ‘deadliness’ was necessary for a conviction of ‘slaughter’, it 
was arguably not of classificatory significance. It related, essentially, to causation, 
and so, being a requirement that applied to all forms of ‘slaughter’, was not a 
particularly useful point of classification. It follows that the nature of the wound was 
relevant to the classification of ‘slaughter’ in some, but by no means all, respects.  
 
 
3. The Crime of Murder  
 
A. Overview of Findings 
 
This article suggests that, to sustain a charge of murder in the Justiciary Court, as 
distinct from a charge of slaughter, the Justices and assize needed to be convinced 
that the panel’s act had been intentional and deliberate. Here the notions of ‘intent’ 
and ‘deliberation’ referred specifically to homicidal forethought (or ‘aforethought’). In 
other words, to be guilty of murder, the panel must not merely have harboured 
hostile sentiments towards the defunct prior to the act of killing (‘precogitat malice’), 
but must have planned the killing itself. Such a specific, technical understanding of 
‘intent’ is to be distinguished from ‘intent’ in the loose sense of the word. For 
instance, whereas someone who kills another in a spontaneous rage can, to the 
modern layperson, be understood to have acted with ‘intent’, such a killer would not 
have been deemed to have acted with ‘intent’ for the purposes of a ‘murder’ charge 
in seventeenth century Scotland.  
In ‘murder’ cases, the intent or deliberate purpose preceding the homicidal 
act was not libelled by express mention of aforethought in the criminal letters; 
instead, this was done indirectly, by libelling in connection to murder certain 
circumstances from which deliberate conduct could be inferred. These circumstances 
included treason, killing in a relationship of trust, ‘unnatural’ killing (e.g. where a 
mother killed her child), or killing by stealth (e.g. at night or by poison).  
Treasonable murder started to be libelled and classified as murder ‘under 
trust’ in the latter part of the period under review. Here the word ‘treasonable’ did 
not refer to betrayal of one’s country, but betrayal of a person; it concerned the 
scenario where the panel and defunct had been in a relationship of trust and the 
panel had betrayed that trust by killing him or her. A homicide where the defunct 
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had been under the trusted credit, assurance and power of the accused would have 
amounted to an aggravated form of murder known as ‘treasonable’ murder. The 
difference between ‘treasonable murder’ and ‘murder under trust’ was 
inconsequential; these were essentially different terms for the same crime.  
The following study is arranged to show the classification of the 
aforementioned types of murder, each of which corresponded to the particular 
circumstance suggestive of ‘deliberate’ killing.  
 
B. Murder under Trust and Treasonable Murder 
 
The concepts of ‘treasonable murder’ and ‘murder under trust’ were 
indistinguishable. Consequently, the mere fact that the latter term became more 
commonly used will not, in itself, have effected a drastic change to this area of the 
law. In Andro Rowane (1627), the panel was charged with the ‘treasonable murder’ of 
Euphame Douglas, his spouse. It was put to the court that contained in an Act of 
Parliament was the rule that, ‘if a party is slain under trust, credit, assurance or 
power of the slayer he shall be put to death for the crime’.85 As the defunct had been 
the lawful spouse of the panel, he was considered to have, ‘most cruelly and 
unnaturally under her trust and his power murdered her’.86 This can be compared 
with the case of Jon Jamesone (1628), wherein the panel was charged with the ‘cruel 
murder and slaughter’ of his spouse by giving to her a cruel and deadly strike.87 
Jamesone was put to the knowledge of the assize, which returned a verdict of 
‘culpable’ and convicted him of the ‘horrible murder of his spouse’.88 Thus, despite 
the similar facts with which Rowane and Jamesoun were concerned, the approach to 
the legal question was slightly different: notably, the panel in the latter case was not 
charged with treasonable murder. Still, it is significant to note that the assize 
convicted him of the ‘horrible murder’ of his spouse. The conviction of murder, as 
against slaughter, was likely a reflection of the fact that the defunct had been the 
panel’s spouse and, consequently, that the two had been in a trustful relationship.  
These two cases also show the divergence of the statutory law and the law of 
homicide in practice. The aforementioned Act of Parliament states that:  
 
(…) where the party slain is under the trusted credit, assurance and power of 
the slayer, all such murder and slaughter to be committed in time coming 
after the date hereof, the same being lawfully tried and the person dilated 
found guilty by an assize thereof, shall be treason, and the persons found 
culpable shall forfeit life, lands and goods.89 
 
This seems to indicate that ‘treason’, rather than ‘murder’, should have been libelled 
in the cases just discussed. It is likely that the first case of Rowan was libelled as 
‘treasonable’ as a result of the reading of this statute. It could also be the case that 
‘murder under trust’ indicated a circumstance that aggravated the libel of murder.  
                                                 
85 APS III 45, c 34, RPS 1587/7/44.  
86 SJC (Vol 1), 73 and JC2/6, 437.  
87 JC2/6, 513. 
88 ibid. 
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 This was certainly the case in Walter Urquhart and others (1642), in which the 
panels were charged and found culpable and guilty of the crime of, ‘treasonable, 
barbarous and cruel murder under trust and friendship’ of the defunct.90 This case 
links the notion of ‘treasonable murder’ with that of ‘murder under trust’. 
 
C. Murder by ‘Unnatural’ Circumstances 
 
Several murder cases in the period under review involved a mother killing her infant 
child. Most importantly, however, the term ‘child murder’ or ‘infanticide’ was not 
used in the Justiciary Court records. Instead, this crime was termed the ‘unnatural 
murder and destruction’ of an infant. It is not clear why this violation of the 
maternal bond was placed into the special category of murder by ‘unnatural 
circumstances’, and not simply deemed another form of ‘treasonable murder’ or 
‘murder under trust’. 
 Three of the ‘unnatural circumstances’ cases discussed below involved a 
mother killing her infant child to conceal adultery. This is not the only instance of 
the word ‘unnatural’ being used in connection with the classification of murder: as 
discussed above, Andro Rowane (1627) was alleged to have, ‘most cruelly and 
unnaturally [murdered his wife] under her trust and his power’.91 What is meant by 
the word ‘unnatural’ is unclear, but given its use in the five cases below and the case 
of Rowane, it seems to have indicated the violation of a relationship of the utmost 
sanctity, of which the two paradigms were spousal and parental.  
 
Case Year Citation Charge 
Jonet M’Craith 1626 SJC (Vol 1) 47 
‘horrible 
murthour’ 
Christiane 
Hamilton 
1634 JC2/7, 305 
‘unnatural murder 
and destruction’ 
Margaret M’Linle 1634 JC2/7, 317 
‘cruel and 
unnatural murder 
and destruction’ 
Margaret 
Cunningham 
1642 SJC (Vol 2) 532 
‘cruel and 
unnatural murder' 
Jonet Campbell 1644 JC2/8, 383 
‘cruel murder and 
slaughter’ 
Jonet Jonstone 1644 JC2/8, 388 
‘cruel and 
unnatural murder' 
Margaret 
Chalmers 
1648 SJC (Vol 3) 768 
‘cruel murder, 
death and 
destruction’ 
~TABLE 3 – SHOWING CASES INVOLVING THE KILLING OF AN INFANT CHILD BY ITS MOTHER. 
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The cases of Hamilton, M’Linle, Cunningham and Jonstone mentioned in Table 3 all 
used the phrase ‘unnatural murder’ in relation to the killing of an infant child. This 
terminology was used in three of the seven cases of homicide committed to conceal 
adultery. The case of Campbell deviates from that pattern. Despite the use therein of 
the phrase ‘cruel murder and slaughter’ to describe the killing of an infant, the facts 
of this case did not involve a killing intended to conceal adultery. The case of 
Chalmers also differs from the others in its use of the phrase ‘cruel murder, death and 
destruction’ to describe a mother’s killing of her infant child in an attempt to conceal 
adultery. From Campbell and Chalmers it would seem that the term ‘unnatural’ was 
replaced by ‘cruel’ in the mid-1640s.  
  These six cases are notable for the absence of defence counsel. Although these 
were not the only cases in the period under review where no advocate appeared to 
defend the panel, this appears to have been a relatively rare occurrence, accounting 
for roughly 20 per cent of the homicide cases considered in this article.92 It has been 
suggested by Wasser that it was common for a person accused of a crime before the 
Justiciary Court to have an advocate present.93 This is plausible in the light of the 
Parliamentary Act of 1424, which required judges to appoint counsel to ‘poor men 
free of charge’, although Wasser has suggested that this was likely intended for civil 
suits.94 The various auld laws, practicks, treatises and Acts of Parliament, passed 
before the 1424 Act, concerning legal representation were either ambiguous in their 
scope or mentioned civil cases only when referring to aid being given to a 
defender.95 By the beginning of the seventeenth century, it was probably common 
for a person accused of a crime before the Justiciary Court to be represented by an 
advocate.96 In 1587, an Act of Parliament stipulated that no advocate or prolocutor 
should be stopped, in Parliament, from appearing, defending, or reasoning on behalf 
of a person accused of treason or otherwise.97 Thus, even in the case of a very serious 
criminal charge (treason), the accused could avail himself or herself of an advocate. 
Against this backdrop, the lack of legal representation in cases involving infanticide 
is particularly marked.  
In each of the six cases mentioned above, the woman on trial confessed 
judicially to the killing of her child, and was thereafter capitally punished. It is 
unclear whether the lack of defence counsel contributed to the women’s convictions; 
it is, conversely, possible that it was their confessions that accounted for the absence 
of advocates in the first place. It is also unclear whether the confessions were 
obtained through the use of torture, as the records do not indicate as much.98 One of 
these cases, however, states that a woman confessed in the avowed hope that God 
                                                 
92 In other words, between 1625 and 1650, 164 cases were decided. Of these, a mere thirty-six did not 
feature an advocate (including the six aforementioned cases on infanticide).  
93 See generally M Wasser, ‘Defence Counsel in Early Modern Scotland: A Study Based on the High 
Court of Justiciary’ (2000) 26 JLH 183.  
94 ibid. 
95 Wasser, ‘Defence Counsel’ (n 93) 184.  
96 ibid 183.  
97 APS III, 443, c 16, RPS 1587/7/26.  
98 B Levack, 'Judicial Torture in Scotland during the Age of Mackenzie’ in H L MacQueen (ed), 
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would show mercy.99 Thus, some confessions were possibly motivated not simply by 
the fear of torture, but by heartfelt religious sentiment.  
 
D. Murder by Stealth  
 
The commission of homicide by stealth, or in the darkness of night, could 
successfully lead to the prosecution of a charge of murder. This scenario arose in the 
case of Johnne Myller and another (1636), wherein the panels were charged with 
‘murder under night’ by giving six or seven cruel and deadly strikes to the sleeping 
defunct on his head.100 This aspect of stealth was also evident in the case of Robert 
Walker and others (1642), in which the panel killed the defunct ‘under silence and 
cloud of night’.101 According to the libel, the defunct was sent from her house at 
night by her husband, Robert Walker, to a neighbour’s house for a pint of ale. She 
was then shamefully and cruelly strangled to death by that neighbour, David 
Grahame. He did so under the order of Robert Walker and David Grahame’s wife, 
Margaret Grahame. It was alleged that Robert had committed adultery with 
Margaret; had been called before the Session of the Kirk of Montrose for the adultery 
previously; and had planned the killing of his wife to prevent her from revealing the 
adultery.102 All three conspirators were found guilty of murder ‘art and part’. This 
case indicates a clear, deliberate purpose; indeed, ‘forethought’ was specifically 
mentioned in the libel.  
 
E. Conclusion 
 
For a successful conviction of murder to be brought in the Justiciary Court, the 
Justices and assize had to be convinced that there had been some ‘intent’ or 
deliberate purpose underlying the killing. This was done by including in the libel a 
reference to such circumstances as treason, unnatural killing and killing by stealth 
(e.g. at night or by poison). Treasonable murder was murder aggravated by the 
betrayal of a trustful relationship between the panel and defunct. It was aggravated 
in the sense that the homicide would be libelled as murder but could also lead to a 
charge of treason under the statutory law. The term was used in the Justiciary Court 
records at the beginning of the period under review but seems later to have been 
superseded by the term ‘murder under trust’.  
Most cases do not explicitly indicate when and how ‘forethought felony’ 
played a part in the murder. In this, the practice of the prosecution of murder in 
1625-1650 might have differed from the statutory law discussed above.103 However, 
the circumstances by which murder was termed and libelled seem to indicate an 
intent or deliberate purpose behind the homicide. Invoking such a deliberate 
purpose seems to have been sufficient to import a ‘forthought felony’ in connection 
with the murder – the key element of a successful prosecution. It should be stressed 
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that the nature of the forethought associated with murder was specifically homicidal 
in character; it signified that the panel had not only borne malice towards the 
defunct, in advance of the killing (‘precogitat malice’) but had planned to kill him or 
her.  
To some extent, the seventeenth century notion of ‘murder’ was similar to the 
older, more restrictive understanding of the term as secret killing specifically.104 This 
is particularly apparent from the aforementioned importance of murder by stealth. 
Also, it might be hazarded that some of the other categories of murderous killing, for 
instance ‘unnatural killing’ of an infant child, were also, incidentally, committed in 
secret. However, the existence of multiple circumstances from which murderous 
‘intent’ could be inferred is suggestive of a broader definition of ‘murder’ than one 
associated solely with secret killing.  
 
 
4. The Libel of ‘Murder and Slaughter’? 
 
A. Overview of Findings 
 
Several records refer to charges of both ‘cruel slaughter and murder’.105 This double 
charge has not received scholarly exploration and has been disregarded in the index 
and introduction to the printed Justiciary Court records.  
Usually, the cases in which the panel was charged with both ‘murder and 
slaughter’ concern homicide in circumstances which, for reasons explored 
immediately below, were potentially indicative of an intentional, premeditated 
killing. Two key examples of these circumstances were killings committed at night 
and killings committed in the context of hospitality. It thus becomes slightly unclear 
why the double charge of ‘cruel slaughter and murder’ was libelled in these cases 
rather than just ‘murder’. Perhaps this was done so that the pursuer had a higher 
chance of securing a conviction. Apprehensive as to whether he or she would be able 
to sustain a charge of murder, the pursuer may, quite plausibly, have libelled 
‘slaughter’ in the alternative.  
This impression seems particularly credible given the importance of the 
criminal letters and the fact that the cases would be deserted if a pursuer only 
libelled one charge but failed to prove it. As discussed above, just over 47 per cent of 
the ‘murder and slaughter’ cases were libelled as the cruel ‘murder and slaughter’ of 
the defunct.  
                                                 
104 See text to nn 11-16.  
105 This double charge appeared in the following cases: Hary Gordoun (1627), JC2/6, 400; Walter 
Jamesone (1628), SJC (Vol 1) 4 and JC2/6, 477; Jon Jamesone (1628), JC2/6, 513; David Quahte (1629), 
JC2/6, 523; Williame Lennox and another (1635), JC2/7, 522 ; James Grant (1635), JC2/7, 629; David Robert 
and others (1637), JC2/8, 8; James Spalding (1637), JC2/8, 38; James Donaldsone (1638), JC2/8, 40; James 
Graham (1640), SJC (Vol 2) 399 and JC2/8, 107; William Anderson and others (1641), SJC (Vol 2) 409 and 
JC2/8, 122; William Fraser (1641), SJC (Vol 2) 443 and JC2/8, 151 & 155; John Morrison and others (1642), 
SJC (Vol 3) 524 and JC2/8, 213 & 225; Laurence Mercer and others (1643), SJC (Vol 3) 564; John Bell 
(1643), SJC (Vol 3) 582; Johnne Bell (1644), JC2/8, 374; Johnne Campbell (1644), JC2/8, 384; Patrick 
Meldrum (1646), SJC (Vol 3) 726; James Urquhart (1646), SJC (Vol 3) 728; Margaret Lamber (1646), SJC 
(Vol 3) 731; Thomas Calander (1647), JC2/8, 544; and Alexander Milne (1649), JC2/8, 667. 
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The libelling of specific circumstances in connection with the killing in the 
cases explored below (e.g. the fact that it was committed at night, in the context of 
hospitality, or in violation of a trustful relationship), was probably intended to infer 
the ‘intention’ or deliberation necessary for a conviction of murder.  
 
B. Homicide Committed by Stealth 
 
The previous section on murder suggests that a charge of murder would be 
successfully prosecuted if the killing appeared, on the evidence, to have been 
committed by stealth. In the case of William Lennox (1635), the panel was charged 
with the ‘cruel murder and slaughter’ of the defunct, which was committed ‘under 
night’.106 The fact that the homicide was committed ‘under night’, hence covertly, 
seemed to indicate that murder, as against mere slaughter, could be inferred from 
the circumstances. The outcome of the case is unknown as it was ‘continued’ and did 
not appear again in the period under review. It seems likely that this was done 
merely as a safeguard to increase the chances of conviction. This also happened in 
the case of James Donaldson (1638), where the assize dropped the charge of murder 
(from the double charge of ‘murder and slaughter’) and returned a verdict of 
‘slaughter’. The circumstances of that case are explored further below.  
 
C. Homicide Committed in Such Contexts as Hospitality  
 
In William Andersone and others (1641), the panels were accused of being guilty, ‘art 
and part of the cruel slaughter and murder’ of William Davidsone.107 The pursuers 
alleged that the panel and defunct were dining together when, at some point, they 
‘fell out in evil words’.108 The case was eventually deserted for the lack of an assize. 
However, the fact that the panel and defunct were friends and were dining together 
seemed to indicate circumstances from which homicidal ‘intent’ could be inferred, 
which, had there been an assize in place to decide on the matter, would have been all 
too propitious for a charge of murder. This seems particularly credible when 
consideration is paid to the expectations, particularly those of honour and good 
behaviour, that hospitality tended to engender in the early-modern period.  
 Hospitality can be understood as, ‘preponderantly a private form of 
behaviour, exercised as a matter of personal preference within a limited circle of 
friendship and connection’.109 One of the earliest uses of the term ‘law of hospitality’ 
was in Philip Sidney’s, The Countess of Pembroke’s Arcadia, which promoted good 
behaviour towards strangers.110 William Heale, who wrote against wife-beating in 
1608, stated that, ‘none who entered into [the house of another], should for the time 
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of his aboad there, suffer any kind of injury upon any occasion’. 111  Stair also 
mentions the, ‘laws of hospitality’ as, ‘the mutual trust between the host and the 
guest, whom he has willingly received in his house, whereby neither of them can act 
anything prejudicial to the life or liberty of the other, while in that relation’.112 At the 
beginning of the early-modern period, the elite became preoccupied with hospitality, 
in particular the perceived need to show honour through the household and to 
provide guests with good entertainment.113  
 Hospitality would thus infer a friendly, trusting relationship that imported 
certain societal and behavioural norms within the period under review. The above 
case does, however, describe a ‘sudden and passionate exchange’ between the 
defunct and the panel. Given the classification of slaughter and murder above, this 
description could mean that there was doubt that the circumstances of the case 
would sustain a successful charge of murder or even slaughter ‘with precogitat 
malice’, given the difference between ‘precogitat malice’ and chaudemella (discussed 
above). As such, it is possible that the pursuers charged ‘slaughter and murder’ in 
the criminal letters in an attempt to straddle the uncertain classificatory boundary 
between those two crimes.  
This case of Andersone and others can be compared with the case of John Dick 
and others (1649), in which it was alleged that the panel committed the cruel murder 
of the defunct by, ‘poisoning him, under trust and friendship’ within Dick’s 
household.114 With great repentance and remorse, the panel confessed judicially to 
the killing in the manner specified in the criminal letters. The friendship between the 
panel and the defunct implied a relationship of trust, the violation of which by 
poisoning was all the more heinous for having occurred within the panel’s 
household. This aspect of hospitality and friendship seems to have facilitated the 
inference that the killing was the product of forethought and premeditation, hence 
the unequivocal characterisation thereof as ‘murder’ rather than ‘murder and 
slaughter’.  
  
D. Homicide Committed in the Context of a Trustful Relationship 
 
As mentioned above, the dual charge of ‘murder and slaughter’ seems to have 
featured in the Justiciary Court records of 1625-1650 because it increased the 
pursuer’s chances of obtaining a conviction, an impression that is further reinforced 
by the case of James Donaldson (1638). Here the panel was charged with both ‘cruel 
murder and slaughter’, committed by giving a ‘terrible and deadly strike’ to the 
defunct, and also with adultery, 115  although the latter charge can, for present 
purposes, be considered irrelevant. The assize returned a verdict of ‘culpable’ and 
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convicted James Donaldson of ‘slaughter and adultery’,116  thereby dropping the 
charge of murder and only returning a verdict of ‘guilty’ on the ‘slaughter’ charge. 
There is no indication as to why the assize returned that verdict, as only the criminal 
letters were relied upon and no extra evidence was produced. However, based on 
the classification of murder proposed hitherto by this article, it could be argued that 
the assize returned a verdict of ‘slaughter’ alone because the pursuers had failed to 
aver a relationship from which intentional, premeditated (hence murderous) killing 
could be inferred.  
Conversely, ‘deliberate’ or ‘intentional’ killing was potentially present in the 
case of Thomas Calander (1647), wherein the panel was charged, and found culpable 
of, the ‘murder and slaughter’ of his son-in-law.117 This would suggest that the 
circumstances of the homicide, namely the trustful relationship between the defunct 
and panel, were potentially enough for a successful prosecution of ‘murder’. This 
certainly differs from the case of Donaldson and is more in keeping with the above 
cases wherein the only charge was ‘murder’. This calls into question why the 
pursuers included both charges of ‘slaughter’ and ‘murder’. Perhaps this was done 
for fear that the tie between father-in-law and son-in-law was not as close as, say, 
that between father and son or husband and wife, hence too weak a basis on which 
to ground a charge of murder.  
 
E. Conclusions 
 
The records do not make it completely clear why some cases were libelled as 
‘murder and slaughter’. However, the likely explanation is that this double charge 
would have given the pursuer a better chance of securing a conviction in more 
borderline cases, where there was some uncertainty as to whether a murder 
conviction would be successful.   
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
From the present survey of the Justiciary Court records, a number of conclusions can 
be drawn regarding the early seventeenth century Scottish notion of unlawful 
killing.  
 The cases considered indicate a division of the law of homicide into 
‘slaughter’ and ‘murder’. For a successful prosecution of murder or ‘forethought 
felony’, in the Justiciary Court, the pursuer had to convince the court that the killing 
had been committed in circumstances from which a ‘certain and deliberate purpose’ 
could be inferred.118 This was made clear by a statute enacted in 1372.119 The above 
cases of murder illustrate that there tended to be an absence of explicit written 
confirmation of when and how ‘forethought felony’ had played a part in the 
homicide. However, the specific circumstances libelled in connection to the murder, 
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for instance treason, ‘unnatural circumstances’ and covert killing, seem to have been 
included to signal the presence of ‘forethought felony’: that is, a deliberate and 
premeditated intention to kill the defunct. The criminal letters relied upon by the 
pursuers, the nature of the terminology included therein, and the circumstances in 
the libel were a reflection of what was required to obtain a successful conviction of 
murder.  
 A tentative suggestion can be made regarding the historical context of the 
‘murder’ cases considered in this article and what role they might have played, if 
any, in the wider development of the Scots law of homicide. As mentioned in the 
introduction, the pre-seventeenth century conception of ‘murder’ was, for many 
years, defined narrowly in terms of secret killing.120 By the eighteenth century, the 
‘murder’ concept had been liberalised into the notion of premeditated killing per se. 
Considering this article’s focus on the seventeenth century, it is only fitting to ask: 
what happened in the interim? What inferences might be drawn regarding the 
development of homicide in the period 1625-1650? From the cases considered, it is 
clear that murder did not, by the first half of the seventeenth century, consist 
exclusively of ‘secret killing’. ‘Secret killing’ was certainly one of the circumstances 
that would give rise to an inference of ‘forethought’ but it was by no means the only 
circumstance. On the other hand, the seventeenth century concept of ‘murder’ was 
arguably not one of premeditated killing per se, given pursuers’ tendency to plead 
specific circumstances (for instance treason and killing by stealth) from which 
premeditated intent might be inferred. This could be taken to suggest that ‘murder’ 
had not yet completely freed itself from the strictures of the old, more rigid 
understanding of that term, and that the seventeenth century conception thereof was 
possibly not as wide as it would become in the eighteenth century. What conclusion 
might be drawn from this development? Quite possibly, the seventeenth century 
could be seen to represent an intermediate stage in a broader trend: namely, the 
liberalisation of the ‘murder’ concept. Equally, however, this may simply be taken to 
indicate that the notion of ‘murder’ was in flux during the seventeenth century and 
that the lawyers of the time had not yet agreed on a definition. Regardless, more 
scholarly exploration of the prosecution of crime in the seventeenth century could 
shed light on this particular issue.  
Besides ‘murder’, the other key form of ‘homicide’ considered in this article 
was that of ‘slaughter’. The term ‘slaughter’ could, in turn, be sub-divided into 
‘slaughter chaudemella’, ‘slaughter with precogitat malice’ and ‘accidental slaughter’. 
The prosecution of slaughter entailed the use of evidence regarding the nature of the 
wound. Pursuers ultimately had to allege and prove that the wound was deadly and 
inflicted maliciously. This was either done directly through the production of 
witness testimony (in court) or by referring to the wording of the criminal letters, 
which would detail whether the strike was given cruelly; was deadly; and included 
diverse strikes. The judicial preoccupation with the nature of the wound concerned 
causation; the pursuers had to show that the defunct’s death had resulted from the 
wound inflicted by the panel.  
                                                 
120 See text to nn 11-16.  
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In some sense, the precise meaning of the term ‘slaughter’ is difficult to 
pinpoint. ‘Slaughter with precogitat malice’ was not the only form of slaughter; there 
was, in addition, ‘slaughter without precogitat malice’, which, in turn, sub-divided 
into ‘slaughter chaudemella’, relating to culpable killing in the heat of the moment, 
and ‘accidental slaughter’. Since it was used as a label for different crimes, it is hard 
to give the term a consistent, concrete meaning. As a term applicable to all three of 
those crimes, the term ‘slaughter’ was perhaps simply a convenient ‘catch-all’ 
referring to all culpable killing short of ‘murder’.  
One of the more fruitful comparisons that can, based on the above survey, be 
drawn is that between ‘murder’ and a specific type of ‘slaughter’, namely ‘slaughter 
with precogitat malice’. In a broad sense, the two crimes were very similar. Both 
‘slaughter with precogitat malice’ and ‘murder’ entailed the killing of another 
coupled with some element of malicious forethought on the part of the killer. The 
terms ‘forethought felony’ and ‘precogitat malice’ both related to some sort of 
premeditation, which poses the questions: Were some forms of ‘slaughter’ simply 
‘murder’ by a different name? Were the differences between ‘forethought felony’ 
(associated with murder) and ‘precogitat malice’ (associated with slaughter) merely 
linguistic, rather than conceptual; more apparent than real? In fact, it was in this 
fundamental similarity between murder and ‘slaughter with precogitat malice’, 
namely the shared notion of killing preceded by some element of forethought, that 
the two crimes also seemed to differ in a fundamental way. With murder, malicious 
forethought consisted of a premeditated desire to kill the defunct. Contrariwise, the 
notion of malicious forethought associated with ‘slaughter’ (‘precogitat malice’) 
seemed to consist of an antecedent course of dealings, which, while suggestive of 
prior ill-will and animosity towards the defunct on the part of the killer, did not 
indicate that the killing had been planned. At least to that extent, ‘slaughter’ did not 
simply refer to all unlawful killing less serious than ‘murder’; it had a positive, 
coherent definition in its own right.  
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